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THE AUCKLAND SMELTING COMPANY 
 
Abstract: Mining in the Tui portion of the Te Aroha field was revived 
in 1948 by Benjamin John Dunsheath, a small businessman who had owned 
several private companies, none of them very successful, in a career marked 
by dubious business ethics. To develop the Tui mines he was assisted by 
others, only some of whom had mining skills. After defeating opposition from 
those concerned about possible pollution, prospecting, mostly for base metals, 
proceeded with reportedly encouraging results. In contrast to the success he 
anticipated from both mines and his planned smelting works, mining 
officials were much more cautious.  
To develop the ground, Dunsheath formed the Auckland Smelting 
Company, an under-capitalized company whose directors and shareholders 
lacked mining experience. Consequently, he obtained advice from outside 
experts and sought assistance, especially financial, from a mostly reluctant 
Mines Department, which considered the area worth prospecting but did not 
share his optimism. Most of the development was focused on driving a new 
level (no. 5) to strike the reefs, but because of inadequate preliminary surface 
and underground testing arguments arose about its correct direction, which 
would lead to the departure of their skilled mine manager, Bert McAra, 
especially after he was asked to provide misleading samples ‘for propaganda 
purposes’. Because by 1953 the results were disappointing and the reef had 
not been struck because the crosscut was being driven in the wrong direction, 
further government subsidies were refused, and in mid-year all work ceased 
after the company, despite several increases in its capital, ran out of money. 
Overseas capital was sought but was not interested.  
This company was an illustration of how not to mine an area lacking 
easily accessible high quality ore. With inadequate capital and inadequate 
prior prospecting, it struggled to develop its ground, and to attract investors 
and government assistance Dunsheath relied on providing incomplete and 
sometimes false information, causing ructions amongst the directors and 
disapproval from officials. Its collapse was inevitable from the start. 
 
PROSPECTING THE TUI DISTRICT  
 
Although mining in the Tui district ceased in the late nineteenth 
century, desultory prospecting continued, given extra impetus by the 
2 
Depression.1 In May 1948, Harold James Samuel Bassett, who had 
prospected, unsuccessfully, in this district at the end of the 1930s,2 was 
granted a prospecting license over 35 acres in the Tui district.3 Five months 
later, in giving supporting evidence for Benjamin John Dunsheath’s 
application for a special quartz claim that included the old Tui and 
Champion claims, he described himself as a metallurgist managing 
Dunsheath’s Auckland factory. ‘Have had considerable experience in 
smelting operations. Have prospected area’. Bassett explained their plans 
for opening up the lode but despite assuring the warden there would be no 
pollution did not know what treatment would be suitable.4 He claimed to 
have ‘known the district’ for 70 years.5 
 
BENJAMIN JOHN DUNSHEATH 
 
Bassett’s employer, Dunsheath, would be the leading figure at Tui for 
several years to come. He was born in August 1887, in Sheffield, England, 
to Hugh, a manufacturing silversmith and cutlery manufacturer.6 In 1913, 
when aged 24, he married Jeannie McKinlay, 12 years his senior; born in 
Dunedin, she had met him when visiting England.7 They moved to New 
Zealand six years later.8  
In July 1920 Dunsheath was elected to the Wellington Chamber of 
Commerce.9 In the following May he advertised himself as being the sole 
                                            
1 See paper on the Depression years. 
2 See paper on prospectors and investors in the Te Aroha Mining District in the 1930s. 
3 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Register of Applications 1934-1961, 3/1948, BBAV 11505/2a; 
Register of Mining Privileges 1933-1972, folio 105, BBAV 11500/5a, ANZ-A. 
4 Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Warden’s Notes of Evidence at Hearing held on 11 August 
1948, 6/1948, B.J. Dunsheath File 1948-1949, BCDG 11289/4a, ANZ-A. 
5 Te Aroha News, 13 August 1948, p. 5. 
6 Death Certificate of Benjamin John Dunsheath, 7 August 1972, 1972/28704; Marriage 
Certificate of Benjamin John Dunsheath, 21 December 1945, 13719/1945 [old microfische 
index], BDM. 
7 Birth Certificate of Jeanie McKinlay, 1877/16606, BDM; Marriage Certificate of Jeanie 
McKinlay, October-December 1913, ancestry.co.uk; Death Certificate of Jeannie 
Dunsheath, 28 September 1945, 1945/21620, BDM. 
8 Death Certificates of Jeannie Dunsheath, 28 September 1945, 1945/21620; Benjamin 
John Dunsheath, 7 August 1972, 1972/28704, BDM. 
9 Evening Post, 20 July 1920, p. 2. 
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agent in New Zealand for ‘the Porter Safety Seal’, which protected against 
pilfering and tampering.10 Two years later he formed a private company, 
B.J. Dunsheath Ltd, with a capital of £2,000 in £1 shares, of which he held 
1,500 and his wife 500. Its objects were ‘To carry on the businesses of 
manufacturers’ representatives, indent agents, importers, dealers, and 
general incidental’.11 Dunsheath was managing director of a firm that 
advertised it could provide ‘Mechanical and Electrical Equipment, Tool 
Steels, Alloy Steels, Machine Tools, Engineers’ and Artisans’ Tools’.12 In 
August 1923 its tender of £2,727 to supply plate girders for a section of the 
Napier to Gisborne railway line was accepted.13 In April 1924, it offered an 
office and strong room in central Wellington for lease.14  
Occasionally during the 1920s there was another shareholder in 
addition to Dunsheath and his wife. After it was resolved in March 1930 to 
increase the capital to £3,500, there were four shareholders: Dunsheath 
with 1,750, his wife with 750, and Charles Mayes Graham, an Auckland 
engineer, and John Ernest Hardey, a Wellington engineer, with 500 each. 
Early in 1932, the company’s office moved to Auckland,15 where Dunsheath 
had settled. In May, Keep Bros Ltd of Birmingham took action in the High 
Court in Auckland against the company. It deposed that ‘at divers dates and 
times and in particular since the month of May 1931’ the company had 
purchased machinery for which it owed £522 2s 8d. In addition to seeking 
judgment for this amount, it wanted another £52 4s, being the cost of 
exchange involved in remitting this sum to England. In the absence of any 
defence being provided by the company, it must be assumed that Keep Bros 
won their case.16 Also in that year Charles Mayes Graham sued Dunsheath 
for £500 and costs because he had not fulfilled the agreement they had 
signed in July 1929 whereby Graham would be employed on condition he 
was given 500 fully paid-up shares and, should he resign, Dunsheath was to 
purchase these, but when Graham did resign, he did not do as promised. As 
Dunsheath neither filed a statement of defence nor appeared in court, he 
was ordered to pay £461 in damages and £40 19s in costs for shares 
                                            
10 Advertisement, Evening Post, 19 May 1921, p. 3. 
11 Evening Post, 10 May 1923, p. 8. 
12 Company Files, CO-WW 3445, no. 269, ANZ-W. 
13 New Zealand Herald, 6 August 1923, p. 6. 
14 Advertisement, Evening Post, 26 April 1924, p. 2. 
15 Company Files, CO-WW 3445, no. 269, ANZ-W. 
16 Auckland High Court, Action Files, BBAE A48/5041, A124/1932, ANZ-A. 
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Graham stated were valueless.17 At the beginning of August the remaining 
shareholders resolved that as the company ‘cannot by reason of its liabilities 
continue its business’ it would be wound up.18 The final meeting of the 
company was held in December 1935.19 
By July 1925 Dunsheath was the New Zealand representative of the 
British Manufacturers and Agents’ Association, which sought preference for 
British goods.20 In the following February he was elected one of three 
representatives of ‘Electrical and Machinery’ to the council of the New 
Zealand Association of British Manufacturers and Agents, immediately 
becoming its acting vice-president; in December he was elected vice-
president.21 In 1926, as a member of the ‘British Engineers’ Association’, he 
wrote to the press praising British engineering practices. ‘In the British 
engineering shops is found probably more practical craftsmanship than in 
any foreign workshops. English and Scottish engineering firms possess 
indisputable reputations for designing and building intricate mechanical 
equipment’. After describing ‘the average British mechanic’ as being ‘highly 
skilled, possessing very wide experience obtained in pattern shop, foundry, 
and as both general turner and fitter’, he explained American success in 
producing cars as ‘mass production, attractive “finish,” and salesmanship’.22   
Appropriately, therefore, during 1926 he became the New Zealand 
representative for four British firms: Fry’s, the Foster Instrument 
Company, Duncan, Stewart and Company, and Lacy-Hulbert and 
Company.23 Two years later the Hardy Patent Pick Company sued him for 
possession of chattels plus damages of £200; he counter-claimed for the 
same amount, being ‘damages for alleged wrongful entry and removal’.24 In 
June 1928 he offered his warehouse in Allen Street, Wellington, for lease.25 
Two months later, when his firm was selling an air compressor and had 
                                            
17 Auckland Supreme Court, Action File: Charles Mayes Graham of Auckland Engineer v. 
Benjamin John Dunsheath, Auckland, Engineer, BBAE A48/5014, box 105, A215/1932, 
ANZ-A. 
18 Company Files, CO-WW 3445, no. 269, ANZ-W. 
19 Company Files, CO-WW 3445, no. 269, ANZ-W. 
20 Evening Post, 12 February 1926, p. 10. 
21 Evening Post, 12 February 1926, p. 10, 15 February 1926, p. 11, 2 December 1926, p. 6. 
22 Letter from B.J. Dunsheath, Evening Post, 21 June 1926, p. 10. 
23 Press, 14 July 1926, p. 10; Evening Post, 19 October 1926, p. 9. 
24 Supreme Court, Evening Post, 3 February 1928, p. 9, 26 October 1928, p. 11. 
25 Advertisement, Evening Post, 23 June 1928, p. 2. 
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other machinery for sale, the address was no longer a street address but a 
post office box.26 In February 1929, when his address was given as the 
National Dairy Buildings, Thorndon Quay, he offered a ground floor and 
office for rent.27 In July 1929, his tender of £1,335 to provide three portable 
air compressors for the Auckland tramways was successful.28 When selling 
a sawmilling plant, a kerosene engine, and steam/oil/gas electrical 
generators in 1930 he had addresses in both Auckland and Wellington.29 
After January 1931, his address was Auckland alone; during that year he 
sold Climax Rock Drills and the Lanz Crude Oil Tractor.30 
The Dunsheath Machinery Company was formed in Auckland in 
September 1932 to take over his existing business as importer, dealer, 
trader and engineer in all types of machinery. A private company, its sole 
shareholders were Dunsheath and his wife, he with 250 shares and she 
with the remaining 750 after he transferred 250 to her in January 1933. He 
was managing director; Jeannie was both the other director and the 
company secretary. She resigned in 1943, a consequence of a stroke she 
suffered several years before her death in the Auckland Mental Hospital in 
1945.31 Three months later, in Christchurch, Dunsheath married Elizabeth 
Dewes (later D’Ewes) Torlesse Pritchett, aged 38, 16 years his junior; they 
promptly had a son.32 His second wife became a director also, along with 
Noel von Batenburg (who did not use the ‘von’), born in 1922,33 an 
Aucklander variously described as a salesman, a company manager, and an 
engineer, who was the only other shareholder in the 1950s. In 1957, 
                                            
26 Advertisement, New Zealand Herald, 6 August 1928, p. 2. 
27 Advertisement, Evening Post, 12 February 1929, p. 3. 
28 New Zealand Herald, 31 July 1929, p. 12. 
29 Advertisements, New Zealand Herald, 21 January 1930, p. 2, 12 July 1930, p. 4; 
advertisement, Evening Post, 21 June 1930, p. 4. 
30 Advertisements, New Zealand Herald, 8 January 1931, p. 2, 7 April 1932, p. 3. 
31 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A; New Zealand Herald, 19 
September 1932, p. 5; Death Certificate of Jeannie Dunsheath, 28 September 1945, 
1945/21620, BDM; Death Notice, Auckland Star, 28 September 1945, p. 1. 
32 Birth Certificate of Elizabeth Dewes Torlesse Pritchett, 18 February 1908, 1908/3095; 
Death Certificate of Elizabeth D’Ewes Torlesse Dunsheath, 1993/49521; Marriage 
Certificate of Benjamin John Dunsheath, 21 December 1945, 13710/1945; Birth 
Certificate of David Hugh John Dunsheath, 7686/1946 [microfische index], BDM. 
33 See Death Certificate of Noel von Batenburg, 1993/28668, BDM; Probates, BAZZ 1570, 
469/1993, ANZ-A; Evening Post, 15 December 1938, p. 24 [as Noel Batenburg]. 
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Dunsheath had 2,990 shares, his wife ten, and Battenberg 1,000 until 
selling these to Dunsheath in the following year. The capital, £3,000, was 
all paid up by the 1950s.34 Its letterhead in the 1940s described its 
members as ‘Engineers, Compressed Air Engineers, and Machinery 
Importers’:  
 
Machinery Equipment for Foundries Engineers Mines Mills 
Quarries Roadmaking Contractors Builders Meat Works Dairy 
Factories Railways Shipping Harbours Brickworks Garages 
Woodworking Lifting Conveying Etc, Etc. Gas Welding 
Equipment. New & Rebuilt Machine Tools. We have over 14,000 
items of surplus machinery & plant - send your enquiries - also 
notify us regarding your surplus equipment.35 
 
As an illustration of how the company was not very profitable, in 
August 1936, when Francis Chapman Sons and Deeks Ltd, of England, sued 
for £196 16s 9d, a solicitor was unable to trace Dunsheath, who did not file 
a statement of defence and therefore lost the case by default. Interest and 
costs made a total of £208 18s 6d to be paid.36 In late 1936, after this 
company moved to wind up Dunsheath Machinery, it withdrew its petition, 
presumably because its claim had been met. A debenture issued in July 
1938 was to be repaid, with interest, by October, but was not repaid until 
May 1945. Another debenture was issued in 1947 to the National Bank, to 
which two Auckland sections were mortgaged in that year. Dunsheath 
provided £2,000 in new capital in September 1949, but three months later 
mortgaged land at Te Aroha owned by the Auckland Smelting Company for 
£2,900.37 In October 1952, after the company had paid only £495 0s 10d of 
£3,387 0s 1d owed to Armstrong Whitworth and Company (Pneumatic 
Tools) Ltd, of Newcastle-on-Tyne, the latter won its case for payment of 
£2,920 17s 8d.38 In 1957 the Bank of New Zealand served a writ on the 
                                            
34 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
35 Letterhead on B.J. Dunsheath to C.H. Benney (Under-Secretary, Mines Department), 6 
December 1948, Mines Department, MD 1, 10/27/124, ANZ-W. 
36 Auckland High Court, Action Files, BBAE A48/5041, box 192, A121/1936, ANZ-A. 
37 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377, no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
38 Auckland Magistrate’s Court, Civil Cases 1952, BBAE 10246/201a; Auckland High 
Court, Action Files, BBAE A307/5527, box 2, ANZ-A. 
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company, the details of which have not survived,39 presumably because the 
money owing was paid.  
Under a February 1958 agreement with the third director, Batenburg, 
who intended to form a new company, Plant and Machinery, Dunsheath 
undertook not to sell machinery within 50 miles of the main Auckland post 
office for five years. Seven months later, Dunsheath agreed to sell his 
company to Batenburg for one shilling. The March 1959 balance sheet 
revealed that only £346 16s 10d had been earned, and its interest in the 
Auckland Smelting Company, theoretically worth £3,000, was valueless. By 
1960, when Dunsheath Machinery had no funds, Dunsheath decided to 
liquidate it once he was certain there were no claims outstanding.40 Because 
of what he described as Plant and Machinery’s ‘dilatory acts’, liquidation 
was delayed.41 At the beginning of 1965 he planned at some time in the 
future ‘to recommence business with Company’,42 but a year later it was 
taken over by Batenburg, as trustee for Plant and Machinery Ltd, and 
liquidated.43 As no records of Plant and Machinery have been located, it is 
not known whether Dunsheath was associated with it. 
Dunsheath formed a variety of other companies. In 1935, he formed 
another private one, Sheffield Silversmiths, to ‘deal in jewellery and 
incidental’, with a capital of just £100; he held a quarter of the shares and 
Jeannie held the remainder.44 Audiovision Ltd, also a private one, was 
established in 1949 to manufacture and import electronic industrial 
machinery, with Dunsheath and John Watson Muir Baxter, an electrical 
engineer, as sole directors.45 In 1950, of the 10,000 £1 shares Dunsheath 
had 5,000, Dunsheath Machinery had 2,000, and Baxter had 3,000. In the 
following year, Baxter sold his interest to Dunsheath, who transferred 100 
shares to his wife. She still held these in 1953, but by then Dunsheath had 
                                            
39 Auckland Supreme Court, Action Files, BBAE 5041/583, A115/1957, ANZ-A. 
40 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
41 B.J. Dunsheath to District Registrar of Companies, 4 April 1961, Company Files, BADZ 
5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
42 B.J. Dunsheath to District Registrar of Companies, 29 January 1965, Company Files, 
BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
43 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
44 Auckland Star, 13 April 1935, p. 4. 
45 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1446 no. 16269, ANZ-A; B.J. Dunsheath to William 
Sullivan (Minister of Mines), 3 November 1953, Mines Department, MD 1C, 5/4/282, 
ANZ-W. 
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sold 7,600, retaining only 300; Radio Heaters of New Zealand and two other 
shareholders held the remaining shares, now totalling 13,000. In 1956, it 
was wound up upon the petition of a creditor, American Donuts (NZ) Ltd.46  
In 1952, Dunsheath established Radio Heaters of New Zealand, 
another private company formed to sell scientific and electrical equipment. 
At first he was the sole director, but three years later his wife became the 
other one, Dunsheath holding 480 of the 500 shares. His only other 
occupation listed was as director of Dunsheath Machinery.47   
In 1953 he was in conflict with the Dominion Glass and Sandblasting 
Company, a private company formed in 1951 that ceased business three 
years later, when Dunsheath Machinery had been asked to sell its plant.48 
According to Dunsheath, but not according to the Companies Office files, he 
owned it.49 The company had been ‘led to believe’ that Dunsheath 
Machinery ‘had sold the Outfit but now when we ask for the money Mr 
Dunsheath says it is not sold. On examination of the Plant at Mr 
Dunsheath’s Store we find several parts missing’, leading to it threatening 
legal action to recover its money.50 Action was finally taken in April 1956, 
when the company declared that in October 1953 it had delivered its plant 
to Dunsheath’s company with verbal instructions to sell its plant ‘for the 
price of £500.0.0. clear of all commission and agency charges but with the 
further additional instruction’ that before a sale was completed approval 
must be obtained. As Dunsheath Machinery had not informed it about a 
sale, Dominion Glass was ‘unaware whether the Defendant has sold the 
aforesaid machinery or not’. If it had been sold, it sought an order directing 
payment of £500 plus interest. For once, four months later Dunsheath 
produced a ‘statement of defence’, claiming that in February 1954 Dominion 
Glass left the machinery and plant ‘in premises formerly occupied by the 
Plaintiff and sold to Plastikpax’. Dunsheath, who was to sell the goods for 
£450 and receive a commission of £10 ‘per centum’, claimed to have 
informed it that nothing had been sold apart from a sandblasting cabinet 
and insisted that he had always been willing to return the remainder, 
which ‘had no commercial value whatever’. No judgment was recorded on 
                                            
46 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1446 no. 16269, ANZ-A. 
47 Company Files, BAEA 5181, no. 27208, ANZ-A. 
48 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1001 no. 7043, ANZ-A. 
49 B.J. Dunsheath to William Sullivan, 3 November 1953, Mines Department, MD 1C, 
5/4/282, ANZ-W; Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1001 no. 7043, ANZ-A. 
50 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1001 no. 7043, ANZ-A. 
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the file or in the press;51 had the dispute been settled out of court, possibly 
by the return of the machinery and plant? 
In February 1954, Dunsheath and his wife were the sole shareholders 
of Plastikpax Ltd, another private company; he held three-quarters of the 
2,000 £1 shares.  It was established to import and export any type of 
material, to be founders, toolmakers, engineers, machinists, stampers, 
welders, electroplaters, and manufacturers of and dealers in plastics, and to 
be consulting engineers and chemists.52 In 1962 its letterhead described it 
as ‘Carton Packaging Specialists’.53 In the mid-1950s, Harold Charles 
Pomeroy, an accountant, was its secretary as well as being secretary of 
Dunsheath Machinery.54 In September 1965, Lawrence John Boyer became 
secretary, but resigned in the following February. Two months later, he 
informed the district registrar of companies that he ‘was not satisfied with 
the manner in which it was run, and I have not received a penny to this 
day, for the services which I rendered’. As Dunsheath would ‘not concede to 
acknowledge my resignation in writing’ he was obliged to inform the 
registrar himself.55 Two days after this letter was written, and one month 
after Eric Russell was recorded as being his replacement, the latter wrote to 
the registrar: 
 
The registration of my name as secretary of the company was 
effected without my knowledge or consent and to the best of my 
knowledge a general meeting was never held nor any resolution 
passed to the effect of appointing me secretary. 
In fact, I take strong exception to this high-handed and arrogant 
action of the managing director taking such a step as in view of 
the extremely questionable, and I would go as far as to say illegal 
acts which occur in this company, I would never under any 
circumstances agree to be appointed secretary. I have no doubt 
that these acts also extend to the companies under the same 
management – named Ipiana Ltd and Dunsheath Machinery Co 
Ltd and there could be others. 
                                            
51 Auckland Supreme Court, Action Files, BBAE 5041/552, A153/1956, ANZ-A. 
52 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1487 no. 16638, ANZ-A. 
53 See letterhead on B.J. Dunsheath to District Registrar of Companies, 3 December 1962, 
Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, ANZ-A. 
54 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1377 no. 5758, box 1487 no. 16638, ANZ-A. 
55 L.J. Boyer to District Registrar of Companies, 11 April 1966, Company Files, BADZ 
5181, box 1487 no. 16638, ANZ-A. 
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I would, therefore, request that my name be removed as secretary 
as urgently as possible with a note that the registration was 
effected without my knowledge or consent.56 
   
(Ipiana Company is not recorded in the Companies Office files; clearly 
it was another of Dunsheath’s private companies.) An example of 
questionable behaviour was its two shareholders agreeing at the annual 
general meetings in 1957, 1958, and 1959 not to appoint an auditor. After 
another man was secretary for almost a year, from April 1967 to September 
1968 Dunsheath’s wife, Elizabeth, held this post. The company’s 
indebtedness declined from £1,489 1s in June 1956 to nothing in 1959; in 
1960 another 500 shares were issued, to their son, then aged 14.57 Two 
years later 1,250 shares were issued to three non-family members and 
Dunsheath took up 600. A petition to wind up the company was lodged by a 
creditor in May 1966, withdrawn two months later, but lodged again by the 
same person in June the following year; another creditor petitioned for the 
same purpose in the same month. It did not operate after 1967, and in 
October 1968 went into voluntary liquidation; in July the following year its 
assets were valued at $677.83.58 
Another private company with a similar name was formed in 1961: 
Plastikpax Sachets Ltd, which made customized packaging. Dunsheath and 
his wife were the directors, its capital being only 500 £1 shares. In 1967 it 
changed its name to Plastikpax Shoo Ltd because ‘sachets’ was misleading 
as its main product had become plastic curtains.59 
In August 1956, Harold Gordon Reading, a retired bank manager, 
made a claim against Dunsheath, whom he described as ‘a dealer in 
machinery and a company promoter’. He stated that in June the previous 
year Dunsheath had offered to sell 1,000 fully paid up shares in Flexipac 
Auckland Ltd for £1,000, claiming this company had the sole right to 
manufacture certain plastic containers. Dunsheath assured him that its 
English parent company, Flexipac Ltd, had sold the New Zealand rights to 
Flexipac Auckland, which in addition to having the ‘sole and exclusive 
                                            
56 Eric Russell to District Registrar of Companies, 13 April 1966, Company Files, BADZ 
5181, box 1487 no. 16638, ANZ-A. 
57 Birth Certificate of David Hugh John Dunsheath, Births, 7686/1946 [microfische index], 
BDM. 
58 Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 1487, no. 16638, ANZ-A. 
59 Company Files, BAEA 5181, no. 27208, ANZ-A. 
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rights’ had all the machinery required and were ‘the only people in New 
Zealand’ able to print on P.V.C. plastics. As all these statements turned out 
to be ‘false and untrue’, Reading had demanded the cancellation of their 
contract and the return of his £1,000, which had not been done. After noting 
that the shares had no value, he requested the court to set the contract 
aside and require Dunsheath to pay him £1,250. As Dunsheath did not file a 
defence, he must have lost the case.60 On the same day in 1956 as this claim 
was filed, Freshfields Ltd of Auckland, manufacturers’ representatives and 
importers, made an identical claim, noting in addition that it had taken up 
the shares in response to Dunsheath’s newspaper advertisement. Once 
again, Dunsheath filed no defence, and must have lost the case.61  
In May 1957, Dunsheath took action against Flexipac Auckland Ltd, of 
which he was managing director and manager from December 1954 to 
December 1956, when he became its manager until dismissed in the 
following April. He sued for payment of promissory notes totalling £800 
issued on 1 March 1956, plus interest. Flexipac described him as ‘the 
majority shareholder in, and the virtual controller of’, Audiovision, 
Plastikpax, Dunsheath Machinery, and Radio Heaters of New Zealand, the 
activities of all these companies being ‘similar to and/or accessory to the 
activities carried on by the Defendant Company’. Dunsheath on behalf of 
himself or these companies made contracts with Flexipac without disclosing 
his interests in these companies. It had been ‘induced the said Promissory 
Notes by the fraudulent misrepresentation of’ Dunsheath, who had 
informed it (in February 1956) that the cost of converting a ‘stepped gallery’ 
in an Auckland building into three offices for the company would cost 
£1,000, which was false, as he knew. On 31 July 1956, by resolution of the 
board he was required to produce details of the costs of the machinery and 
goods supplied, but had not done so, and as he had ‘ignored disobeyed or 
failed to comply with directions and requisitions lawfully made to him’ it 
wanted him to produce these details in court and to be required to pay 
damages, being any profits he had made from the company. Not till October 
1957 did Dunsheath inform it that he did not hold the documents sought, 
having posted them to ‘the person entitled to the same’; as for other 
documents, he claimed these were privileged because they related to his 
dealings with his solicitor. The company informed the court that it did not 
hold the documents because of a fire in February that year as well as some 
                                            
60 Auckland Supreme Court, Action Files, BBAE 5041, A357/1956, ANZ-A. 
61 Auckland Supreme Court, Action Files, BBAE 5041, A358/1956, ANZ-A. 
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being sent to others or removed by unauthorized people. No decision was 
recorded for the hearing held in October 1957, but it cannot have favoured 
Dunsheath.62 
Dunsheath died in 1972, four days short of his eighty-fifth birthday.63 
As he had not made a will, presumably he had little to leave to his widow 
and friends after his years of struggling, sometimes unethically, to make a 
living from unprofitable small private companies. 
In addition to his business ventures, Dunsheath was involved in 
community projects. Just before Wellington’s carillon was inaugurated in 
April 1932, it was recalled that the movement to erect it dated back to 
November 1924, when Dunsheath placed his proposal for ‘a campanile with 
bells’ before the Wellington Soldiers’ War Memorial Committee. Although 
his idea was rejected, others took it up, formed an association, and raised 
the funds; his firm obtained the contract to erect the campanile.64 In April 
1939 he was one of a three-man publicity for the Citizens’ Home Defence 
movement and in the following month, when he was its organizer, was 
elected to its committee.65 From December 1940 onwards he was secretary 
of the St Heliers Home Guard, whose motto was ‘Prepare Now or Perish!’66 
 
DUNSHEATH AND MINING 
 
In 1951 Dunsheath described himself as an engineer but not a mining 
engineer: ‘no degrees’, although ‘I have had experience in Mining’.67 Two 
years later, he told the Minister of Mines that he had qualified as a 
mechanical and metallurgical engineer at Sheffield University.68 The first 
time he was directly connected with mining was in December 1931, when he 
sought the forfeiture of a cinnabar license in the Puhipuhi district, near 
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Whangarei, on the grounds of non-working. As it was proved that ‘nothing 
of any importance had been done since 1922’, the syndicate was fined £25 
but did not forfeit its license; from this amount, Dunsheath ‘was allowed a 
sum towards his costs’.69 In the following November, when requesting a 
copy of the Mines Department’s instructions on how prospectors should peg 
out, he informed it that his Dunsheath Machinery Company had ‘already 
assisted a number of mining parties with Plant, and if your Department, at 
any time, is unable to accommodate any mining parties we shall be glad if 
you will mention our name to them and put them in direct touch, as we are 
prepared to give assistance and share the responsibilities’. His company had 
some used mining machinery and was ‘rather inclined to give greater 
facilities to reliable groups of Gold Miners’, provided it would ‘secure a 
recompense in the event of success being accomplished’.70 Any involvement 
in mining that resulted has not been traced, apart from in January 1940, 
when from an unrecorded source this company sent five ounces of amalgam 
to the Thames School of Mines that produced 10dwt of bullion plus slate 
valued at £1 13s.71 
In March 1935, Dunsheath held 50 of the 1,625 shares sold in 
Mahakirau Mines Limited, a private company formed by ten shareholders 
in 1933 to mine at Coromandel; it wound up in that same month.72 In 1953, 
he proposed floating a company to prospect for oil in Northland, with 
George Ernest Hyde as his partner.73 Hyde was a skilled mining engineer 
who, after studying for five years at the Karangahake School of Mines, 
worked in the Talisman mine.74 According to a prospectus, he had 
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graduated with distinction from the Otago School of Mines before assisting 
the New Zealand Geological Survey and then prospecting in Australia, the 
United States, and Mexico, doing ‘considerable work on the Californian 
oilfields’.75 Since 1935, he had explored the supposed Northland oilfield they 
intended to prospect.76 In 1938, he formed Northern Oilfields Ltd, being a 
director for its first year and then its geologist. Although he predicted 
success in its 1940 prospectus, it was wound up six years later. Another 
shareholder was Thomas Raymond Impey, later a director in the Auckland 
Smelting Company; Dunsheath held no shares.77 Hyde Oil (Kaitaia) was 
formed in 1954, and Hyde actively prospected until his death in 1969.78 
Despite earlier expressing interest, Dunsheath did not hold any shares.79 
Hyde came to Dunsheath’s attention because, for a short period in the 
1920s, he had held the Peter Maxwell claim, near the top of Te Aroha 
mountain, plus prospecting licenses at Tui.80 At the request of Dunsheath’s 
Auckland Smelting Company, in 1952 Hyde inspected its work at Tui.81 In 
the following year, when applying for a petroleum prospecting license in 
their joint names, Dunsheath informed the Minister that, having made 
preliminary explorations with Hyde, they proposed ‘to interest a group of 
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friends in this proposal’.82 Later that month, he told the under-secretary of 
the Mines Department, Cecil Henry Benney,83 that a small private company 
was being formed, and, on the assurance that it would ‘energetically engage’ 
in prospecting and drilling, was not required to provide a deposit.84 A year 
later, he assured the department that he was trying to interest New 
Zealand and overseas capital,85 but within two months decided to transfer 
his interests to Hyde ‘in the light of his many obligations’.86 Hyde had done 
all the practical work, Dunsheath ‘contributing only to the application and 
rental fees’; he had been meant ‘to attend to the financial side of the 
proposition but due to his many other interests this objective has been 
somewhat neglected’.87  
 
PRELIMINARY WORK AND PLANS FOR TUI  
 
According to the Te Aroha News, Dunsheath was ‘solely responsible’ for 
the Auckland Smelting Company being established to rework the Tui 
mines.88 In May 1950, Dunsheath wrote that he was putting his ‘whole 
time’ into them.89 A month later, he claimed to be ‘unconcerned’ whether he 
made ‘any money at all out of this Scheme’ to which he was ‘giving every 
possible support in time, thought and finance’, despite having received no 
financial benefit from floating it.90  
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When Dunsheath first sought prospecting, mineral, and special quartz 
claim licenses in May 1948,91 he immediately ran into difficulties with the 
borough council because it feared for its water supply.92 He ‘was interested 
principally in lead’, but preliminary prospecting had discovered ‘worthwhile 
quantities of gold, silver, copper, zinc and other metals’. He claimed to have 
‘sufficient capital and adequate plant available, and there would be no call 
on the public for funds, or calls on sterling and dollar resources for purchase 
of plant’.93 His assured the warden that he was not a mere company 
promoter but intended to develop the resource to benefit New Zealand.94  
During 1948, Dunsheath, Walter Haydn Burton,95 and Bassett 
prospected the area.96 Edward John Scoble, the mining inspector, reported 
that they had obtained encouraging results from surface prospecting and 
from reopening No. 3 level.97 The results were indeed encouraging, for 
although they were searching mainly for base metals, assays made in June 
from samples Scoble collected from an outcrop at the No. 4 level produced 
6oz 11dwt of gold, and a nearby outcrop gave 3oz 8dwt, silver being found in 
both cases. Much lower assay results were obtained from the Peter Maxwell 
mine and another mine dump.98  
In August, William Daubney, an Otahuhu contractor, wrote to Bob 
Semple (unfortunately spelling his name ‘Simple’), the Minister of Public 
Works, enclosing a statement produced for potential shareholders about 
how he, Dunsheath, and Bassett intended to open up a ‘substantial deposit’ 
of galena. The ore would be sent ‘more than a mile’ to the smelting works 
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site, which was ‘well away from trees and habitation of any kind with the 
result that there can be no objection whatever from any possible fumes’. He 
enclosed an ore sample ‘which we can assure you is placed in substantial 
seams which we consider can be advantageously worked with modern 
machinery which we possess. We are skilled in the matter of treatment of 
the ore and refining of same’. Should the area be closed to them because of 
pollution fears, it would be ‘an economic catastrophe so far as New Zealand 
is concerned, because if we or anyone else can produce from 500 to 5000 
tons of Lead a year and the Government receives the royalty from same, we 
believe we are justified in expecting support and encouragement’. Before the 
hearing in the warden’s court they were ‘most anxious to have the proof of 
encouragement by some reputable Minister with technical knowledge’, and 
enclosed plans plus a draft letter for people to send supporting the 
syndicate’s venture because New Zealand was ‘vitally and economically 
interested in the success of your mine and smelting works’. There was no 
‘insuperable difficulty’ in permitting mining whilst protecting the water 
supply; and Semple could ‘rest assured that you have my whole-heated 
support and if you would like me to help you further I shall be happy to do 
so’.99  
(Daubney had no known expertise in mining or treating such ore. In 
1916, when at Gisborne, a company wanted him declared bankrupt because 
he was unable to pay the £257 4s 1d owing.100 In 1929, when a plumber at 
Henderson, Auckland, he had been taken to court to force him to pay wages 
to a 16-year-old he had illegally employed as his assistant.101 Working as a 
builder and plumber at Napier after the earthquake there, he was adjudged 
bankrupt in September 1932. His debts amounted to £1,137 18s 2d, and as 
his assets realized only £33 10s 3d a dividend of only 4 3/5d in the £ was 
paid.102 After his bankruptcy meeting, he left Hastings for Frankton 
Junction, at Hamilton, where in July 1933 he was reportedly running a 
boarding house.103 In the following month, when he was a carrier at 
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Rotorua, he stole a load of house blocks. Despite pleading that his wife was 
dangerously ill and that poverty had driven him to this extreme because of 
his bankruptcy, having been earlier convicted of two charges of false 
pretenses he was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment.104 Three years 
later, when he sought his discharge, he was a dairy farmer.105 The official 
assignee was unwilling to grant a discharge, explaining that there had been 
‘much dissatisfaction’ amongst creditors because ‘practically nothing about 
this estate turned out to be as represented by bankrupt and he appeared to 
have a dispute with everybody he had dealings with. I may further add that 
he was not at all helpful to me’, for after arranging to meet him to explain 
his affairs Daubney left the district and made no further contact.106 In 1937, 
when his tearoom and store at Orewa was destroyed by fire within three 
months of being erected, his wife was in hospital, leaving him to look after 
their two children. After losing everything in this fire, he started rebuilding 
immediately.107 In the following year, when fined for playing two-up in an 
Auckland gambling house, he was a labourer.108 In 1945, when he was a 
builder and contractor living at Otahuhu, after 17 years of marriage his 
wife obtained a divorce on the grounds of desertion.109 That there was no 
probate of his estate when he died in 1970, aged 78,110 indicated that he had 
little or nothing to leave his children.) 
To obtain public support, the syndicate publicized its plans. At the 
beginning of July, under the headline ‘Big Development Possible’, the Te 
Aroha News announced that, after three months of prospecting, Dunsheath 
and Bassett planned to extract New Zealand’s annual lead requirement, 
approximately 4,000 tons. 
 
They were not company promoters, they told a “News” 
representative, and were intending to work the claims themselves 
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under the name of the Auckland Smelting Company. Mr 
Dunsheath, an importer of machinery, stated that he had 
sufficient machinery in Auckland to make a start on the job, and 
Mr Bassett, who was a metallurgist, said that the process which 
it was proposed to use would be new to this country. The ore 
would be extracted from the seam high up the mountain, 
transported to the works handy to the town, and there treated by 
a modern method which would not give rise to harmful fumes. 
 
After explaining that, although they had government approval, the 
council had refused permission to mine until the pollution issue was 
resolved, Dunsheath described lead as ‘a scarce and valuable commodity’ 
and explained how it was needed. As Australia supplies might be reduced 
because of world demand, ‘the government was anxious for the company to 
reach the productive stage’. The company would be ‘highly beneficial for the 
township’, in time bringing in 100 employees and their families, thereby 
ensuring the retention of a good railway system. There would be no 
pollution from either smelting works or mine. They were ‘not tinpot 
prospectors’, having ‘already spent a considerable amount of money in the 
preparation work’. They would benefit both Te Aroha and ‘the rest of the 
country’, and hoped ‘to work amicably with’ the council.111  
At the August hearing, his solicitor assured the warden that 
Dunsheath had ‘sufficient plant to start almost immediately’ and could 
operate a plant ‘economically’. Work would start with three employees, with 
one more being employed ‘when ore produced’. Three men  would drive each 
additional adit, and two would operate the smelting works. The proposal 
was in the ‘public interest even to British Commonwealth’. Bassett 
explained they intended to drive to ‘pick up reef & run along reef. Possibly 2 
other drives’. The method of treatment to be used was unknown. After 
hearing all the objections, the warden granted permission to mine, with 
conditions to avoid pollution.112 
Some councillors were concerned about pollution, but others considered 
this fear was exaggerated. One described Dunsheath’s plan as ‘one of the 
few opportunities’ for increasing local prosperity, and two others opposed a 
blanket ban on mining.113 According to one of Dunsheath’s associates, 
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writing in August, the mayor and councillors were ‘most anxious to see this 
new industry started’ and as individuals were assisting the plans.114 
Charles Scott, a non-miner who described himself as ‘a mining man and a 
rate-payer’ and who had attempted to organize prospecting during the 
Depression,115 in supporting Dunsheath’s venture quoted the latter’s 
arguments verbatim.116 (But despite their statements of support, neither 
Scott nor any councillors acquired shares in the company.)117  
‘Ratepayer’ believed that resuming mining ‘would start an era of 
progress that would result in the town becoming one of the most prosperous 
in the Dominion’. It was ‘practically devoid of progress’ at the moment, and 
he applauded the warden’s comment that ‘a community had either to 
progress or sit down and die’.118 ‘Argus’ was also certain that ‘non-
progressive’ councillors had failed to realize that, should pollution occur, 
they could apply for a government grant to obtain water from unpolluted 
streams.119 
 
OBSERVERS AND OFFICIALS ASSESS THE POTENTIAL 
 
When Dunsheath and Bassett announced their plans, a Wellington 
newspaper reported skepticism in mining circles that they could produce all 
New Zealand’s lead requirements. An unidentified Wellington expert said 
no lead had ever been mined commercially there; although the 
superintendent of the Waihi School of Mines had taken samples, ‘in no case 
could the assay be considered encouraging’. Much more testing was required 
before erecting a plant.120 The Department of Industries and Commerce, 
interested because of difficulties in obtaining lead from overseas, in mid-
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1948 sent an official to inspect.121 In asking Scoble to report, Benney noted 
that ‘little or no prospecting work has been done despite the exaggerated 
claims that have been made in the press’,122 and advised the Department of 
Industries and Commerce of earlier evidence indicating that lead could not 
be produced economically. He did not think there ‘was the faintest doubt’ 
that Scoble’s report would be ‘most unpromising’.123 
After summarizing the concerns over water pollution, Scoble noted 
that, despite optimistic reports by interested parties over the years, all the 
tests made had been ‘without success’. During June, he had inspected the 
property with Bassett, but as all the adits had collapsed an underground 
inspection was impossible. Bassett provided information about a winze that 
Walter Joseph Gibbs124 had sunk in the 1930s and claimed Gibbs had 
exported 50 tons ‘but could give no figures’ about the results obtained. ‘The 
winze was full of water and I could not check up on the information’. 
Referring to the two good assays (already noted) that he had obtained from 
the broken stone at the outcrops of the Champion reef, Scoble warned that 
he had ‘no faith in these results as far as gold is concerned as the stone was 
undoubtedly selected by somebody in the past’. He was not ‘suggesting 
anything in connection with the present holders of the property’, and in 
fairness to Bassett noted ‘that he did not know I intended taking samples’. 
He had not told either Bassett or Dunsheath the confidential assay results. 
‘Up to the time of my visit, practically no prospecting work had been done 
on the area by Bassett and Dunsheath as far as I could see, though it must 
be admitted that with lead at about £NZ120 a ton’ the ground was ‘worth 
testing’. He was not prepared to predict its value until the lode had been 
crosscut and sampled at depth.125 
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Robert Faulks Landreth,126 a mining engineer who was the chief 
inspector of quarries and later became the Mines Department’s chief 
engineer, was asked for his opinion. He considered that, although there was 
no gold at Tui, with zinc fetching £75 a ton and lead £100 and both were in 
short supply, these minerals might be profitably mined, and prospecting the 
lode would be worth doing. 
 
In the past extravagant claims have been made as to the gold 
content of the ore and assays of samples have been produced 
which subsequent sampling by Government Officers completely 
disproved. Accordingly I am a little hesitant to accept without 
reservation the values claimed by Mr A.A. Adams.127  
 
This was a reference to the 1929 report by Albert Augustine (Bert) 
Adams, son of Henry Hopper Adams,128 which gave high values in base 
metals along with a small amount of gold and silver and stated that this 
proposition was ‘one of the best’ he had seen ‘for many years’.129 (Yet Adams 
did not acquire any shares in Dunsheath’s venture.) Although John Julian 
Stephen Cornes of the Dominion Laboratory told Landreth there was lead 
and zinc in an area about which he had an ‘intimate knowledge’ and where 
members of his family had prospected for many years, Landreth pointed out 
that Cornes was a chemist, not a geologist.130 (Cornes likewise did not 
purchase any shares.) ‘Any suggestion of producing 4,000 tons of lead per 
year and satisfying New Zealand’s requirements’ was ‘fantastic at this 
stage’, and it would cost £20,000 to develop the mine. ‘In common with the 
history of other mining fields in New Zealand if the money spent in trying 
to solve treatment problems and obtain finance from London had only been 
spent on prospecting and development some worthwhile information would 
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have been obtainable’.131 Without such information, the department could 
only make an educated guess about the prospects. 
In the light of these reports, Benney decided it was worth prospecting 
the area ‘vigorously’. Ministry of Health concerns about pollution were 
countered by the argument that a discovery of good ore would be valuable 




Prospecting was delayed whilst the pollution issue was debated with 
the council and the Health Department.133 In September, once permission 
to prospect was granted, an editorial in the local newspaper believed 
‘progressive elements’ would be pleased, for Dunsheath’s party would ‘give 
the mine a proper working test’, and for the sake of Te Aroha it hoped they 
would succeed.134 In the following month, after Dunsheath received plans of 
earlier mining from the Mines Department, he wrote that ‘to thoroughly 
examine this area’ was ‘a big job’, especially as most of the adits had fallen 
in. Work had started under the supervision of an Otago School of Mines 
graduate, unnamed, but so far they had ‘only very lightly “skimmed the 
surface” ’.135  
In November, Dunsheath informed Benney that his ‘technical 
consultants’ had recommended ‘an extensive Drilling programme’, and 
asked whether the department could provide a drill.136 Informed that none 
of the light drills deemed suitable were available,137 he replied that it was 
‘imperative’ their investigation took place over summer because their 
‘considerable experience’ had revealed ‘the impossibility of operating 
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unrestrictedly there in the winter’. Complaining about delays caused by the 
pollution issue, Dunsheath claimed his company had ‘the highest skilled 
engineers, both mining and geological and sanitary, operating on our behalf’ 
(with one exception, their names were never given), who were all ‘most 
emphatic in stating that we should “get on with the job and produce the 
Lead” ’. He asked ‘in all sincerity to please give us the word to get on with 
producing’ it because of the increased need for it. To explain why light drills 
would be inadequate, he outlined his intention 
 
to follow the dip and strike of the lode downwards as far as 
economically possible, or till the Drill reaches the fault zone. I 
then propose to explore from this level horizontally to pick up the 
faulted ore body or to prove its disappearance at this level. If I 
cannot locate a continuation at depth from this point, horizontal 
drill holes to prove the lateral extensions of the ore body will have 
to be made, as the ore body will have to be opened up from this 
level. 
 
In that way, he hoped to overcome the Health Department’s concerns 
by opening up the mine below the water catchment. 
 
I expect to have a minimum programme of six holes to commence 
with, but if the ore body develops as I hope, there will be a series 
of these six holes at various intervals down the mountainside. 
From this, you will be able to realise that an extensive 
programme is required which would have to be undertaken by a 
Drill capable of recovering cores from 500 to 1,000ft in depth. 
I naturally realise the demand being made on all your good 
equipment at present, but I am glad to advise you that I have 
received an offer from an overseas man of great experience 
[unnamed, as usual] to do all the drilling I require and he has 
already quoted a price at so much per foot of core recovered, and 
he can do drilling of the distance I require as indicated above, and 
of course there would be no contamination whatever from water 
and sludge leaving the bores, because my contract is that all 
sludges are collected and taken away for complete examination 
along with the cores. 
 
This man guaranteed he would not pollute any stream, ‘and naturally 
I have made terms with him feeling I am very fortunate in getting his 
services’.  
 
As you can no doubt realise, this work is going to cost a lot of 
money, but it will give a complete geological survey of the Lode 
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Systems with the minimum disturbance of the surface area of the 
leases. 
What is very important to me, and to New Zealand’s economy as a 
while is that the work can be proceed[ed] with immediately and 
completed by contract much earlier than any other known drilling 
programme we have heard of in New Zealand. 
 
Assuming that Benney would appreciate his ‘terrific efforts’, he asked 
him to obtain the Minister’s assistance in overcoming the ‘pettifogging 
objection’ raised over pollution.138  
Eight days later, to counter these objections, Dunsheath and Keith A. 
Beatson, director of the Waihi School of Mines from 1946 to mid-1949,139 
who was testing the samples, informed councillors that they were 
prospecting on the basis of ‘skilled advice’ and wanted to diamond drill to 
locate the ‘exact position’ of the lodes, at a cost of from £3,000 to £10,000. 
Beatson’s comment that prior council consent had not been granted for 
removing samples prompted the note-taker to record: ‘Illegally on area’. 
They needed a ‘complete record’ of the lode, which diamond drilling would 
provide without creating pollution.140 By the beginning of the following 
year, Dunsheath was increasingly impatient at the delays caused by 
pollution concerns, for he was spending £26 5s a week plus wages for two to 
three men, a mining engineer, and other staff. He claimed that Norman 
Annabell,141 the borough engineer who was ‘the instigator’ of the objections, 
had ‘boasted that he has taken steps to prevent my Mining Scheme going 
forward. He seems particularly jubilant, and has even this last few days 
erected a large notice prohibiting any person passing through the pathway 
which leads to the Mine’. The delay was holding up his other applications, 
expensively.142  
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After his arrangement with the proposed drilling contractor fell 
through for reasons unknown but probably financial, in July 1949 
Dunsheath renewed his request for drills, but none were available.143 In the 
following month, when he announced a new plan to reopen some crosscuts 
and drives and requested technical advice from the department and the 
Director of the Geological Survey, he was told this could be given once the 




In August 1949, the Auckland Star announced that preparations were 
being made to open New Zealand’s first lead mine. ‘Preliminary 
investigations’ had found it ‘to be rich in lead, gold, silver, zinc and copper’, 
which would be extracted ‘by a big company expected to begin operations in 
about two years’. A new firm, the Auckland Smelting Company, to be 
gazetted ‘soon’, planned to spend ‘one to two years analyzing the ore and 
tracing the path of the seam’ before mining. This report, clearly based on 
Dunsheath’s information, provided details of earlier failed attempts to treat 
and export the ore. Dunsheath was cited as having overcome the objections 
‘from fourteen separate public bodies and Government departments’ and as 
intending, ‘based on the recommendations of leading outside mining 
engineers’, still unnamed, to thoroughly test by tunnelling and diamond 
drilling. No ‘objectionable treatment plant’ would be erected near Te Aroha. 
The company would ‘test the ground preparatory to forming a big company 
with adequate capital’ to develop it and install ‘an ore dressing plant’ using 
‘modern selective flotation methods’. Dunsheath expressed surprise that, 
despite the country having to import all its lead, zinc and copper, nobody 
had ‘had the foresight to make a major trial and find the value of the 
deposits’. He estimated that the gold and silver in the ore might be almost 
as valuable to the base metals. The article concluded that they did ‘not 
know what other minerals and elements might be found in the initial 
opening-up work’, but were being assisted by ‘excellent technical advisers in 
Australia and the United Kingdom’, who would be ‘supplemented soon’.145  
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In the absence of the company’s records, there is no evidence of any 
overseas advisers visiting, although there must have been correspondence, 
particularly about selecting a suitable plant. Without visiting the ground, 
receiving complete information, and testing the ore, no overseas expert 
could have provided meaningful advice. In September, Dunsheath wrote 
that ‘we have been extremely disappointed by the unreliable information 
given by some men who claim to be competent mining engineers’, again 
unnamed. As the only plans he had were ‘by no means correct’, he would 
have to employ a surveyor.146 
That Dunsheath provided information to the Te Aroha business 
community was indicated by the president of the Chamber of Commerce 
stating that there was no danger of pollution, that the ore body was ‘very 
extensive’, and that ‘vast quantities’ of lead could be extracted.147  
 
FORMING A COMPANY 
 
In 1949, Dunsheath told Benney that originally he had intended ‘to 
prospect the area with his own funds but he received friendly advice that it 
would be wiser to collect a group of men willing to risk the cost of 
prospecting’.148 William Daubney, who described himself as Dunsheath’s 
partner, in August 1948 told the Minister of Public Works that they would 
form ‘a private company working more or less on co-operative lines’. It was 
‘not intended to make this scheme the subject of fancy company promotions’, 
as they were confident of producing ‘some valuable metals without 
depending upon big financial institutions’. He sought encouragement but 
not money from the government, for they were ‘skilled men quite able to 
start in a very small way’ and meet the development costs ‘as we go along’. 
They had ‘a few thousand pounds worth of machinery already available’.149 
(Daubney was yet another person who, despite making high claims, did not 
acquire any shares.) 
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The Auckland Smelting Company, registered on 19 October 1949, had 
a capital of £10,000, in £1 shares, which both its secretary, Alexander 
Page,150 and mining officials considered inadequate.151 Julius Hogben, its 
solicitor, did not anticipate ‘any difficulty in raising this amount’.152 It did 
not issue a prospectus, Page informing a sharebroking firm that ‘a 
document in lieu of Prospectus was prepared but not published’. When 
brokers ‘asked if there was any printed matter at all, that we could have’, 
Page referred them to Dunsheath, ‘who, he was sure, could give us any 
information an investor would require’.153 The four-page statement of 
objectives referred to by Page, dated 20 October, listed the ‘Signatures to 
Memo of Assn & Articles’ as four Aucklanders:154 Dunsheath, Thomas 
Raymond Impey, a paint merchant and partner and assistant manager in 
Phillips and Impey Ltd,155 Thomas Stewart Littlejohn, managing director of 
Aluminium Utensils Ltd and manager of Metal Products Ltd,156 and 
Emmeline Young, widow of James Alexander Young and his successor as 
sole owner of Robert Young and Company, a private company of 
manufacturing jewelers, and by then sole director of her brother’s 
goldsmith’s business.157 The other signatories were Andrew McMurtree of 
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Manawatu Heads, a retired farmer, and two Palmerston North residents: 
Martin Pearce, a company manager, and Frederick Newton Andrews, a 
house furnisher. Its objects were to acquire all Dunsheath’s licenses, to take 
up mining privileges and to ‘carry on Mining operations of every kind at any 
place in N.Z.’, to be ‘metal dealers, metallurgists, assayers &c’, indeed ‘to 
carry on any business or agency of any kind’, form new companies, and 
lease land.158 
The first directors were Impey, Littlejohn, and Dunsheath. The latter, 
managing director until he ceased to be a director, was to receive one paid-
up share for every two shares sold, up to a total of £5,000, as payment for 
transferring his properties and rights to the company.159 When it was 
formed, he received only £100 fully paid up shares, the eventual 5,000 ‘not 
to be issued until the Capital of the Company was increased which was 
prohibited by legislation unless by special permission’.160 His fellow 
directors were, Dunsheath wrote, ‘most enthusiastic’ and ‘determined to see 
what is of value in the Te Aroha Mountains’.161 ‘No professional Company 
Promoters ever were or are connected with this scheme which has been 
commented upon most favourably by many Overseas Firms’, unspecified.162 
Page, a public accountant who Dunsheath said had ‘for many years’ 
been ‘on the Staff of the Waihi and Martha Mining Companies’,163 reported 
in early November that ‘shares were being readily taken up’, with over 
7,000 subscribed.164 The return of allotments to 2 November revealed that 
only 6,000 had been allotted, 10s being paid for 200 and 5s for the 
remainder. Dunsheath had received a first installment of 100 paid up 
shares. There were 56 other shareholders. Those with 200 shares, apart 
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from directors Impey and Littlejohn, were a master plumber of Whangerei 
and a company manager of Auckland. Four people had 250 shares each: 
Emmeline Young (now described as a company manager), a Rotorua fish 
merchant, an Auckland manufacturing plumber, and a Whangerei civil 
engineer. At Kamo, a plumber had 400 and a farmer had 500. There were 
21 shareholders with 100 shares each, in one case in joint names, and 24 
shareholders had 50, the lowest number allocated. One lived in Hamilton 
and another in Foxton, two each in Mercer, Whangarei, Helensville, and 
Rotorua, three at Te Awamutu, nine at Palmerston North, and 24 at 
Auckland. There were eight other women apart from Young: an ‘Apartment 
House Proprietress’, a company director with the same occupation and 
address as her husband, a fish merchant who jointly owned shares with a 
male fish merchant, and five who gave their occupation as ‘Married 
Woman’. In addition to these shareholders, others had a wide range of 
occupations. Apart from one retired miner, not one had an occupation that 
suggested familiarity with any sort of mining, although the five company 
directors, the one managing director, the two company managers and the 
one factory manager may be assumed to have been able to discern whether 
this investment was likely to be profitable. Possibly the departmental 
manager would also have had these skills, but there was no indication of 
what he managed. There were four storekeepers, two master builders and 
two salesmen, and the following occupations were each represented by one 
shareholder: hotel proprietor, insurance representative, electrical engineer, 
manufacturer, petrol station proprietor, retired farmer, stationer, pastry 
cook, pastry cook proprietor, commercial travellor, jeweller, timber 
merchant, master plumber, milk bar proprietor, motor dealer, car painter, 
house furnisher, instructor, and fish merchant.165  
 
WALTER HAYDN BURTON 
 
The skills of two men were to be crucial. Dunsheath had reported in 
August 1949 that he had got a ‘good, experienced man’ as manager, and in 
the following month described him as one who, although ‘not a fully 
qualified mining engineer’, had ‘capacities and knowledge far more useful 
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than some of the men holding paper credentials’.166 He was Walter Haydn 
Burton, aged 64 in 1949, an engineer. His father, confusingly another 
Walter Haydn, had been a mine manager;167 in 1913 his son felt it 
necessary, when applying for a water race at Maratoto, to indicate that he 
was ‘the younger’.168 According to Dunsheath, writing in February 1952, 
Burton had had over 30 years experience of mining and prospecting.169 Four 
months later, Dunsheath revised that to 40 years of mining experience in 
New Zealand; he had ‘at times been in charge of fairly large Shows 
including the “Zeehan” [at Waiomu], also “Maratoto,” and several others. 
His experience has been very wide both underground and on the surface, 
and at all times I have found him a most valuable asset’. Burton had helped 
to prospect Tui before the company was formed.170 He was recorded as a 
shareholder in eight claims at Coromandel and Thames from the early 
twentieth century until the late 1930s, and in 1937 was granted a 
prospecting license for the latter district.171 
Scoble, who had known Burton for some 14 years, reported that he had 
worked in the Ohinemuri Gold and Silver Company’s mine at Maratoto and 
might have been a foreman there for a time before leading a prospecting 
party at Thames. Although ‘a sound and reliable man’, he did not have any 
‘special mining qualifications’.172 Burton had prospected at Tapu, near 
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Thames, in early 1924,173 and later that year the director of the Thames 
School of Mines, Hugh Crawford, informed his Waihi counterpart that he 
had been asked by ‘Haydn Burton of the Zeehan Consolidated’ to help find a 
young man with a first class mine manager’s certificate to develop its mine 
and ‘work under an uncertificated man (Haydn Burton)’.174 Later in that 
decade, Burton took samples for Zeehan Consolidated Ltd and treated most 
of them under Crawford’s supervision.175  
In 1932, when living in Auckland, Burton told Crawford that he was 
‘very anxious to prospect some ground near Thames’, but was ‘not quite 
strong enough financially to carry on without a little assistance’. He 
wondered whether he could receive money under the unemployment 
scheme, for although this was intended for Thames men, ‘I think I can rank 
as a Thames man, though I have been away for a little time I worked there 
long enough, and spent a lot of money there’. His proposed prospecting 
would take about 12 months.176 Not being a Thames resident, he was 
deemed ineligible.177 In 1937, he applied to prospect at Waiomu.178  
As he was not certificated, Burton could not manage the company’s 
mine and instead was described as its supervisor, his tasks being to assist 
the mine manager and, from the end of 1950, to be in charge of surface 
work.179 
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The mine manager, appointed in November 1949 when aged 41, was 
James Bert McAra, known to everyone as ‘Bert’.180 McAra had been born at 
Waikino, where his father worked at the battery and had a 100-acre ‘farm’ 
of fern and scrub.181 In his history of mining at Waihi, McAra wrote a vivid 
sketch of his childhood,182 recalling that his occasional visits to the battery 
with his father were ‘among the highlights of my earlier years. I can still 
remember the thrill when I first saw the great machines, the vast tanks of 
slimes and solutions crossed on narrow plank walkways, and heard the hum 
of electric motors and the thud-thud of air-compressors’. While his father 
was chatting to his mates, he ‘took in the magic of the surroundings’. From 
the Scientific American he became interested ‘in the world of science’, from 
which he drew ‘a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction’.183 After leaving 
school, he ‘took on clerical work for a while but disliked it and worked 
instead at the battery, on the farm, and at various casual jobs’. When the 
Depression began, he started working in the Waihi mine ‘and found it was 
to my liking’.184 ‘Being young and footloose’, he mined in Western Australia 
for several years, followed by quarrying in the Auckland area and then 
being a co-operative contract miner at Waihi.185 After studying at the Waihi 
School of Mines he had qualified as a mine manager, quarry manager, and 
battery superintendent; he would be on its council in 1948.186 He mined at 
Waihi for ten years before being offered the Tui job, his previous post being 
as a shift boss at No. 7 shaft, ‘the newest and most high-tech of the 
Martha’s shafts’. But thinking ahead, ‘like several of his middle 
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management colleagues at the Martha, Bert saw the closure looming for 
years before it happened. He planned to leave before the closure, thereby 
avoiding the inevitable rush for mining jobs’ when it closed.187 In his history 
of Waihi mining he wrote that he left Waihi ‘for Western Australia about 
three years before the Waihi mine closed’ in 1952,188 omitting any mention 
of his years as the Auckland Smelting Company’s manager, for reasons that 
will become apparent. 
When working in a co-operative contract party, he recalled earning 
‘reasonable money over several years. I found the work challenging and 
interesting as there was always something different, either about the work 
or in the nature of the reef, and there was satisfaction in knowing at the 
end of the day that a good job of work had been done’.189 An obituary 
recalled that, as ‘a man of integrity he demanded the best from his fellow 
workers’, and as mining inspector ‘he expected things to be up to scratch. 
Because he expected these high standards he wasn’t always popular. But 
he’d always set himself the same standards’.190 McAra also contemplated 
wider issues, and after his retirement and writing his excellent history of 
Waihi mining published a 76-page treatise entitled: Humanity - Will It 
Survive? Describing himself on the title page as ‘A Thoughtful Layman’, it 
explained his philosophy of ‘Worldwide Humanitarianism’.191  
In 1985, he recalled being appointed as Dunsheath’s mine manager.  
 
When it became apparent in 1949 that the Martha mine would 
have to close down in the not too distant future I took a job with 
the Ministry of Works at Paeroa and after learning the office 
routine there moved on to take charge of a Ministry of Works 
quarry at Galatea. I didn’t care for this work after mining so 
when two men representing an Auckland group of businessmen 
called on me at my home in Waihi and asked me to take a job as 
mine manager to carry out exploration of the old Tui mining area 
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which had not been worked since the eighties I welcomed the 
chance.192 
 
According to Dunsheath, McAra approached him ‘some time after’ the 
former had first met Burton, with whom he was ‘prospecting and preparing 
the way’ for the company,193 thereby suggesting that McAra had applied to 
him for the job and not the other way round. Whichever version was correct, 
after interviewing McAra both Burton and Dunsheath considered he was 
the best candidate.194 In February 1950, Dunsheath described him as being 




In early November 1949, the Waihi School of Mines was asked whether 
it could provide equipment and materials ‘not immediately in use’ for the 
company’s laboratory.196 As the acting director considered this request 
‘really amounted to establishing a laboratory’, he declined it, ‘although co-
operation towards procuring specific items later was promised’.197 Late that 
month, Dunsheath informed Benney that he was ‘installing a good assay 
plant’ on seven acres of farmland adjacent to the Tui district that was to be 
their headquarters. After seeking aid in obtaining two items of machinery, 
he reported that Beatson had ‘strongly recommended’ diamond drilling to 
discover whether there was sufficient ore ‘to justify development by a larger 
Company’. The directors, however, were ‘very strongly of the opinion that 
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the safest and most satisfactory prospecting method’ was to drive a crosscut 
below several reefs traced on the surface, as ‘the contour of the land’ was 
‘favourable in spite of the reef dipping away from us’. The Mines 
Department’s drilling superintendent had warned that their capital ‘could 
dissolve too rapidly in core drilling’. Surface sampling had been ‘extremely 
encouraging’, but Beatson’s report had turned out to be ‘most inaccurate 
and absolutely valueless’. As constructing a road to the mine would cost at 
least £600 and they would have to hire an air compressor and drill, he 
asked whether the department would meet this cost. The road would open 
up ‘the entire area with unlimited possibilities for both Base and Precious 
Metals’ and enable the company to devote all its finances to crosscutting, 
extending the existing No. 4 level and, if this was ‘reasonably successful’, 
commencing a new one about 200 feet lower. Dunsheath also requested a 
visit from members of the Mines Department and Geological Survey.198 
There was no immediate reply, for Benney wished to obtain Scoble’s views, 
but he promised to support Dunsheath’s request to import machinery.199 
Two weeks later, Dunsheath wrote to William Sullivan, the Minister of 
Mines, and other ministers in the new National Government, tendering his 
‘sincere congratulations’ and assuring them ‘of supporting confidence’ and 
conveying the directors’ ‘very best wishes for a most successful future’ for 
themselves and their government. He informed that that he had been 
prospecting ‘for a couple of years’ and had ‘spent a large sum of money’ 
before arranging ‘with a number of other friends to join in the venture of 
Exploration’. Should they obtain ‘favourable results’, he would float a large 
company to treat the ore by ‘Selective Flotation’. To test the ground, a drive 
would be put in 500 feet below the reefs traced in the old workings. His 
company was ‘staking at least £15,000 (to £30,000)’ in proving the ores, had 
employed ‘fully qualified chemists, a certified Mine Manager and Assayer’, 
and had acquired most of the testing machinery. As its present capital was 
less than £10,000, it did not wish to spend it all making a road.200 (Being 
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without one meant a three-hour walk to the mine.)201 Five days later, 
Dunsheath complained that ‘our little company’ was spending £150 each 
month in wages alone without being able to construct a road because 
Annabell was obstructing ‘everything connected with mining from A to Z’ 
and the farmer whose land they had to cross refused access because he 
would have to fence off the road.202 
Late in December, Scoble reported about the route for this road, 
possible pollution, and the variable results of his five samples. Two samples 
taken from adits indicated that, whilst ‘values and reef widths’ were 
‘somewhat erratic’, the ‘venture might be classed as a reasonable prospect’. 
As McAra did not know the results of Beatson’s samplings (why had 
Dunsheath not shared this information with him?), Scoble suggested that 
the company be asked to provide a copy of Beatson’s report.  
 
All payable ore above No. 4 tunnel has apparently been worked 
out, and it is the Company’s intention to construct another tunnel 
which will be known as No. 5 (elevation 1,950ft), 200ft lower 
down the hill. The estimated length of this tunnel is 1,000ft and 
driving north and south on the line of reef will be undertaken on 
its completion. Two shifts will be worked, and rock drills 
employed. The men are to live in Te Aroha, which is desirable 
from a sanitary point of view, and improved access seems justified 
in consequence. 
 
On condition that the company proved its financial position was sound, 
for driving No. 5 level would cost ‘considerably more’ than the £7,000 
capital he believed had been subscribed, Scoble recommended that £300 on 
a £ for £ basis be granted towards making the road. This grant should not 
be used ‘for the purpose of raising further capital’.203  
A road was bulldozed to the site of the proposed tunnel, now to be 
1,200 feet long and 1,650 feet up the mountainside, to intersect the 
Champion and Ruakaka reefs.204 Despite Dunsheath’s earlier criticism, 
during the Christmas holidays he employed Beatson to produce another 
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report; Scoble understood that his surface and underground sampling had 
produced ‘satisfactory’ averages of zinc and lead,205 but neither he nor the 
department received copies of Beatson’s reports. 
Dunsheath complained once more in January 1950 that the ‘very 
severe obstacles’ created by the council had put the company ‘a long way 
behind’, and asked Benney to assist in providing a telephone line to his 
Remuera house so he could keep in contact with McAra. ‘We cannot work at 
Te Aroha in the bad weather, and we are spending a great deal of money 
and putting in extreme efforts in order to get the place ready for work, and 
a drive started’.206 Benney did assist,207 but asked for details of the 
company’s finances because £7,000 was insufficient for the proposed tunnel, 
and requested a copy of Beatson’s report.208 Dunsheath responded with a 
six-page letter requesting a grant of ‘not less than £1,000’ of the estimated 
£1,200 cost of the road. A farmer had allowed ‘his paddocks to be crossed as 
a short-cut during the fine weather’ while the contractor made the all-
weather road, using part of the old Tui track. After describing in great 
detail how it was being constructed, he explained why the contract had been 
let before applying for the grant: 
 
It was not realized that the work would be so big and costly as it 
has now proved to be. Our men are working against time because 
it is imperative that the Road be completed before the weather 
breaks to enable us to carry men (two shifts) and materials 
throughout the length of the Road during the winter, day and 
night. If the Road was not completed before the Autumn the 
whole scheme will be held up till December with a very serious 
consequent loss of time and money plus the serious deterioration 
of the work already done. The activities of both Contractor and 
our men are by no means confined to a forty-hour week. 
 
The company was ‘most anxious to avoid consuming our subscribed 
Capital unnecessarily on Road making’ because it wanted to ‘devote all 
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energies and finance to driving the Cross-Cut’ to enable ‘large-scale 
underground prospecting investigations, to thoroughly test the lead-zinc 
reefs’. Mining plant worth up to £3,000 had been purchased (presumably 
from Dunsheath Machinery), and the ‘first-class Assay Office and 
Laboratory’ would allow them to ‘expeditiously deal with the large volume 
of sampling’ anticipated. Dunsheath himself had spent ‘well over £2,000, 
some of which, unfortunately, was wasted in obtaining unreliable technical 
assistance over a period of two years’, presumably a reference to Beatson. 
Because of ‘the contour of the country and imposed restrictions by the 
Authorities such as tipping debris in the creeks’, it had been decided to 
commence the main crosscut approximately 225 feet below No. 4 level ‘and 
almost vertically below the well-known base metal outcrop’. Instead of 
wasting money re-opening old drives, they would drive 1,800 feet to cut 
from six to seven reefs, ‘the existence of which we have more or less 
established on the surface’. Although it was not possible to cut all the reefs, 
they were confident this crosscut would ‘justify an increase of Capital’ and 
the opening up of ‘other known reef systems extending beyond the initial 
interesting area’. As his ‘little group’ was ‘extremely enthusiastic regarding 
the Te Aroha area’, should the department provide financial assistance they 
would prospect the whole mountain, for they had ‘seen so many valuable 
things’ and ‘sincerely’ believed there was ‘a great future for Te Aroha 
mining of base metals’. He mentioned that Waiorongomai was ‘completely 
deserted and impossible of access due to overgrowth’, implying their wish to 
explore it. They would not waste money on a reduction plant until certain of 
being able to keep it supplied with ore. Diamond drilling had ‘not by any 
means’ been overlooked, ‘but we have considered the expense and our 
present proposal to drive is, in the opinion of our Advisers’, names 
unspecified, ‘the scheme most likely to get results with a reasonable 
expense’. Presumably to indicate that there would not be continual requests 
for funds, Benney was assured that the managing director of Sheffield 
Smelting Co Ltd, whom Dunsheath had known for 50 years, had promised 
that ‘when we prove what there is there he can handle our Concentrates or 
our output or help us with the finance’. He offered to visit Benney in 
Wellington, possibly accompanied by Burton.209 He made no reference to 
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Beatson’s report, and Benney noted his ‘considerable reluctance’ to send 
this.210 
Three days later, Dunsheath explained to the Controller of Customs 
that, having failed to obtain rails in New Zealand, he needed permission to 
import some from England. To encourage a favourable response, he claimed 
his company ‘certainly’ possessed ‘large deposits’ of lead, zinc, copper, silver, 
and gold, and was ‘taking the entire risk in carrying out an investigation of 
vital importance to this country’s economy. The clarion call to-day is to 
produce more ourselves’. His ‘little Company’ had equipped ‘a most up-to-
date assay office and laboratory’ and would have its road completed in about 
two weeks.211 Contradicting his reference to gold, assays made in January 
and February had revealed only miniscule amounts.212 
Scoble reported that the road would cost over £1,200 because a small 
bridge was needed. The new drive was lower than originally planned in 
order to dump spoil away from Tui Creek, thus avoiding further concerns 
about pollution, and he recommended raising the recommended grant of 
£300 to £400, equal to £1 for £2.213 Despite agreeing with Benney that ‘we 
should not be jockeyed into the position of being partners in this enterprise’, 
Landreth considered they should assist the road. He estimated the cost of 
initial development at over £20,000, beyond the means of this under-
capitalised company. Although he considered the area worth prospecting, he 
wondered why Dunsheath would not show the department Beatson’s 
reputedly optimistic report.214 Because it was never provided or made 
public, clearly Beatson, who did not acquire any shares, was more cautious 
than was claimed. Landreth’s recommendation that, if the department 
refused to assist the road, it should subsidize driving by £1 per foot up to a 
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maximum of £500 was sent to Sullivan for approval,215 but he was 
unimpressed: 
 
If the Coy is considered Under-Capitalised at present, and asks 
for a Grant to form the access road. 
How then can it possibly make a success of prospecting the area. 
It seems assistance at this stage may Committ the Dept to 
further Commitments. 
I think it best to hold the application over for 6 months, review 
then and see if the Coy is making any real progress.216 
 
Informed of his decision, Dunsheath expressed ‘gratitude’ that Sullivan 
had considered the issue. ‘We shall look forward in the next few months, to 
giving you reports and statistics covering the steps we have taken and the 
success with which we have met and we trust that you will be able to 
favourably consider our proposal’.217  
 
McARA STARTS WORK 
 
By mid-1950, buildings and plant were being erected despite by the 
road being ‘in a very poor state owing to bad weather’.218 The directors, who 
made their first official visit in June, were reportedly ‘very enthusiastic’ 
about the ore.219 As soon as McAra was hired, the company ‘bought an 
elegant old house, formerly a doctor’s residence, in Longfellow Street, Te 
Aroha. Bert lived there for the first year or so’, according to his recollections 
in the former stables, returning to his family in Waihi on weekends.220 ‘One 
of the rooms was set up as a lab, complete with scales, bottles of chemicals, 
etc’. His son Peter recalled that ‘for whatever reason’, other employees or 
consultants  
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spent time in the house on occasions, and Bert established 
friendly connections with them. Generally, they were white-collar 
types, usually from Auckland, by contrast with Bert’s local blue-
collar upbringing. He seems to have enjoyed their company, even 
commenting once that he took pleasure in conversing in French 
with one gentlemanly type who visited occasionally. It was never 
clear to anyone (other than perhaps Bert) why these men spent 
time at Te Aroha, or what work they did. The impression at the 
time was that they acted as minders/flies on the wall while Bert 
immersed himself in the work. Day by day, Bert led an 
equipment-laden packhorse, pastured across the road from the 
house, up the steep mountainside. He surveyed the lease for 
mineral deposits, reefs, etc, assembled maps, pegged out future 
roads, and put together plans for a crushing plant, a generator, a 
compressor for ventilation and powering drills, and a treatment 
plant for the ore. At the time, flotation seems to have been flavour 
of the month for base metal extraction. Accordingly, Bert 
immersed himself in books on flotation technology.221 
 
The steep country made prospecting difficult and slow, but he was 
‘very impressed’ when he first examined ‘the various shows and outcrops of 
mineralised quartz’:  
 
The old workings were inaccessible owing to collapsed timbers 
and there was little reliable information as to the nature of the 
reefs. When all available exposures had been sampled and plans 
of the area prepared by me, it then became necessary to make a 
decision as to whether or not to reopen the old workings and 
embark on an underground prospecting programme in the hope of 
getting more information as to the value of the deposit and, 
hopefully, its viability as a mining proposition. Up to this stage 
there were only three or four men employed, but underground 
work required machinery and vehicle access and more men, with 
facilities, tools, roads formation, accommodation, change room 
etc. The managing director and his technical advisor [unnamed: 
Burton? Beatson?] visited the area frequently in order to report to 
his fellow directors in Auckland so that they could make decisions 
re finance. I carried out careful compass surveys of the two reefs 
and the various points of interest and prepared suitable plans to 
show their relevance, and from this information I recommended 
that a new level, No. 5, be driven to intersect the Champion reef 
at right-angles about 150 feet below the previously opened No. 4 
level, but about five hundred feet or so to the south of it. This was 
central to both reefs so that after cutting the Champion the 
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crosscut could be turned a little to cut the Ruakaka at right-
angles at about 1500ft. This plan was eventually adopted.222  
 
He wanted to know whether the reefs ‘were any good at that depth. I 
always contended that if they weren’t any good at that depth there was no 
good bothering about it at all. You’d never make a mine because you must 
have the depth to make a mine’.223  
The road, designed for four-wheel drive vehicles, had a gradient of one 
in four in places. ‘Only the worst portions of the road were metalled at first 
and later rock from the excavation of the No. 5 crosscut adit was back-
loaded from the mine on to the road, the gradient being too steep to haul 
metal uphill’.224  
 
The 1500 foot long crosscut in hard andesite rock required heavy 
drilling equipment including an air compressor and a party of 
four skilled miners working on contract with support personnel, a 
fitter, tool-sharpener, etc, general supplies and a change-room 
with hot and cold showers. This meant installing an air 
compressor driven by a diesel engine and a water supply. There 
was no flat ground anywhere near the mine so a spur at the 
junction of the No. 4 and No. 5 roads, about a hundred metres 
from No. 5 portal, had to be levelled by bulldozing and explosives 
for a building site. At the adit portal a hopper, to receive the rock 
from the tunnel face and discharge it into trucks, and a 
ventilating fan and explosives magazines had to be installed.225 
 
Diesel compressors were required because there was no electricity.226 A 
party of Waihi miners did the driving, which commenced in July.227 They 
experienced ‘considerable difficulties’ in the ‘very hard ground’ with 
‘unsuitable and second-hand machinery’;228 provided by Dunsheath 
Machinery? Four men in two shifts drove the tunnel and there was ‘one 
man attending the machinery and one man on transport’. No more could be 
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profitably employed until the reef was cut, when it would be driven on to 
determine its extent and value.229  
 
INCREASING THE CAPITAL 
 
To encourage the purchase of shares, a broadsheet containing 17 
photographs was published in 1950 showing the crushing, grinding, and 
weighing room, the office, the store, and the drawing office, along with the 
road and two vehicles. The portals of No. 4 and No. 5 levels were shown, 
plus a bulldozer preparing the site for the compressor engine room, 
engineers’ shop, smithy, change room, and ‘crib’. This broadsheet explained 
that modern techniques in prospecting and assaying were being used and 
that once the geology was understood a plant would be erected to treat 
‘substantial bodies’ of sulphide ores containing lead, copper, zinc, gold, and 
silver.230 One or more brokers sold shares, and £980 was paid by March 
1950 as ‘Commission on Shares sold’. During the following year, commission 
of £25 on shares sold was included amongst the ‘Overhead Charges’, but in 
future years ‘brokerage’ was not itemized, being combined with a variety of 
other costs as overhead charges.231  
On 18 November 1949, 31 new shareholders had joined. The largest 
holdings were ten of 100 shares; four were of 25, and the rest were of 50. 
Clearly a special effort had been made to attract support in Northland, for 
12 were residents of Dargaville, five of Kaikohe, four of Kawakawa, two of 
Ruawai, and one each of Mangawhere, Matakohe, Russell, and Moerewa, in 
addition to four in Auckland. On 28 November, allotments were made to 17 
new shareholders in parcels of 100, 50, and 25 shares. In addition to three 
Aucklanders, there were five residents of Hamilton, one of Te Awamutu, 
seven of Matamata, and two of Otorohanga. Five shareholders joined on 16 
December, one from Helensville and four from Auckland. Shares were 
allotted to four Aucklanders on 24 February 1950, 100 each to the wife, son, 
and daughter of Impey, and the largest of all the new shareholdings, 250, to 
a company manager. The occupations were similar to those earlier noted 
and none revealed a mining background; there were now 13 managers of 
various types and four directors, with almost all the remainder being skilled 
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workers, probably self-employed in most cases, and small businessmen, 
including one business woman. Only three other women had shareholdings. 
By the beginning of March, 9,775 shares had been allotted.232  
The secretary had commented in November 1949 that ‘the capital 
would have to be increased as it was not nearly big enough’.233 The 
following June, it was doubled to £20,000, and by the end of the following 
month another 1,250 shares had been allotted to seven men, all of Auckland 
except for a Matamata baker and two Te Aroha residents: Nicholas 
Quirk,234 licensee of the Hot Springs Hotel, acquired 500 shares, and Henry 
William Dickens Skidmore, a confectioner who would become mayor in 
1959,235 obtained 200.236 Another 250 were allotted, to a Rotorua fish 
merchant, by 24 October.237 Another 700 were allotted by 11 December, to 
seven Aucklanders.238 A Christchurch sharebroker informed the Mines 
Department in September that Dunsheath had sought his assistance in 
getting shareholders,239 but, if he agreed to help, he was unsuccessful. 
Existing shareholders acquired increased holdings in transactions that were 
not recorded in the records submitted to the registrar; for example, Impey, 
the largest shareholder in mid-1950, was ‘very enthusiastic’ after visiting 
the mine in August and trebled his investment.240  
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1950 
 
In early July, Dunsheath was ‘pleased to advise’ Benney of ‘rapid 
strides’. The 2 1/4 mile road was completed and metalled, with further 
metal being spread in parts ‘showing signs of wear’. An air compressor and 
a diesel engine were in place along with other machines and buildings, and 
the new crosscut had been started. He anticipated visiting him to explain 
the work and to show him photographs and figures. ‘Each night, or early 
morning, after 6 am’, he was ‘in telephonic communication’ with either 
McAra or Burton as there were ‘many things to be decided upon daily, 
requisitions to be given and authorities to be obtained’. Having lost his 
telephone connection through purchasing ‘a little larger House’, he 
requested assistance in forcing the Post and Telegraph Department to 
reinstall a telephone promptly. He apologized for troubling him, ‘but the 
work I am doing I sincerely claim is of National importance when we are 
completely dependent upon imports of Lead, Zinc, Copper and in view of the 
ominous war clouds in the North Pacific’,241 a reference to Korea. Benney 
immediately did as requested,242 prompting gratitude along with a lament 
that it was ‘likely to be some time yet’ before the telephone was reconnected.  
 
I am discussing my business with Te Aroha now seven days a 
week and sometimes twice in one day, and these conversations 
are held either soon after 6 a.m. or late in the evening which 
precludes the possibility of using either an Exchange Telephone 
the nearest of which is four miles from me, or my Office which is 
about the same distance. 
I am putting my whole time into the Auckland Smelting 
Company’s Mine and I realize that with the gloomy outlook in the 
International Situation we, in this Country, may have the 
uncomfortable experience of being starved for Lead, and other 
Metals in case of a Third World War. Quite obviously that has 
already commenced, and we cannot forecast how extensively the 
fighting will spread. Almost all the people the Writer speaks to 
are apathetic and do not really think there will be any kind of an 
uncomfortable War but such stupid optimism will get us nowhere. 
In furtherance of my most enthusiastic attempts to quickly find 
extensive and valuable deposits easily accessible, I have, during 
                                            
241 B.J. Dunsheath to C.H. Benney, 11 July 1950, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, 
Part 1, ANZ-W. 
242 C.H. Benney to Director General, Post and Telegraph Department, 13 July 1950, Mines 
Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 1, ANZ-W. 
47 
the past seven days, considerably speeded up the work at Te 
Aroha. The Cross-Cut Drive has now been started and 
arrangements made to rush the work as fast as ever possible. On 
Wednesday the 19th instant, the Face was approximately 30 feet 
in and we now anticipate to advance with the present Driller and 
his Mate, at the rate of 4 feet or more, per day. If we could receive 
permission from the Mines Department to put on two Shifts it 
would necessitate our employing more than the number (namely 
6) of men allowed by the Warden. 
 
More drillers would be employed ‘according to the attractiveness’ of the 
reefs. Some men were ‘continuing with vigorous prospecting on Saturdays 
and Sundays, and we are gradually tracing most promising Mineral Reefs 
which are being approximately surveyed and placed on paper’. All his staff 
‘and others connected with our Company’ were ‘most enthusiastic’, and 
wanted to prospect most of the mountain within a radius of two miles from 
the trig station and receive preference in mining this area. If this right was 
granted, ‘the privilege will be by no means abused but will be prosecuted 
with the utmost enthusiasm’. He had secured an option over approximately 
80 acres of freehold land ‘with a view of taking the fullest economic 
advantage as and when we discover payable Ore in sufficient quantity’. He 
was ‘very interested’ in Littlejohn’s recent visit to Benney, and ‘seriously 
and emphatically’ asked ‘with all sincerity and respectfully’ for financial 
assistance, not only because of the cost of the road but because expenses 
would be ‘fairly heavy’ when the laboratory started ‘in charge of a good 
Chemist’. He would ‘greatly appreciate’ further help and noted that it was 
‘unnecessary to emphasize the relationship between Atomic Defence and the 
Metal Lead’. With Benney’s backing the chances were ‘heavily in favour’ of 
their being able to produce ‘products of enormous economic assistance’ to 
the country. He apologized ‘for inflicting lengthy letters upon you but 
feeling the necessity of explaining to you what is happening and what are 
our difficulties’.243  
In providing the Post and Telegraph Department’s response, Benney 
explained he could do nothing further about his request. Nor could he 
comment on the warden restricting his workforce to six men, this decision 
not being within the department’s jurisdiction, though he recommended 
that this restriction could be modified when the license was renewed. Nor 
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would any financial assistance be considered until the six months had 
passed. Dunsheath’s desire for a prospecting license for up-to-8,000 acres 
could not be granted ‘without statutory conditions as to employment of 
labour with which, considering the limited financial resources available, 
your company would find it difficult to comply’. Benney had suggested to 
Littlejohn that the minister could proclaim the proposed prospecting area 
under the Statutes Amendment Act of 1940, but approval would be refused 
if ‘purely for speculation purposes with no intention to do serious 
prospecting’. As he had told Littlejohn, he intended ‘to visit the area at an 
early date’ to discuss such proposals.244 
In early August, Littlejohn called to see Benney; as he was absent, he 
discussed developments with Landreth and encouraged a visit (and 
requested the return of a small sample provided at their earlier meeting). 
Their capital was ‘insufficient to carry out the development programme, a 
minimum would be 2,000ft of cross-cutting and driving’, but there was 
‘some talk of mining sulphides and shipping them overseas in crude form to 
finance development from the sale’. To Landreth this method of meeting 
costs was ‘obvious’.245  
After Benney and Scoble visited on 29 August, Dunsheath wrote 
thanking the former because ‘we were able to give you evidence of some of 
our more obvious activities’. The company was making ‘a most serious 
attempt at large scale prospecting within an important Area’ that had been 
neglected for 40 years, during which time new methods had been devised for 
treating the ‘complex materials’. Financial assistance was sought ‘to enable 
us to conserve every penny of our finance for underground Work’. Over 
£1,500 had been spent on the road; as it opened up ‘a very important 
Mining Field the value of which’ could ‘only be ascertained by persistent 
activities by enthusiastic and sincere modern Prospectors’, he ‘respectfully’ 
asked for a grant of £1,000 towards it. As driving was costing £5 per foot, he 
requested ‘a substantial Subsidy for the driving of the 800 feet in our initial 
programme’. He claimed to be ‘unconcerned’ about whether he made ‘any 
money at all out of this Scheme to which he is giving every possible support 
in time, thought and finance but he cannot possibly do all that is required 
in the direction of finance’. Once again Benney was reminded that 
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discovering payable base metal mines was ‘of the utmost National 
importance’: ‘We sincerely hope that in view of the urgency and economic 
importance of what we are trying to find, you will be able to help us with 
both the Road and the Drive’. Five ‘self-explanatory’ plans accompanied his 
letter.246  
After their meeting, Benney noted that the ground’s importance lay in 
Adams’ 1929 report of ‘a continuous band of lead-zinc ore averaging 2ft 
thick in contrast to other deposits in the Hauraki Gold Fields where the 
sulphides occur in bunches irregularly distributed through the lode’. 
Although no other geologist had noted this ore, the results Adams claimed 
from his sampling made the mine ‘a most attractive prospect’. Scoble 
reported that Beatson had checked these results and ‘confirmed this in 
conversation here before he left for Tasmania’. Both Benney and Scoble had 
‘repeatedly’ requested Beatson’s maps and reports but Dunsheath would 
‘not release them giving as reason’ that they were ‘unreliable’.  
 
I cannot understand the position but apparently the workings 
whether inspected by Beatson or not are now fallen in and 
inaccessible. No Inspector of Mines and no geologist has inspected 
these drives. 
To my mind the exposures of ore reported are crucial to the whole 
enterprise and development work should have commenced there 
even though it involved opening up old workings. 
However company are now crosscutting 250 ft below old workings 
and it is estimated that 750ft of cross cutting required to intersect 
the Champion reef (i e the reef worked in upper levels). Another 
reef, the Ruakaka, should be cut between 1400 & 1600ft. This 
where sampled on surface by Mr Scoble has shown content of base 
metals. It is possible that other lodes should be intersected, 
particularly a new one recently located. 
However 750ft are required to cut the Champion & a minimum of 
250ft driving on the reef is required, say 1000ft. If company 
cannot finance this programme they should never have started. 
My original estimate was that £20,000 would be required to 
prospect this occurrence & there seems no reason to alter it. 
Basic to intelligent prospecting is a large-scale plan showing all 
outcrops, workings, samples, assay values & contours. If this has 
not been prepared [this] must be regarded as ill considered. 
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Concerning Dunsheath’s desire for a much large prospecting area, 
Benney ‘would like to see [the] company thoroughly prospect the claim they 
now have before tying up surrounding country’.247 He informed Sullivan 
that his visit with Scoble had revealed that it had ‘made a courageous start’ 
by forming the road and buying machinery.  
 
Does the reef exist at depth, or is it a “pipe” thinning out at depth 
from the outcrop on the surface? Do values increase at depth if 
the reef lives? These are the vital issues which, as far as I can 
see, can only be determined by testing. If the reefing system with 
satisfactory values does live at depth and quantity can be 
established, it would be a most valuable national discovery. 
 
It seemed to be ‘a genuine mining prospect and so far the money has 
been wisely spent in a workmanlike manner’. The company had been 
advised to make written application for financial assistance for the road.248  
Shortly afterwards, Scoble reported that two men were driving ten feet 
each week. They were being paid £2 per day, but when the work was let on 
contract they would receive from £2 10s to £3, and there would be 
additional costs for insurance and holiday pay, making the cost of the level 
£4,000, as Dunsheath had estimated. A proper survey was needed, and the 
values of McAra’s samples should be obtained before granting any 
assistance.249  
In response to a sharebroker’s query, Sullivan stated that the company 
had a ‘legitimate mining venture’ but that, like all prospecting, the outcome 
was ‘highly speculative’ and the yield could not be determined until 
development was completed.250 Four months later, Benney gave his 
confidential opinion of the prospects to a delegation from the council: there 
was ‘a 1000 to 1 chance against it being a success, but until that was 
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proved’ the company would be left to test for payable quantities of lead.251 
But when inviting William Goosman, the Minister of Works, to visit the 
mine, which was in his electorate, Impey claimed that Benney had been 
‘very impressed’ with their progress. To encourage Goosman to support 
their application for a subsidy, ‘literature and photos of work carried out’ 
were enclosed’.252 
In response to another request for information, in early October 
Dunsheath sent details of assays, including some done by Beatson, but ‘a 
number’ of Beatson’s other reports were not sent because they were ‘very 
lengthy’ and he considered he had provided sufficient details. (Earlier, he 
had claimed that one of Beatson’s reports was ‘most inaccurate and 
absolutely valueless’.)253 The assays revealed a minute amount of gold in 
almost all the samples.  Dunsheath claimed that, ‘owing to the leached, 
broken and inaccessible nature of surface exposures, extensive surface 
sampling is considered to be redundant, particularly as a means of 
determining Base Metal content. Unleached surface exposures of Base 
Metal Sulphides have been sampled’. When visiting, a representative of the 
largest importer of lead from Broken Hill had ‘tried to give us the 
impression that even if we have large bodies of economic Ore, the Broken 
Hill people will by one means or another, prevent our developing it’.254 No 
more was heard of this alleged threat.  
After reading this letter, Scoble denied that extensive surface 
prospecting was redundant. ‘Invaluable information’ could ‘always be 
obtained by systematic sampling wherever undertaken’, and ‘surface 
exposures’ supplied ‘the same information as could be obtained from the 
driving of levels, etc’. Sampling should have been done ‘at regular intervals 
along the line of reef irrespective of its appearance or width’. The assays 
were ‘erratic’, some high ones being ‘largely offset by others which give 
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negligible results’.255 Landreth agreed there should have been a ‘thorough 
survey of outcrops and old workings with sampling of all exposures’ at the 
start. However, as ‘useful information should be obtained from the driving 
of the crosscut’, which could be ‘classed as reasonable prospecting work 
worthy of some encouragement’, he suggested granting £1,000. Being 
concerned about whether the company had ‘sufficient finance to complete its 
programme even with the £1,000 grant’, he recommended that, instead of 
paying £1 5s per foot for all 800 feet, £2 10s be provided for every foot over 
400 feet and up to 800. ‘This would offer some incentive to the company to 
drive the full 800 feet and assure that the grant’ would achieve ‘a useful 
purpose’.256 Sullivan accepted his recommendation.257 Dunsheath was 
informed that the grant was ‘a free one with no provision for repayment’.258 
It was gratefully received, Dunsheath responding that he would ‘almost 
simultaneously’ open up No. 4 to test the values, along with another drive 
to the north and at the same altitude. Yet again he asked for assistance to 
meet the cost of the road,259 but Sullivan declined, preferring to subsidize 
‘work ahead’, thereby providing an incentive, rather than ‘past work’. He 
expressed regret ‘that at this stage of your development programme’ he 
could ‘see no reason to increase the measure of assistance beyond £1,000’, 
particularly as the grant was ‘free and unsecured and not recoverable from 
future profits’.260 
By the beginning of November, No. 5 drive was in 130 feet.261 At the 
end of the year, the warden was informed that the company had spent 
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£11,527 14s 5d during the term of its prospecting licenses, and was given 
details of all the machinery acquired. The drive was progressing ‘steadily’, 
the drillers working two shifts daily. ‘Prospecting on the surface has 
continued steadily throughout the whole term of the licenses’,262 an 
exaggeration. 
By January, No. 5 had been driven 200 feet, with six men at work, 
three in the tunnel.263 Cornes, who had very briefly prospected at Tui 
during his summer holidays in 1929-1930,264 at Dunsheath’s request visited 
over six days in January, and informed the Dominion Analyst, who had 
been shown an interesting geological sample and had requested more 
details plus another sample,265 that McAra had drawn ‘scale-maps and 
sections’ from ‘careful field surveys with transit instruments’. The level was 
‘a “do or die” effort to cross-cut the Champion system’ and prove the value of 
the reefs, and he considered that ‘the clear definition of outcrops in the field, 
and their continuity as shown by mapping’, provided ‘confidence that the 
venture should succeed’. Furthermore, ‘no expense, consistent with good 
management, has been spared to ensure both efficiency and speed’, the 
greatest delaying factor (and cost) being ‘the scarcity of good miners’.266 (As 
noted, Cornes was not sufficiently impressed to become a shareholder.)267 
 
INTEREST IN WAIORONGOMAI 
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On 21 January 1951, Malcolm Hardy,268 another optimist who 
sufficiently tempered his enthusiasm to refrain from becoming a 
shareholder, showed McAra and Burton his Waiorongomai leases. That 
evening, Burton told Dunsheath that ‘Hardy’s is a very big thing so Mac 
and I are taking a few days to go into the matter before reporting to you’. 
They had been ‘much impressed with what we saw. We had no idea there 
were so many big reefs. Of course, we had no time to do any underground 
inspecting though we saw large quantities of good looking ore at various 
levels. There is no doubt it is a very big thing with immense possibilities’.269 
Hardy had explained that McLean’s level270 provided ready access, although 
a new road would be needed between the tramline and the portal, access to 
which was ‘rather primitive’, McAra noted. After this brief inspection and 
discussion with Hardy, McAra considered ‘the property a most interesting 
one and worthy of further examination to determine as far as possible the 
quantity and grade of ore available’.271 Burton believed there was ‘a great 
possibility of opening up a large low grade gold-silver mine’, and, like 
McAra, saw much evidence of base metals. He recommended an 
investigation lasting at least six months by a mining engineer, assisted by 
four men who would clean out the drives and widen the upper track, at an 
estimated cost of £4,000.272 In May, the company bought Hardy’s 
interests.273 
 
NEEDING MORE CAPITAL AND MORE SUBSIDIES 
 
The company attempted to avoid paying what it considered were 
unnecessary expenses. Having failed to meet three payments for 
chlorinating the town’s water supply and owing the council £191 7s 9d, 
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access to its mine was refused until payment was made.274 To meet such 
costs, more shares were sold. The annual return to 31 December 1950 
reported that 11,700 shares of the 20,000 had been issued, and calls had 
raised £11,637 10s; unpaid calls totalled £62 10s, and 375 shares had been 
forfeited for non-payment.275 An Auckland warehouseman and a married 
woman living at Te Aroha were the first to acquire shares, 100 each, in the 
first two months of 1951.276 By 10 April, another 600 shares had been sold 
to four Aucklanders,277 and 700 were allotted on 8 May, 500 of them to a 
Wellingtonian and the remainder to two Aucklanders. At the same time, 
5,000 paid up shares were allocated to Dunsheath under the agreement 
whereby he had transferred his properties to the company.278 In June, 
another 1,450 were allotted, four of the new shareholders living in 
Auckland, one in Feilding, one in Awakino, and five in Whanganui.279  
In February 1951, Benney discussed the company with Eric Henry 
Halstead, the National Party’s Member of Parliament for Tamaki since 
November 1949, who had become the company’s auditor in that year.280 
Littlejohn followed up this meeting by informing Benney that their broker 
was having difficulty obtaining the extra capital of £10,000. To strengthen 
his request for more assistance, he provided details of payments to 12 
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February. Exclusive of wages, buildings had cost £1,100, the road £1,172, 
and driving No. 5 level £1,200. Plant had cost £1,600, rails £880, a truck 
£462, piping £271, explosives £191, and wages amounted to £3,713. This 
totalled £10,855; in addition, £2,507 was owed on the plant. The extra funds 
were required immediately because the drive was in only 300 feet and the 
subsidy would not be provided until it reached 400 feet, which had ‘got us 
on the spot for the moment’. The company’s finances were ‘cramped’ because 
it had to put metal on the road to make it an all-weather one. He requested 
either paying the subsidy before 400 feet had been driven or granting 
£1,172 for making the road. If this aid was given, their broker was 
‘confident’ that the extra capital could be raised.281 Landreth commented 
that the company, being under-capitalised, was ‘running true to type in 
making further demands upon the Government for assistance to keep 
going’. He suggested that £2 per foot be paid for driving 500 feet, 
commencing once the tunnel was 300 feet long, and, because the company 
was doing ‘useful work’, the department should reconsider granting 
assistance for the road.282 Benney agreed their money was being spent 
wisely on a genuine venture, and recommended the subsidy be varied as 
Landreth suggested, plus a grant of £500 for the road; Sullivan 
concurred.283 The company was grateful, and asked Benney to ‘expedite the 
payment’.284 For the year ending 31 March, subsidies were paid of £500 
towards the road and £120 towards the crosscut.285 Driving had been slow 
with only one shift, but now would be speeded up by employing another two 
men.286  
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To raise more capital, the company sought the assistance of Sir James 
Fletcher, of Fletcher Holdings Ltd,287 who had invested in goldmining from 
at least 1932.288 Fletcher wanted Dunsheath to discuss the planned creation 
of a larger company with Benney, ‘whose approval must be obtained’ before 
he would assist. Being unable to meet with Benney, Dunsheath discussed 
the issue with Landreth in early May, who assured him there was no 
objection to a larger company, for the department’s ‘main criticism has been 
that of under-capitalisation’.289 According to Dunsheath, Landreth ‘was 
quite sure’ that Benney would approve forming a larger company and was 
willing to give his ‘utmost support to get the Mine placed on a sound 
commercial footing’.290  
Dunsheath gave Landreth a copy of an eight-page ‘cyclostyled 
information sheet’ produced to tempt investors. After explaining that the 
‘primitive miners’ of the past had been unable to treat sulphide ores, a 
problem now overcome, the leaflet made several dramatic but unsupported 
statements: 
 
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS THE TE AROHA MINING 
RESERVE has created considerable interest of English, 
Continental, American and Australian Companies. Mr J[ohn 
Howes Gripper] Banks,291 Attorney for the Martha Gold Mining 
Company Ltd, Waihi, has stated to many people that he received 
instructions from London to secure the Te Aroha Mining Area. 
When Mr Banks gave instructions to carry out the order from 
London he was surprised to discover that the Area had already 
been applied for by and granted to The Auckland Smelting Co. 
Ltd. The fact of London’s interest along with the largest Gold 
Mining Company in New Zealand is very significant. Certain 
sound Mining Geologists have stated that Te Aroha is the “Gold 
Field of the Future.” This is more than likely now it is known 
beyond doubt that the Refractory or Complex Ore located there 
exists in massive formation. 
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(In the absence of the company’s records, it is impossible to disprove 
the claim that European, Australian, and American companies were 
interested, but no such interest was reported to the Mines Department or 
the press. There was no evidence that the Martha Company wished to 
acquire the area; despite plenty of vacant ground being available in the ‘Te 
Aroha Mining Area’, it made no move to secure any.) 
Once the new level struck the reef, the company would be able to make 
‘accurate Assays and Analyses’ that would ‘prove to the satisfaction of 
prospective Investors that a modern treatment plant’ was ‘fully justified 
and capable of handling 100 tons or more per day for say a minimum of 20 
years’. Its ground contained ‘Drives, Shafts and Stopes which were put in 
forty or more years ago for the obviously successful extraction of “free” gold’. 
Having thus referred to late nineteenth century workings which, as was not 
noted, had almost all fallen in, and which had not successfully extracted 
gold, free or otherwise,292 the leaflet emphasized that the sulphide ore 
remaining was of great value: 
 
DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS we have had this Area 
prospected and surveyed by Miners, Geologists, Mining 
Engineers, [and] Prospectors, every one of whom has expressed 
himself as being absolutely astounded at what they have seen 
and most enthusiastic to get the growth removed from the surface 
and do all that is necessary to open up the Area in a businesslike 
way. 
IF THE TE AROHA MINING AREA happened to be located in 
Canada or the United States it would have been opened up, 
proved and a Treatment Plant installed twenty years ago. 
MR SCOBLE THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR OF MINES, 
Waihi, periodically visits our Area and has reported persistently 
most favourably upon the great prospects of success. Mr Benney 
the Under-Secretary of Mines recently made a special trip to 
investigate and he reported most favourably upon the Area and 
placed on record his utmost surprise at the enormous amount of 
work we had accomplished in a period of twelve months without 
soliciting any financial or other assistance from the Government. 
 
(Readers were misled by thus exaggerating the number of people who 
had visited and their enthusiasm and by stating that government 
assistance had neither been asked for nor received, for £500 had been paid 
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for the road and £120 for driving, and larger amounts had been requested.) 
The leaflet stated that the Minister of Mines, apparently spontaneously, 
had ‘decided to make a cash grant to the Company and the amount of which 
grant runs well into four figures’. (To be precise, it was £1,500.) There was 
‘no question whatever of repayment by us - it is a gift’.  
It then gave alarmist details of a world shortage of metals. Its zinc 
deposits were ‘obviously very large’, and some of the ore contained 70 per 
cent of pure lead, of which it anticipated a shortage in New Zealand.293 
(Appended assays revealed that only once was the amount of lead as high as 
69.8 per cent.)294 In addition, the company would be able to meet the 
country’s silver needs once mining ceased at Waihi.  
 
IN PLEASANT TIMES of peace New Zealand’s economy could be 
revolutionised by the development of Te Aroha alone. However, 
with the at present International Situation promising a Third 
World War, New Zealand has a very fair chance of actually 
producing within the Dominion these several essential Metals 
named above. 
IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED that our Area and the large 
surrounding Area be “proclaimed” under Section 34 of the Statute 
Mining Act 1940, and we understand that this is to be gazetted in 
the near future. This will place the Company in a remarkably 
favourable position due to the work we have done and are doing 
at present, plus our programme for the next year.295 
 
(The Act meant was the Statutes Amendment Act, as had been 
suggested to Dunsheath by Benney in the previous year;296 there was no 
Mining Act in 1940.) 
 
OUR PRESENT OBJECTS as stated above are to prove the value 
of the Area in blocks as we go along. When a pre-determined body 
of Ore of a certain minimum value is in sight it is intended that 
this present Exploration Company shall form a substantial 
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Company to build the Treatment Plant and carry out the mining, 
milling and refining, etc. The present Company will arrange its 
own terms for the proposed new Company and take either Cash 
or shares or both.297 
 
(The fact that its name proclaimed it to be a smelting company, that 
Bassett, who managed Dunsheath’s Auckland factory, claimed ‘considerable 
experience in smelting matters’,298 and that Dunsheath had been promised 
help with treatment by a long-time associate who was managing director of 
the Sheffield Smelting Company,299 confirmed that Dunsheath preferred to 
smelt the ore himself rather than send it overseas.)  
After listing the equipment and machinery owned and providing 
details of work done to date, two pages were devoted to reproducing some of 
the ‘very large number’ of assays ‘taken at random from our Assay Book’, 
unintentionally revealing highly erratic results. (They were not random: 
apart from two samples taken by McAra, all the other assays were made by 
Beatson in 1949,300 and all 28 had been reported to the Mines Department 
in October 1950.)301 It was stated that in January 1951 ‘we had an official 
visit to our Mine by a Senior Officer of the Dominion Laboratory’, meaning 
Cornes, ‘who was sent to give a report upon the Area and the work we were 
doing and we have received a letter from the Department stating that they 
have reported most favourably to the Under-Secretary of Mines’. (Although 
Cornes did write encouragingly, no letter informing Dunsheath of this is in 
the department’s files.) After describing the company’s headquarters and 
raising the possibility of producing ‘many tons of High Grade Sulphur per 
day’, the leaflet invited applications for another 9,000 shares. It concluded 
that, once the ‘present parent company’ had ascertained the value and 
extent of the ore reserves, it would either increase its capital to enable it to 
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erect a treatment plant or form ‘a separate larger Company to undertake 
the mining and to install [a] suitable plant’.302 
Appended were the assay results of four samples sent to the Dominion 
Laboratory and of ten samples submitted in December 1950. Two of the 
latter samples were considered not worth assaying, and the others had 
erratic results, mostly poor. Another 11 assays, made in January 1951, 
revealed more traces of gold and silver than of base metals, but none gave 
high values.303 Also appended was Cornes’ report on his visit.304 
In mid-May, Dunsheath informed Benney that Douglas Hay, of Hendy 
and Hay, according to him ‘the best and oldest established Mining 
Stockbroker in New Zealand’, had visited the mine:  
 
Mr Hay took with him a Partner of his Firm, and very seriously 
enquired into, examined, and figured upon, our proposition at the 
Mine and on the Outcrops. After some hours up the Hill Mr 
Douglas Hay said, “Many people have asked me about your 
Scheme and I wanted to see first-hand what it comprised. I now 
realize that you have a very serious and promising proposal and 
without any more consideration my opinion is that the job has 
now got to that stage when you must form a large Company to 
continue your work to develop and mine the Area.” 
Mr Hay said he had spoken to other Members of the New Zealand 
Stock Exchanges regarding our Base Metal Mine, and Mr Don 
Schnauer, Auckland Stockbroker, has also visited the Area and 
has personally put money into it.305  
 
(Like several other reportedly enthusiastic people, Hay did not acquire 
any shares; however in December 1950 Donald Ara Schnauer had indeed 
been allotted 200.)306 Hay suggested they should ‘approach some Firm or 
Person likely to be interested and able to’ form a larger company, and ‘for 
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some time past’ Dunsheath ‘had been considering discussing the matter’ 
with Fletcher, giving him details of what had been done and what finance 
was required.  
 
Sir James proved to be most responsive and said that a Company 
of perhaps £500,000.0.0 at least would be necessary to cope with 
what is required. We then mutually discussed the cost of 
engaging one, two or three overseas, (probably from Australia), 
men of repute to visit the Area – 
1. To see what is available, design a layout for the development 
and mining, 
2. To advise upon and design the layout for the mechanical 
equipment, transport, Buildings and Machinery. 
3. To deal with the Metallurgical and Laboratory features of the 
Scheme. 
 
Fletcher was ‘in a position to obtain the temporary services of one or 
more of these necessary reputable and capable men whose services will 
entail an expense of probably a thousand guineas and expenses, each’. To 
raise sufficient capital in New Zealand appeared ‘hopeless’, but should 
Fletcher assist he could ‘secure substantial contributions from Australia, 
England and the United States’. There was ‘no suggestion’ of selling their 
interests to an overseas company, ‘but individual overseas investors’ would 
contribute capital. As thousands of pounds were required for a prospectus 
and to advertise the new company, their ‘small company ‘could not 
physically or financially accomplish’ its launch ‘unaided’, nor ‘readily obtain 
Guarantors willing to take the risk’. It might have ‘to make a temporary 
secondary Company to bear the brunt of those rather extravagant expenses’ 
involved in floating the larger company, but he did not know how much 
money was required for ‘this Intermediate step’. Having discussed Benney’s 
‘favourable attitude to the Scheme’ with Fletcher, they were ‘mutually 
preparing the enquiry for a friend in Australia’ who would be asked to 
suggest suitably skilled men of integrity to visit and produce ‘a first-class 
report’.  
‘Quite apart’ from Fletcher, the company had ‘received an offer based 
upon a personal introduction, (and an introduction from the Stock 
Exchange,) through Sir John MacKenzie to Campbell Craig & Co of 
Wellington’. Sir John, who had been ‘known to’ Dunsheath ‘for many years’, 
had stated that if these base metals could be produced ‘he would give us as 
much backing as he possibly could to ensure that we meet with success. 
With the MacKenzie Trust we are assured of the necessary intermediate 
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steps and under-writing authority and the marketing of the Shares through 
the necessary financial Areas’. (Clearly Sir John McKenzie of Christchurch, 
founder of a chain of stores and one of New Zealand’s wealthiest men, was 
meant. However, if they were so well acquainted, surely Dunsheath would 
have been able to spell his name correctly, and would have known that the 
J.R. McKenzie Trust, one of the largest philanthropic trusts in the southern 
hemisphere, did not assist with company flotation.)307 Should Fletcher 
provide assistance, the company would not ‘proceed with’ McKenzie and 
Campbell, Craig, but it was ‘quite likely’ that Campbell would ask Benney 
for his opinion of the mine’s prospects. (There is nothing on file to indicate 
that he did so.) Campbell, Craig had ‘stated definitely their willingness to 
go overseas’, taking Dunsheath to ‘discuss the matter with suitable 
Australian Advisers, again with a view to getting good technical men to 
visit us and prepare the data for floating the Main Company’. As they did 
‘not propose to act with Campbell, Craig in the meantime’, Dunsheath did 
not want them to know about the negotiations with Fletcher. 
After purchasing Malcolm Hardy’s interests, the company had 
prospected some of his Waiorongomai leases and wished to acquire more 
ground there. After providing details of their work, he concluded with a 
renewed appeal for assistance: ‘I thought it wise to let you know definitely 
what is being done and trust you will approve and give us your blessing in 
our very energetic efforts to bring to fruition the production of Base Metals 
in New Zealand on a sufficiently large scale to help the Country’s 
Economy’.308 
This letter crossed with one from Benney protesting at his leaflet 
claiming he and Scoble had praised the mine. ‘It has been the invariable 
policy of the Mines Department not to express judgment on prospective 
ventures of a speculative nature and thereby commit the Department to the 
success of the enterprise’. Their statements had not been as positive as 
claimed, and must be excised.309 Scoble protested to Benney about the 
circular: ‘I am at all times very careful in any remarks I make about mining 
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propositions.... I am sure that I have not said anything to Mr Dunsheath 
that might be construed as specially favourable to his venture. In fact, I can 
only recall meeting him at the mine once’.310 After Dunsheath hastily 
assured Benney that the offending paragraph had been removed,311 the 
latter clarified his department’s stance. The prospects ‘while highly 
speculative still constituted a legitimate mining venture’, but even if the 
lode was proved to have good values ‘a considerable prospecting and 
development programme still lay ahead before the worth of your areas could 
be assessed’.312 In response, Dunsheath said that he wanted McAra and the 
directors to visit Wellington to discuss their plans with the government.313 
In December he was told that his proposals would be submitted to the next 
meeting of the Minerals Resources Committee, and that Mines Department 
and Geological Survey officers would visit in the following year.314 
Late in May, Dunsheath informed the Department of Industries and 
Commerce that he wanted to form a new company and, to assist the 
flotation, requested a grant of £25 per ton for the first 1,000 tons of lead, 
zinc, and copper mined and treated locally. Alternatively, he asked whether 
the government would subscribe £50,000 towards the £500,000 capital.315 In 
early June, Halstead sent Benney a telegram asking if Impey could see him 
urgently ‘concerning proposition which I think will solve most of the 
difficulties’.316 This meeting took place,317 but was unrecorded. Two weeks 
later, Halstead informed Landreth by telephone that the company’s 
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finances were ‘now desperate as they are at a loss to meet this week’s wages 
bill’, and suggested the department should loan it £2,000, after which an 
‘additional £5000 could be raised from some of his friends who realized that 
it was a gamble. This would allow completion of crosscut to reef’, which 
Landreth considered was the only way to keep the company afloat. Fletcher 
was reportedly interested still, and a Mr Watson was coming to inspect.318 
Benney informed Sullivan that Halstead was ‘interested in the company’ 
and suggested an interest-free loan of £2,000, repayable in five annual 
instalments of £400; Sullivan agreed.319 (Halstead’s ‘interest’ did not extend 
beyond auditing its books: he held no shares.)320  
By 13 June another 5,450 shares had been sold, some to existing 
shareholders, Dunsheath and Littlejohn acquiring another 100 each, and 
Impey 200.321 The annual return dated 23 August reported that of the now 
30,000 shares, 20,100 had been taken up. Calls received totalled £18,925, 
leaving £1,175 outstanding.322 On 1 August, Dunsheath informed Benney 
that it had been decided to increase the capital to £50,000, after which the 
shareholders would ‘convert our interest into a Development Company’. Yet 
again, Fletcher was mentioned as being interested in the plans,323 and 
indeed, when the next allotment was made on 11 September, he was the 
most notable new shareholder, acquiring 500 of the 5,600 sold.324 But Sir 
John McKenzie did not acquire any shares, either then or later.325 Fletcher 
was appointed a director in the same month as he purchased his interest, 
                                            
318 R.F. Landreth to C.H. Benney, 21 June 1951, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 
1, ANZ-W. 
319 C.H. Benney to William Sullivan, 22 June 1951; memorandum by William Sullivan, 22 
June 1951, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 1, ANZ-W. 
320 Auckland Smelting Company, Returns of Allotments, Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 
949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
321 Auckland Smelting Company, Return of Allotments to 13 August 1951, Company Files, 
BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
322 Auckland Smelting Company, Annual Return, 23 August 1951, Company Files, BADZ 
5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
323 B.J. Dunsheath to C.H. Benney, 1 August 1951, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, 
Part 1, ANZ-W. 
324 Auckland Smelting Company, Return of Allotments to 11 July 1951, Company Files, 
BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
325 Auckland Smelting Company, Returns of Allotments, Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 
949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
66 
and would be appointed chairman of directors at the next directors’ 
meeting.326 In the two allotments made after the capital was increased, 22 
of the initial shareholders of 1949 acquired more shares.327 In October, 
Dunsheath correctly informed the warden that there were about 150 
shareholders. ‘He admitted that a broker had been travelling about selling 
shares, but this had been stopped’,328 which, if true, was only a temporary 
halt. Two months previously, he had told Benney that the company was 
‘already receiving very interesting letters from various overseas companies’. 
Both individuals and firms were showing willingness to help finance both 
the mine and a larger company, depending upon which ‘eventual 
arrangement’ was decided: ‘Mine only, or Mine Concentrate, and possibly 
Smelt’.329 (None of these overseas individuals or companies ever took up 
shares.) 
 
MORE PROSPECTING, PREPARATIONS, AND ADVICE 
 
In May, McAra and Burton inspected Waiorongomai again and 
observed considerable deposits of sulphide ore. Further prospecting of the 
Peter Maxwell had ‘opened up a wide seam of very heavy dense Sulphides’ 
and discovered ‘several other substantial Sulphide seams adjacent’ that had 
never been ‘touched previously’, Dunsheath believed. 
 
At present we are also cutting a track to the “Thames Lead & 
Silver” also opening up the collapsed No. 4 Drive, cleaning up the 
faces of the Sulphide Reefs in Copper Creek-Peter Maxwell, 
clearing the Peter Maxwell Tracks including Track down the hill 
to Copper Creek. We are installing Ladders in several of the 
Winzes and are putting not less than two additional cuts in the 
Base Metals Outcrop. 
Owing to the great difficulty in obtaining supplies of Drill Steels 
and Tungsten Carbide or other types of Bits our No. 5 Cross-Cut 
Drive programme has had to be reduced to one shift temporarily 
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but as soon as we are able to get supplies we will resume two 
shifts.330 
 
They planned to employ Hardy, who had provided maps and details of 
the ore treated, to assist to restart mining at Waiorongomai.331 Shortly 
afterwards McAra had a ‘serious accident’, of an unrecorded nature, 
requiring his being hospitalized; despite this, No. 4 level was re-timbered.332 
In the year to 31 March 1952, the company spent £460 of their subsidy.333 
By the end of July, No. 4 had been cleaned out completely (a distance of 400 
feet) and the reef at its end was sampled. Preparations were also being 
made to examine the Thames Lead and Silver mine, on the far side of the 
ridge, and the Ruakaka reef was being tested, along with the Peter Maxwell 
section, which Dunsheath reported was ‘most attractive’. Surveys were 
made of Waiorongomai, with Hardy and some casual employees cleaned out 
drives there ‘to facilitate inspection and check sampling by an Overseas 
Engineer whom we have engaged to visit our Area and give a complete 
report’.334 A week later, Dunsheath reported that G.H. and J. Watson of 
Sydney,335 now their mining and consulting engineers, had sent J.M. 
Warrington to inspect; he invited the department to visit at the same 
time.336  
Before Warrington arrived, six samples from Tui and one from the 
Premier mine at Waiorongomai were assayed by the Dominion Analyst, 
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with very variable results, none of much value.337 At his request, 
Dunsheath received a copy of Eric Ogilvy Macpherson’s 1932 report of Te 
Aroha’s geology on condition that no portion was published.338 In returning 
this ‘very interesting reading’, he claimed that, as ‘no interest was being 
taken in Base Metals’ then, its comments did ‘not have the same importance 
as they would to-day’. Nevertheless, ‘there was at least one helpful 
observation’, unspecified, ‘which I have already taken steps to work 
upon’.339  
The annual report submitted to the company’s general meeting on 9 
August 1951 began by stating that the ‘very many difficulties’ encountered 
had mostly been ‘successfully overcome’. Replacing the ‘steep, overgrown 
and narrow tracks’, a road of two and a quarter miles had been constructed 
to an altitude of 1,600 feet.  
 
Engineroom, Engineer’s and Blacksmith’s Workshops, Crib Room 
and Shower Room have been built. At this altitude is the Portal of 
No. 5 Cross Cut Drive which the Company is now piercing to 
intersect the lower level of the “Champion” lode which outcrops 
505ft above. This Drive has now advanced to 455ft and is being 
pushed forward with all possible speed. 
At the Mouth of the Drive have been erected Staging, Bins, 
Chutes and a Store and Shelter Building. Nearby has been built a 
Blower House.... 
The Main Engineroom is equipped with a four cylinder Diesel 
Engine of modern type driving the Air Compressor for working 
the rock drills underground.... 
At the Company’s Depot within the Borough we have already 
equipped a first class Laboratory to take care of the assaying and 
analysing, also Drawing Office, Store, and Manager’s and 
Superintendent’s residences. For transport purposes to the Mine 
the Company possesses a Heavy Duty four-wheel drive Truck, 
also has the use of a “Jeep.” 
A convenient water supply has been arranged and led to the 
Building and to the underground drive. Air supply pipes lead 
from the Engine House to the Drive and up to the working face. 
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New rails are laid in the drive which is equipped with the usual 
facilities. Modern Steel Dumping trucks are used in the Mine. 
 
The ground contained ‘a large number of more or less substantial 
Sulphide Reefs’, the outcrops of which had been surveyed. After many 
samples had been taken from the surface and, where possible, underground, 
all the ground from the Thames Lead and Silver to the Peter Maxwell had 
‘proved worthy of close examination’ and was being explored. The 
government had been ‘most helpful’, providing £500 towards constructing 
the road and £120 towards No. 5; no mention was made of its offer of a 
£2,000 interest-free loan. 
 
As you will no doubt understand it is the intention of this 
prospecting Company to float a considerably larger organisation 
to develop and mine the property. With this in view we have 
already made contact with substantial authorities who have 
evinced considerable interest in the valuable Te Aroha area held 
by us and in due course the Directors propose to negotiate with 
these people. 
 
Since work had commenced, £12,007 10s had been spent.340 (In the 
absence of the company’s records, it is not known whether in fact 
‘substantial authorities’ had expressed interest.) 
At the end of the month, Dunsheath wrote to the Te Aroha News 
thanking residents who had written to support the company’s plans. After 
promising that future operations would ‘avoid inflicting ugly scars on the 
beautiful bush-clad mountain’, he made some exaggerated statements: 
 
Both Labour and National governments have sincerely 
encouraged our prodigious exploration scheme at Te Aroha and 
have financially backed our efforts in no uncertain manner. No 
great stretch of imagination is needed to realise that the mineral 
wealth of Te Aroha can produce results with far-reaching 
consequences in respect to the economy of this Dominion. 
The President of the British Institute of Mining Engineers in 
London recently said that no substantial deposit of metallic ores 
had been discovered during the past fifty years, and it was 
imperative that additional sources of supply be found if the world 
is to maintain the present rapid rate of consumption of metals. 
For our comfort everyone of us is dependent upon metals, 
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although the average person completely fails to realize this fact. 
Our present £50,000 capital cannot fail to help Te Aroha, and an 
ultimate operation by a large company will lift the township to 
greater prosperity.341 
 
Warrington inspected from 30 September to 7 October. After visiting 
the outcrops and adits in the Tui area, the Thames Lead and Silver and 
Peter Maxwell mines, and McLean’s level at Waiorongomai, he felt unable 
to ‘form a precise opinion of the value of the deposits exposed in the existing 
workings’, but because of the potential considered ‘a programme of 
expansion’ was ‘warranted along proper planned lines’.342 He made several 
recommendations: 
 
A development programme should be launched as soon as possible 
designed to establish, positively, the value of these deposits. The 
scheme should include - 
(a) A minimum of 4,000 feet of openings and up to 6,000 feet of       
diamond drillings. 
(b) A substantial increase of existing staff at the mine to allow the 
investigation to go forward on a scientific basis from the outset. 
(c) A comprehensive sampling programme to cover all phases of 
the work and include check sampling of all existing unstoped 
drives etc. 
(d) The assay laboratory already existing at the mine is to be 
brought into operation and a competent officer engaged to carry 
out the work. 
(e) Accurate surveys with theodolite and chain and establishment 
of a system of co-ordinates to facilitate the work of exploration. 
Preparation of geological records will be an integral part of this 
work. 
(f) Stepping up of underground work in order to complete the 
expansion in a reasonable time and inauguration of two-shift 
operation for a five day week.343 
  
He gave the distances to be driven or diamond drilled in the various 
adits, and wanted 4,000 samples taken at 10-foot intervals.344 Improved 
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road access and more plant must be provided. At the end of six months the 
staff should consist of a superintendent, a surveyor-geologist, an assistant 
surveyor, an assayer, an assistant assayer, a storekeeper-clerk, two shift 
supervisors, a surface foreman and prospector, three samplers, 16 miners 
and labourers, four drivers, and one fitter. ‘Technical Managers’ should 
control the work. This development, to take two years, would cost 
£100,880.345 According to Dunsheath, Warrington considered the area ‘the 
most interesting one he has ever inspected’ and which could justify erecting 
a plant capable of treating 50,000 tons a month.346 
In late October, protection was sought for the two Waiorongomai 
claims, purchased in the previous month, ‘to enable completion of the 
financial and technical arrangement’ for their ‘joint working’. They were 
part of the 2,000 acres the company wished to prospect, for mining would be 
uneconomic unless ‘undertaken over a very large and extensive area’. The 
company claimed to have ‘spent £30,000 on prospecting and exploratory 
work and the total length of driving opened up was nearly 3,000ft’. The 
development recommended by the Sydney engineer ‘of world-wide repute’ 
would not be undertaken unless the company had confidence in it. It was 
claimed that ‘the Mines Department considered that the project would be of 
great benefit to the Dominion at least’. As Dunsheath told the warden,  
 
The idea of a small scheme had been turned down on economic 
grounds. To be successful the scheme had to be an extensive one. 
Engineering reports had confirmed the company’s previous 
contentions. Mining was an expensive business and at least fifty 
per cent of the money already spent had been used for the 
purchase of plant and machinery. 
 
The department ‘had been kept fully informed’ and ‘had offered an 
interest free loan but this had not been accepted’. (There is nothing in the 
departmental files to explain why this offer had been declined; presumably 
it was because, being a loan and not a grant, it would have to be repaid.) 
Challenged by counsel for two men who wished to prospect 200 of these 
2,000 acres, Dunsheath admitted that the company ‘intended to take up all 
the land available for mining’ because this was most economical; its 
‘objective was to find out what was worth exploring’. Responding to the 
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complaint that his area was too large, Dunsheath claimed that ‘an 
American smelting company had been interested in a piece of land at 
Waiorongomai but had turned it down because it was too small. The 
expense would be too great to deal with the area piecemeal’. He was anxious 
to work the Waiorongomai claims immediately, as had been ‘suggested in 
Wellington … by a very important man of the government’,347 possibly 
Halstead, who was to become Minister of Social Security in 1954 and 
Ministry for Industries and Commerce as well as Customs in 1956.348 The 
company was granted its prospecting license, less these 200 acres.349 
According to Norman Annabell, probably this large area was sought ‘for the 
purpose of an enlarged Company promotion scheme’.350 
During 1951, old drives at Waiorongomai had been cleared out, and 
McAra and Burton had examined many reefs both underground and on the 
surface. They considered the area to be ‘a big low to medium-grade gold and 
silver proposition’. A tender had been obtained to form a road from 
Waiorongomai to McLean’s level at a cost of £3,000, not including pipes, 
metalling, and blasting. Dunsheath wanted the Waiorongomai and Tui 
mines worked together both for reasons of economy and because the gold 
and silver from the former would ‘sweeten’ the Tui base metals when prices 
for the latter fell. Electric engines could haul ore on double track tramways 
driven through the mountain to underground hoppers for trucking down to 
Waiorongomai, thus ending the dispute with the council over the water 
supply;351 he did not mention how much these developments would cost. 
 
MORE SUBSIDIES REQUESTED 
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In late November, Trevor Lewis Gick, a chartered accountant,352 
previously the company’s auditor and now its secretary, informed the Mines 
Department that the directors intended to carry out Warrington’s report, 
‘subject to securing substantial Government assistance’. Of their now 
50,000 shares, 38,000 had been sold, making £8,000 currently available. As 
a capital expenditure of £39,275 was planned, they planned to seek 
permission to increase the capital to £125,000. The directors’ requests had 
ballooned: they now sought a £25,000 interest-free loan, a subsidy of £7 
towards what was now estimated to be a cost of driving of £20 per foot (no 
explanation was given for this big increase), the loan of diamond drilling 
equipment, and a grant of £5,000 towards the estimated drilling cost of 
£13,500.353 To support their case, details were provided of the planned 
developments along with costings and plans.354 Because of this request for a 
considerably increased loan, granting the £2,000 one was deferred.355 
After Warrington pinpointed ‘the best location for a proposed drive to 
intersect the reef identified by extensive surface surveys’, mining could 
commence ‘in earnest’, and McAra moved his wife and four children to a 
house he had purchased in Te Aroha.356 In December, Dunsheath claimed, 
in a letter to the county council, that the company would start carrying out 
Warrington’s proposals ‘early in January next’. To get machinery to 
McLean’s level, he offered to purchase the tramway for £10 if the council 
would not repair it. ‘At very considerable private expense and subsidized by 
the Government, we are making a do-or-die effort to open up this Te Aroha 
Complex Ore Mining Field, which we are confident is of considerable 
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dimensions’.357 While awaiting a response to the request for assistance, 
constructing the road to McLean’s level was postponed and none of the 
‘several good technical men’ seeking work were employed.358  
An editorial in the Te Aroha News in early January 1952 supporting 
the project was clearly based on information provided by the company, for it 
stated that, with the Martha mine at Waihi soon to close,  
 
all eyes have turned to Te Aroha where a private company has 
been conducting preliminary investigations on the possibility of 
launching a major lead mining project. It has been known for 
some considerable time that valuable deposits of lead and other 
metals which are in great demand today exist in this district but 
these have not yet been fully surveyed and proved. 
Mining is an expensive business and before any major 
undertaking can be embarked upon it has to be proved, despite 
the world’s shortage of metal, that there is sufficient ore present 
to make its extraction a practical and economic proposition. The 
company which is making the test here has spent a considerable 
sum of money and has made good progress. Its work has been 
thorough and methodic and it should not be so very long before it 
can announce the results of its investigations. 
Who knows, but the town may be on the brink of a new mining 
boom. If this is the case Te Aroha may soon become of even 
greater importance.359  
 
Scoble and Landreth visited from 21 to 24 January but a member of 
the Geological Survey was unable to join them. They considered that no 
‘serious attention’ needed to be paid to Waiorongomai, where the company 
had made only ‘desultory examination of old workings’ (a very different 
perspective to Dunsheath’s claims),360 a district ‘subject to an intensive 
survey by officers of the Mines Department in past years’. They did not take 
any samples at Tui, considering these ‘not crucial’, as previous sampling 
had revealed a ‘high base metal content’ but with ‘negligible’ gold content of 
the sulphides. Scoble’s and Crawford’s 56 samples taken in 1936 had proved 
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the area had ‘no possibilities as a gold producer, and while no assays were 
taken of the base metal content this was because their occurrence was not 
considered sufficiently encouraging to justify sampling and assaying’. They 
discussed Warrington’s prospecting recommendations with Dunsheath, 
Burton, and McAra, as well as with Hugh Crawford, who had ‘inspected the 
area on various occasions’. Adams’ 1929 report claiming high base metal 
content was ‘sufficiently encouraging to warrant an investigation’ to confirm 
it, but as ‘unfortunately when the workings were open they were not 
inspected by any officer of the Mines Department or the Geological Survey’ 
there was ‘no official record available’. They believed operations should 
have commenced by re-opening No. 3 level to test the lode by driving on it, 
then doing likewise in No. 4, and finally, if results were sufficiently 
encouraging, commencing No. 5. ‘The company determined otherwise, and 
has staken its hopes upon the driving of No. 5 crosscut some 160ft below 
No. 4’. To date, only 560 of the estimated 800 feet needed to hit the reef had 
been driven. 
 
Progress has been painfully slow due to difficulty in securing 
labour. At the moment only 3 men are employed, 2 in the drive 
and one on the surface looking after the compressor, ventilating 
unit, etc. If reasonable progress is to be made the crosscut must 
be worked in two shifts. Difficulty in obtaining labour is due in 
great part to lack of suitable housing accommodation at Te Aroha. 
It seems as if the only solution is for the company to provide 
housing, but this would be a heavy drain upon a prospecting 
company with limited financial resources. 
 
Although No. 4 level contained ‘excellent’ ore exposed over a length of 
ten feet, the width of the sulphide band was ‘a little disappointing in view of 
the old reports’, averaging less than one foot. Driving on No. 5 made further 
development of No. 4 redundant for the moment.  
 
All together there would appear to be a possible extent of the lode 
along the strike for 2,000ft plus, and a possible vertical depth of 
say 500ft. If the sulphide band averaged 1ft in width over the 
whole of this extent both horizontally and vertically, there would 
be some 100,000 tons of sulphide ore. 
 
Based on several assumptions, this lode could contain 400 tons of 
copper, 8,000 tons of lead and 16,000 tons of zinc, worth £4,000,000. On the 
other hand, development might reveal sulphides ‘only in bunches 
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irregularly distributed’ and diminishing with depth, making the total 
tonnage ‘negligible’. The possibilities were ‘sufficiently attractive to justify a 
prospecting programme’, even though the result was ‘highly speculative’.  
 
From a national viewpoint definite information about the 
behaviour of the lode in depth and an estimate of the total metal 
content of the lode would be of value and accordingly in our 
opinion merits some measure of financial assistance from the 
Government. There has been a tendency on the part of the 
company to expect that the major portion of the finance should be 
contributed by the Government, and apparently the extensive and 
ambitious prospecting programme is based on such an 
expectation. In our opinion from the information available there 
is little justification for embarking on the large scale intensive 
prospecting programme set out and certainly none for the 
Government to contribute all but a small fraction of the necessary 
finance.  
 
To encourage the company to complete No. 5 and drive 400 feet along 
the lode in both directions, they recommended that, in addition to the loan 
of £2,000, the subsidy per foot be raised from £2 to £3, to a maximum of 800 
feet, which was equivalent of a £1 for £1 subsidy.361 This arrangement was 
offered to the company in early March.362 One week later, Gick expressed 
the directors’ ‘keen disappointment at the amount’ offered, claiming the 
company had spent £30,000 of the £43,000 raised whereas the government 
had provided only £900.363 (In fact, the company’s records showed the 
government had provided subsidies totalling £1,080 to the end of March,364 
and its offer of a £2,000 interest-free loan was yet to be taken up.) The 
department was now asked to promise ‘substantial aid’ if a payable lode was 
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found.365 Landreth told Benney that he considered that ‘if results were 
satisfactory’ and the company could not obtain ‘sufficient finance to proceed 
some further measure of assistance’ would be ‘justified’, but no commitment 
should be entered into until results were obtained.366 Benney responded 
that ‘this project was never designed or carried on on the basis of the State 
providing a substantial, or any, part of the capital, and if successful the 
reward, quite rightly, will be to the shareholders’. The company ‘would not 
need financial aid from the State should good payable ore be struck and 
proved to persist in No. 5 Level’.367 
 
CONTINUED WORKING, MORE ADVICE RECEIVED 
 
At the end of March, Sullivan was informed that the company had 
obtained a ‘working party of experienced miners from Waihi’ to complete 
No. 5 and to drive along the exposed face of No. 4.368 The Te Aroha News 
explained that because of mines closing down elsewhere the company had 
been able to obtain ‘reliable and skilled underground machine drillers’, who 
were working two shifts on contract.369 The following month, McAra 
informed the Te Aroha Rotary Club about their testing, ‘a big undertaking’ 
that was making ‘good progress’. Successful development ‘would not be only 
an asset to the district but would assume national importance’. With new 
methods, ‘highly payable quantities of ore’ could be produced at a time when 
demand for base metals was increasing. ‘The work done to date showed that 
there was an intricate network of payable reefs throughout the whole of the 
Te Aroha-Waiorongomai areas and was such that extensive underground 
exploration was definitely warranted’.370 By early May, in attaining 700 feet 
                                            
365 T.L. Gick to C.H. Benney, 14 March 1952, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 2, 
ANZ-W. 
366 R.F. Landreth to C.H. Benney, 17 March 1952, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, 
Part 2, ANZ-W. 
367 C.H. Benney to R.F. Landreth, 17 March 1952, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, 
Part 2, ANZ-W. 
368 T.L. Gick to William Sullivan, 31 March 1952, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, 
Part 2, ANZ-W. 
369 Te Aroha News, 28 March 1952, p. 4. 
370 Te Aroha News, 4 April 1952, p. 5. 
78 
No. 5 had struck a 12-foot reef, possibly the Champion or ‘a portion which 
has split off from same’; extending it would prove what had been cut.371  
Late in May, Dunsheath asked for the report written by ‘Government 
Geophysical Survey Officers’ who had spent ‘some considerable time’ 
examining Te Aroha.372 At the beginning of the following month, John 
Benjamin Misz,373 of the Geophysics Division of the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, produced his geophysical survey.374 He 
reported that although 28 working days had been spent between 1 
November and 7 December, on 16 of these days work was impossible 
because of ‘continuous heavy rain’, and seven other days ‘were cut short by 
early afternoon downpours’. Lack of labour had hindered the survey as well. 
‘For the first week, only one man was available’ to assist, and when two 
helped later, they were ‘not the same two for the entire remaining period, 
and whenever a new man was assigned, time was lost familiarizing him 
with the work’.375 Having explained why the survey had taken so long, he 
gave full details of the geological history of the peninsula, largely using 
earlier geological surveys to explain the mineralization and noting their 
disagreements on basic points.376 McAra believed the ‘extreme ruggedness’ 
of the country to the west of Waiorongomai’s buck reef had prevented the 
discovery of reefs there, but Misz considered the reason was ‘more apt to be 
geological’. He warned that mining would not be cheap, pointing out the 
lack of roads and the hours it took to walk from one part of the field to 
another. The company had ‘cleaned and drained’ No. 2 level and No. 4 
crosscut, both of which contained ‘a nine inch sulphide band’. After No. 5 
crosscut struck the Champion reef it might be continued to the Ruakaka 
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reef, about 400 feet further east.377 Details were given of geophysical 
investigations ‘confined to self-potential and resistivity on the Paddock 
Reefs [just above the golf course],378 Dead Goat Creek Reef, Thames Lead 
and Silver, No. 2 level, No. 4 crosscut and Goat Winze’.379 Adequate testing 
required longer time using better equipment and a ‘field crew’ of at least 
three men.380 
 
DISAGREEMENT OVER MANAGEMENT 
 
The following month, Dunsheath wrote a personal letter to Landreth 
about Burton and McAra. After stating that the former had at all times 
been ‘a most valuable asset’, he found fault with McAra:   
 
To begin with we made McAra to be in charge of all the Works 
Underground and Surface, but following a number of errors of 
judgment made by McAra it was decided to put Burton in charge 
of the work and make McAra the Mine Manager only. This 
worked very well and the two men worked in cooperation. The 
various works required were discussed amicably and between 
them they decided who should do the work and how it should be 
undertaken. I found that McAra was rather inclined to undertake 
certain jobs with which he had no experience whatever. In this 
way we got into trouble on many occasions. As you will readily 
realize mistakes cost money, therefore at the end of 1950 after Mr 
McAra had been employed by the Company just over a year, the 
Management of the job was split up so as to make McAra Mine 
Manager in charge of all underground works and Burton in 
charge of all surface works. This worked very satisfactorily until 
one day Mr McAra raised the point in front of some of the 
Directors whom he asked to clarify his position with the 
Company. As a result of this a memorandum was given to both 
McAra and Burton setting out their respective duties. McAra was 
to be definitely the Mine Manager in charge of all underground 
works, and Burton was to be surface Supervisor in charge of 
everything above ground including roads, transport, engineroom, 
etc. 
McAra is an ambitious man and with proper supervision and 
guidance everything went very satisfactorily. However, for some 
reason he sent a personal letter addressed to the Chairman of 
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Directors Sir James Fletcher, and complained regarding the 
instructions given by myself as Managing Director. Sir James, 
unwittingly, fell into a trap and found that he and I had given 
contrary orders to McAra. McAra then adopted the attitude that 
he should only take instructions from the Managing Director 
provided they were confirmed by the Secretary in writing. 
Naturally, this was rather difficult for all concerned, and in the 
meantime, Mr Burton was asked by Sir James Fletcher to work 
under McAra’s instructions. Poor McAra, unfortunately, has given 
so many foolish orders that Burton decided he could no longer 
work alongside McAra, and decided to leave the job and take a 
little holiday which he is still doing. 
In the meantime the whole matter has been ventilated at the 
Directors’ Meeting to-day, and we have decided to tell McAra that 
it is our intention to put one man in charge of the entire property 
and Mine, and that this may would be appointed in the near 
future.  
 
As the directors wanted a certified mine manager who could also do 
surface and clerical work, they would soon ask Landreth to suggest one. 
 
From my own personal experience and intimate knowledge I 
would like to have Burton take on the job because he is an all-
round man, a first-class prospector, a good man on timber, 
excellent at putting down engines and foundations, building tips, 
putting up buildings, installing machinery, putting in a straight 
Drive, assessing the hardness of the Country underground, taking 
a compass survey, doing general blacksmith’s work including 
pointing and hardening Miners’ Picks or making Drill Steels. 
Burton is a first-class man on making roads, water dams, etc. He 
can outdistance most young men when trailing round the 
mountain or in man-handling heavy timber, etc. What is most 
important, he is most wonderfully tactful and capable when it 
comes to handling labour. 
McAra has got us into a whole lot of trouble in connection with 
our underground Drillers who are supposed to be working on 
contract. They are taking advantage of him and of course, of us. 
They completely ignore his orders and carry out the work just as 
they like. For instance, much of the work done by him or to his 
instructions has either had to be done over again or will have to 
be pulled down and rebuilt in the very near future. At the present 
he has allowed the Drillers to get the Roof on No. 5 Drive nearly 
9ft from the top [of] the rails instead of the maximum of 7ft which 
is in our specification. Mac says that the men “cannot help it” but 
it is naturally quite ridiculous to be taking out a matter of 2 tons 
of country rock with each round fired. They were playing up with 
him last week and telling him the country was so hard that it 
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took them six individual times to fire out the round. He thinks 
they are quite sincere and is at present recommending we pay 
them much more money than the agreed contract price per foot. 
There is no doubt in my mind that McAra will leave us and I am 
wondering what your opinion is regarding the suitability of 
Burton, who incidentally, is an extremely hard worker at all 
times and possesses great wisdom and understanding when it 
comes to matters of mining and engineering. 
 
Having thus extravagantly praised the man he had always wanted as 
his mine manager, Dunsheath professed to be worried about the cost of 
obtaining an ‘outside man’ and the long delay before he could start work, 
and sought Landreth’s private opinion about the best thing to do. He added 
a postscript that if they could obtain ‘a pensioner with a certificate Burton 
would gladly do the rest’.381 
Landreth expressed surprise, for he had considered that McAra and 
Burton had ‘co-operated very well in what must be regarded as a difficult 
situation’, as dual control always was. He agreed that single management 
was better. ‘It seemed to me, as I informed you, that the general lay-out and 
method of working was adequate and workmanlike, but not extravagant’ for 
a prospecting company. While impressed with Burton’s ‘considerable 
experience’, the fact of his being uncertified ‘must handicap him 
considerably, and the appointment of a certified man to act more or less as a 
dummy for him must eventually result in the same difficult situation’. He 
named an employee of the Otago School of Mines as being an excellent 
replacement.382  
The following day, Dunsheath wrote to Benney about a suggestion 
McAra had made at the beginning of May, which (although Dunsheath had 
not explained this) had provoked his attack on him. When McAra ‘suggested 
very strongly’ that the reef cut in No. 5 at 600 feet was the same as that in 
No. 4, the directors were ‘very sceptical about the Country moving 200ft to 
bring the Reef to this particular position’. Gordon Williams, director of the 
Otago School of Mines, was cited as agreeing with them. McAra wanted to 
turn the level 40 degrees to the south to be at right angles to the Ruakaka 
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reef, which was 700 feet away.383 Landreth advised Benney that the 
direction of the level did not make much difference to the length to be 
driven, and doubted the reef cut was ‘either a new reef or a split off the 
Champion’, for it was ‘not a question of the country moving 200ft, but of a 
change in the dip in the reef’. As Scoble was ‘non-committal’ and Williams 
considered the reef was not the Champion, ‘the crosscut should be persisted 
with’ until a decision could be made, and he recommended continuing the 
subsidy ‘up to 800ft as originally approved and in the changed direction’. 
The uncertainty was ‘inseparable from the driving of low level crosscuts 
without following the reef down by winzing from the last level’, the ‘golden 
rule of prospecting’ being ‘to stick to the ore’. Continuing the crosscut to 
intersect the Ruakaka would ‘further demonstrate the folly of such 
prospecting’. If the Champion did not ‘carry base metals in depth’, it was 
‘difficult to see why there should be an improvement’ in the Ruakaka. He 
recommended that, when the position of the Champion reef was 
determined, the company drive on it to thoroughly test its value; if the 
results were disappointing there was ‘little case’ for exploring the 
Ruakaka.384 Dunsheath was informed that the subsidy already paid for 350 
feet of driving would be continued for an additional 150 feet, as originally 
agreed to. ‘Should, however, another reef not be intersected in this distance, 
it would then appear that the reef intersected must be the Champion after 
all’, and the department considered the company would be ‘well advised to 
explore this reef by driving along it before undertaking the long crosscut to 
the Ruakaka reef’.385 
Two weeks after his first attack on McAra, Dunsheath again 
complained to Landreth about him, listing a number of skills he allegedly 
lacked that were irrelevant to his work as mine manager. He claimed 
McAra lacked ‘sufficient experience in the general handling of the Mine 
requirements, Timber, Roads, Machinery, etc, to be able to make a right 
decision’. He also lacked ‘experience with road making, cutting timber, 
driving trucks, putting in foundations’, and so forth. Whereas McAra 
received a salary of £850 plus a house and allowances, Burton had been 
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‘carrying the load’ on a labourer’s wage. He repeated that Burton had lots of 
tact.386 The following month, it was planned that, when in Dunedin, 
Fletcher would interview McAra’s possible replacement.387 
 
AN OFFER OF ASSISTANCE, WITH WARNINGS 
 
As mentioned in passing by Dunsheath, Gordon Williams, of the 
University of Otago and director of the Otago School of Mines,388 when 
visiting in June had ‘suggested that the company allow him to help it’, being 
particularly interested in how to concentrate the minerals. The local 
newspaper welcomed his assistance because it would prevent ‘the company 
wasting thousands of pounds on unnecessary experiments before deciding 
upon the most suitable method’.389 ‘Argus’ believed that ‘perhaps a fair 
percentage of the more progressive residents’ had been heartened by the 
news, and considered it likely the mine would be ‘a most important factor in 
the prosperity of both town and district’.390 In the following month, ‘S. 
Ignatius’ considered that the company’s plans were ‘the greatest progressive 
movement ... ever brought about in the history of Te Aroha’.391 
Nothing was made public about Williams’ investigations, even 
shareholders not being informed of them. However, Williams sent Landreth 
a copy of his private report, asking him ‘to consider it confidential and not 
use it in any official way’.392 His opinions were based on ‘brief first 
impressions’ during one afternoon’s visit, and reached without access to 
assays, maps, and other information. He believed the ore was likely to be of 
lower value at depth and it was ‘probable that no large scale workings may 
be anticipated’. A successful mine would need to produce 12,000 tons per 
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year for 15 years, an amount which did not exist in this mine alone and was 
unlikely to occur ‘in any other single mine’. He was ‘under the impression 
that the fundamental importance of tonnage and grade’ was ‘not fully 
realized. However attractive individual exposures may be’, they had ‘no 
commercial value’ unless ‘reasonably persistent’. After advising about 
techniques for mining the narrow reefs, he warned there was ‘no 
alternative’ to erecting ‘a central mill of 50-ton per day capacity, and 
capable of producing three products by selective flotation - the concentrates 
of zinc, lead, and copper’. Experiments would determine the most suitable 
milling procedures, but ‘the all-important question of ore reserves’ must be 
determined first. When estimating costs, he warned that ore would ‘almost 
certainly have to be drawn from small mines in several localities, each 
requiring separate mining equipment, surface access, and underground 
entry’. Mining and milling plus overheads would cost as much as £12 per 
ton, much more than elsewhere, and with the falling price of ore along with 
the need to ship concentrates to Australia or elsewhere, with a tentative 
freight cost of £6 7s, profit per ton would be only £1 13s. Offering to assist 
prospecting in November for other reefs, he suggested possibly bringing ore 
from other base metal reefs on the peninsula and amalgamating with other 
parties to share the mill and provide adequate reserves; he would be ‘glad to 
act as an intermediary if such a scheme should be entertained’. His 
conclusions made sobering reading for the directors: 
 
(i) The formation of an operating company with, perhaps 
£100,000 capital is not yet justified. 
(ii) There is considerable doubt whether, even if the reef is struck 
in No. 5 crosscut, the Champion Reef alone would make a mine. 
(iii) More consideration should at this stage be given to 
neighbouring prospects, firstly by studying records and maps. 
(iv) Unless 150,000 tons of good grade ore are available, there is 
little hope of operating with financial success.393 
 
In his 1965 publication Economic Geology of New Zealand, Williams 
analyzed the complex ore without giving any estimate of its value, apart 
from noting ‘the very lean gold content of the oxidized ore’.394 
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Williams’ report was never released, not even after operations ceased, 
and instead the company’s ‘good news’ policy continued. In July it 
announced the discovery of the ‘valuable and rare element Germanium’, 
particularly needed in transistors, its first discovery in New Zealand.395 
Four days later, a Te Aroha News editorial noted the ‘distinct possibility’ 
that the mountain might ‘again produce something of real wealth and value 
to the economy’, creating ‘another mining boom’ for the township, for the 
company’s ‘extensive tests’ had revealed that base metals, for which there 
was a world-wide demand, were ‘present in fairly large deposits’. Should it 
decide that the project warranted ‘developing into a major undertaking’, Te 
Aroha would ‘experience far greater prosperity of a permanent nature than 
it did during the short lived gold era’ of the 1880s. Careful testing meant 
the field had ‘never been so thoroughly explored before’, and by using 
modern machinery and obtaining the best technical advice the project was 
‘well organized’ and worked ‘in a thorough, efficient and very methodic 
manner. With any reasonably good chance, the company should experience 
the success it rightly deserves’. The newspaper was certain the mine would 
not have any ‘detrimental effect on the borough’s welfare’, a reference to the 
still-simmering issue of pollution, and commended the company’s 
‘initiative’, hoping ‘that the painstaking effort and the years of work that 
have already gone into it will ultimately be crowned with success’.396  
 
RAISING MORE CAPITAL AND DEVELOPING PLANS 
 
Between 25 September 1951 and 22 July 1952, another 19,640 shares 
were allotted, meaning all the capital of £50,000 was subscribed. Like their 
predecessors, none of the new shareholders were connected with mining.397 
Another Te Aroha resident acquired an interest, the last to do so. Despite 
local enthusiasm, only ten residents had bought shares, value £2,400, an 
amount inflated by one farmer who acquired 1,000, the largest number 
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bought by anyone apart from Dunsheath’s brother.398 The annual return of 
24 July 1952 reported that £38,321 10s of the nominal capital had been 
called up; calls amounting to £6,679 10s were unpaid, and 100 shares had 
been forfeited for non-payment of these.399  
The general meeting held on 10 July was informed that £11,578 15s 
10d had been spent in the year to 31 March, of which £460 was the 
government’s subsidy. The annual report, written by Dunsheath,400 covered 
the ‘considerable progress’ made during the second full year of operations, 
including acquiring the majority shareholding in and all the assets of ‘the 
old established Company, Hardy’s Mines Limited’. Shareholders were 
reminded that the previous general meeting had agreed ‘to obtain the 
services of a reputable and internationally acknowledged Consulting 
Mining Engineer’ to inspect and make recommendations. Warrington, of a 
‘reliable and well-known’ Sydney firm, was stated to have been ‘full of 
enthusiasm for the Te Aroha Deposits’ after his ‘more or less close 
examination’. At Waiorongomai, he  
 
was greatly impressed with the Hero Reef and the Colonist Reef 
in McLean’s Level from which he duly took samples. An 
inspection was also made of the 1400 feet level which has been 
driven upon these particular Reefs, the quality and sizes of which 
give great promise for our future development. 
 
Warrington ‘conducted very extensive enquiries’ into mining over the 
past 60 years and ‘expressed himself as most favourably impressed with the 
magnitude and chances of success of the proposition and the likelihood of Te 
Aroha becoming a successful Mine’. The directors, having decided to carry 
out the first section of his ‘substantial programme of further development’, 
had requested a subsidy. ‘Replying to our overtures the Government has 
granted us a further subsidy to cover the additional work we have now 
undertaken. Also, the government has offered the company an interest free 
loan for ten years which we have decided to accept’. (The ‘further subsidy’ 
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was really a continuation of the original one, being paid for the completion 
of No. 5, and the amount of the loan was not indicated; perhaps being only 
£2,000 it would not have impressed the shareholders.) 
In No. 5, ‘at about 600 feet a 5ft wide Reef was cut with great 
satisfaction to the Directors, because it proved conclusively that their 
foresight was justified, for here lies proof that the mineralised Zone “lives” 
down to that particular depth’. (As an analysis of this reef had not been 
received, it was premature to claim that good ore was to be found at depth.) 
After driving about another 100 feet, they expected to cut the Champion 
lode. As well, preparations were being made to drive north and south on the 
reef cut in No. 4, and the road had been extended to its portal. The 
Dominion Laboratory’s analysis of the reef in this level revealed it 
contained 25.7 per cent lead, zinc 33.5 per cent, copper 2.1 per cent, and 
‘smaller amounts’ of gold and silver.  
 
We have now made tentative arrangements to deliver a quantity 
of Ore from our No. 4 Level to a Treatment Plant where our 
peculiar type of Complex Ore can be treated successfully with 
Selective Flotation Equipment. Naturally an operation of this 
kind calls for a great deal of planning but we are convinced that 
we shall be able to do what we have embarked upon, and see 
results of this Treatment on a Pilot Plant Scale within a few 
months. 
 
They were negotiating with the Mines Department about extending 
No. 5 to the Ruakaka reef, which would give backs of almost 1,000 feet; 
‘when proved’, these would mean ‘a very substantial reserve of Ore’. The 
‘extensive scheme of development’ recently commenced was ‘already moving 
well ahead’ with ‘the benefit of advice and help from leading Technical men 
comprising both Geologists and Mining Engineers and in every direction’ 
the company had received ‘the utmost co-operation and encouragement’.401 
(As the directors revealed neither the number of advisers nor their advice it 
is impossible to know whether their advice was indeed so positive or 
whether at least some of them shared Williams’ gloomier prognostications. 
Nor did they mention that the company could afford to employ only seven 
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men.)402 The about 40 shareholders present gave ‘a most enthusiastic 
reaction’ to this report, according to Dunsheath.403 
 
DISPUTES ON THE BOARD 
 
At this annual general meeting, the number of directors was increased 
from four to six, all current directors retiring and offering themselves for re-
election.404 In the absence of Fletcher, Julius McLachlan Hogben, the 
company’s solicitor,405 chaired the meeting, and was elected chairman of 
directors. Dunsheath, who remained managing director and vice-
chairman,406 was joined on the board by Alfred Henry Crawford, Frederick 
Sedgwick Stevens, and Charles Oliver Gibbs, all of Auckland.407 Crawford 
was managing director of a canvas goods manufacturing firm; when he died 
in 1954 he left an estate valued under £45,000.408 Stevens was an 
engineer,409 and Gibbs a retired farmer.410  
Impey and Littlejohn were not re-elected, and after Fletcher, who had 
been chairman of directors, resigned the day after this meeting he told 
Benney about dissention within the directorate, providing a context for 
Dunsheath’s attempt to replace McAra with Burton. He had been unable to 
attend the meeting, at which he was re-elected with the maximum number 
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of votes. Littlejohn and Impey had been defeated because ‘Dunsheath 
considered it necessary not only to ensure the defeat of these two Directors 
(who, in my opinion, have done a good job of work) but also to ensure that 
the four new members of the Board were elected by himself and his 
associates’. Accordingly, Fletcher had resigned, and was no longer actively 
associated with the company.411 As an indication of his attitude to this 
venture, when an authorized account of Fletcher’s life was published in 
1970 his involvement was not mentioned.412  
Ten days later, Dunsheath gave his version of events. Fletcher had 
ordered a letter read asking for the re-election of the existing directors and 
the election of his brother-in-law, Dr Arama Thomas Begg,413 who had 
taken up 400 shares in May,414 and Hugh Douglas Guthrie, director of the 
Guthrie Bowron paint company,415 who managed the BALM paint company 
under the chairmanship of Fletcher. (Only one other investment by Begg 
has been traced: in New Zealand Weaving and Spinning Mills in 1934.)416 
 
This voting is a democratic matter, but Sir James insisted that 
Messrs Littlejohn and Impey, who follow Sir James’ every whim, 
and two of his outside supporters be given the votes. My friends 
and I had the power (by paid-up shares), and voted for four new 
men holding the necessary share qualifications. Sir James and I 
were also elected, but the former gentleman has written strongly 
worded letters [which have not survived] objecting to the swing of 
votes against the Fletcher Holdings Group. 
Sir James states to me in his letters that he is specially writing 
personally to you so you will know he is not at the head of the 
Company as a result of this slight, and if his intention is to injure 
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our standing in your opinion, we feel you will have the capacity to 
judge the matter quite independently.417 
 
The reasons for the conflict were not revealed in either Fletcher’s or 
Dunsheath’s letter.  
 
SEEKING FUNDS, SEEKING THE REEF – AND LOSING A 
MANAGER 
 
At the beginning of July, the company raised the issue of the £2,000 
interest-free loan. According to Gick, ‘subsequent events showed that the 
loan was not at that time necessary and we requested that the grant should 
be held over until such time’ as required. As that time had come, Benney 
was asked to ‘expedite the approval of the grant on the same conditions as 
before’.418 He so instructed the Crown Solicitor, making 1 January 1954 the 
date for the first annual repayment of £400.419 Not until December did the 
company provide the debenture that enabled the loan to be provided.420 On 
29 July, when Halstead introduced Dunsheath to Sullivan, he requested a 
subsidy of £3 per foot for driving 400 feet south on No. 4, making 
connections between Nos. 4 and 5 estimated at another 400 feet, and for 
driving No. 5 another 575 feet to the Ruakaka reef, all of which would add 
£4,125 to the £2,400 already granted. Furthermore, he sought an interest 
free loan of £15,000. Landreth noted that ‘the Hon Minister was not 
particularly encouraging’.421  
Dunsheath provided copies of McAra’s sketch plans of work both done 
and planned, which showed that the drive had changed direction towards 
the Ruakaka reef, and at 910 feet had almost cut what was named as the 
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Champion reef.422 At the beginning of September, Scoble reported that he 
had been informed by telephone that Burton had become mine manager, 
McAra having resigned and left for Australia.423 In reminiscences written in 
1985, McAra wrote that, after cutting the Champion reef he had turned the 
crosscut ‘slightly to the right on the line for the Ruakaka and reached 
approximately a thousand feet from the portal when owing to a 
disagreement with the managing director I resigned’.424 Conflict had been 
caused in part over the direction of the No. 5 drive, as indicated in 
Dunsheath’s letter of 10 June. Eric Coppard, who worked in this level 
during the 1960s and 1970s, described how the drive, after swinging to the 
right, suddenly ‘swung back to the left again, more in an easterly direction’. 
He understood that  
 
there had been a disagreement as to the direction that that drive 
should go in looking for the Ruakaka reef. Bert felt that they were 
going the wrong way and had advised them to turn to the right 
and head south at that first bend ... but unfortunately the 
management from the Board came down and they decided that he 
was going in the wrong direction, and they had to turn back. So 
you had this dog leg in the mine.425  
 
As for the disagreement over whether the Champion reef had been 
struck, Landreth reported later in the year that, as the No. 5 level had been 
driven 925 feet without striking another lode, the reef had indeed been the 
Champion, its dip having ‘flattened somewhat between the levels to allow 
for the slight displacement’.426 It was described by McAra’s son as ‘perhaps 
a metre wide, with a trace of mineralization along one edge’. From the 
moment it was struck, ‘Bert’s demeanour mirrored the company’s 
disappointment at the find. The scant mineralization of the reef meant that 
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the mine would not have a future. Bert discussed this with Dunsheath, via 
regular nightly phone discussions’.427 
The immediate issue that prompted McAra to resign was an ethical 
one, as he explained in 1985:  
 
I resigned because the managing director ... wanted me ... to take 
his samples and send them away to the DSIR [Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research] and get them analyzed for 
propaganda purposes, you know, for raising money.... 
I said, “No, I must take the samples myself,” and he and his 
henchmen had gone up the mine and taken these samples and 
they wanted me to send them away as genuine samples. “No, I 
must take the samples myself, you can’t do that.” Oh, well, of 
course, that was the start of an argument and so far as I was 
concerned that was the finish. And I just told him, “Well, I’m 
finished”.... 
Well, my ticket was at stake, you see. If one of those DSIR men 
had come up and taken a sample, and it was a quarter of what I’d 
taken, he’d have said, “I don’t think much of your mine 
manager.”428 
 
Peter McAra, then aged 14, recalled this conflict between his father 
and Dunsheath: 
 
Then the story took an interesting turn. Although Bert attempted 
to keep it a secret from his family, Dunsheath directed him to lie 
to all concerned about the mine’s prospects, even down to 
falsifying assay results. The mine would go ahead…. 
Bert took a strong stand from Day One. He would refuse to lie 
about the reef’s potential. Very soon, Bert was told that if he 
didn’t go along with ASC’s directive, he’d be sacked. The family, 
just beginning to settle into Te Aroha after the move from Waihi, 
would have to move once again. 
Bert stuck to his principles. One of his treasured mementos from 
that time was a letter from ASC’s chairman, Sir James 
Fletcher…. The message of that letter was “I’m sorry that you 
made your decision not to go along with the company’s plan, but I 
must complement you on your honesty. I’d have done the 
same.”429 
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Another recollected version of Fletcher’s letter, long since lost in the 
McAra family’s many moves, was: ‘Sorry to see you go, and I’d have done 
the same. I like your taking a stand on a matter of principle even though it 
cost you your job’.430 
(If Dunsheath did intend to produce fraudulent assays, there is no 
evidence of this happening, for no assays provided to the department or 
publicly released had questionably high values. Perhaps he came to 
understand McAra’s point of principle. On the other hand, lack of evidence 
does not mean that he did use such assays when seeking capital but simply 
that the department was not aware of his behaviour.)  
As a footnote to the issue of McAra’s competence, when Benney 
recommended in November 1953 that he become an Inspector of Mines and 
Quarries he did so after receiving a report from Landreth that McAra’s 
work for the Auckland Smelting Company ‘was sound, and he gave the 
impression of being conscientious. He has had managerial experience both 
in New Zealand and overseas and his educational background is as good as 
any other applicant’.431 McAra, after some time in Western Australia and 
Tasmania,432 returned to New Zealand in 1956 as Inspector of Mines and 
Quarries, based at Huntly,433 a post he held for 19 years. He was also a 
member of the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, and a 
member of the board of examiners that assessed candidates for mine 
managers’ certificates. After retiring as Inspector of Mines in 1973, later in 
that decade he managed the re-opened Waihi mine for three months.434 His 
history of mining at Waihi illustrated his superb technical competence. 
 
MONEY TROUBLES CONTINUE 
 
At the beginning of September, Dunsheath and Hogben, in almost 
identical letters, informed Sullivan that its capital of £50,000 was now paid 
up. They claimed that both American and Japanese interests wanted to 
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purchase the ore, on generous terms. The Americans were willing to 
purchase all the concentrates they could supply, and Japanese smelters had 
offered ‘to take as much ore as we can send on terms that they pay freight 
and the cost of extraction and give us half the metals extracted, or their 
value’. As the shareholders (he stressed there were 300) preferred to treat 
the ore in New Zealand, it was necessary to ‘conduct a major scheme of 
development’ such as recommended by Warrington. A total of £21,000 was 
requested, comprising £6,000 to continue subsidizing crosscutting and 
£15,000 as an interest-free loan (it was noted that £2,000 had already been 
approved). Details were given of how the mine would save millions of 
pounds in overseas exchange within a few years and the ‘many millions of 
tons’ of ore would prevent shortages in time of war, as in previous wars. 
They hoped ‘favourable consideration’ would be given, soon, as their plans 
were ‘materially dependent upon your decisions’.435  
Six days later, Landreth reported that assays of the Champion lode in 
No. 5 level revealed values to be ‘too low to be of economic value, but before 
abandoning hope the lode should be driven upon’ using the subsidy. Until 
this was done, ‘the question of additional financial assistance’ did not 
arise.436 Despite these assays, after a directors’ meeting Halstead told 
Landreth that they wished to interview Sullivan; Landreth preferred them 
to meet Benney, commenting that instead of their latest request ‘they would 
be satisfied with an increase in the interest free loan from £2000 to £5000 
and a subsidy of £3 a foot’ for driving 400 feet in No. 4.437 To strengthen the 
company’s case, Hyde visited the mine at its expense, and a copy of his 
report was sent to the department. Hyde claimed that the Geological Survey 
had been far too negative about the potential of the reefs. After describing 
his prospecting and the quality of the ore he had extracted, he 
recommended extending No. 4 to strike the Champion lode, from which he 
had obtained ‘very high grade’ specimens 25 years previously.438 (Hyde was 
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still not sufficiently enthusiastic to become a shareholder.)439 The company 
sent his report to Sullivan as proof of the directors’ wisdom in requesting 
large-scale aid.440 
After Landreth’s inspection on 22 and 23 September, accompanied by 
Hogben, Dunsheath, and a member of the Geological Survey, he reported 
that ‘there was little to see beyond what had been available for inspection’ 
in January. The reef cut in No. 5 was ‘only weakly mineralized’, assays 
giving two per cent for zinc and lead and half of one per cent for copper 
making it ‘not payable at this point’. As there was disagreement about 
whether this was the main Champion reef, the crosscut had been driven to 
750 feet.  
 
At this point it was decided to change the direction of the crosscut 
in order to reach the Ruakaka reef in the shortest possible 
direction, and the crosscut has been driven an additional 175ft in 
this direction, making a total distance of 925ft without 
intersecting any further reef. The country rock traversed has been 
hard throughout and alteration and propylitization has been 
slight and generally is not favourable to a reef of economic value. 
In the meantime the company had arranged for a survey of the 
bottom levels by a firm of registered surveyors. 
 
As the company’s position was ‘inseparable from development by low 
level crosscuts without adequate exploration at higher levels’, he 
recommended it should confirm the existence of another reef ‘most speedily 
and effectively’ by reverting to the former course of No. 5 and extending it 
for from 50 to 75 feet. He did not expect another reef to be found, removing 
the need to extend No. 4 to search for one. There were ‘two obvious courses’: 
 
(1) to extend the crosscut to intersect the Ruakaka reef in the 
hope that conditions at depth are more favourable with this reef 
than with the Champion. Under the circumstances it seems 
reasonable to assume that similar conditions will prevail and the 
chances of improvement are no better than chances of greater 
impoverishment. 
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(2) to explore the reef already intersected by driving along it in 
either direction on No. 5 Level so as to adequately test the reef. If 
no improvement is met with in these drives it can then be 
assumed that there is no possibility of developing ore at this level. 
This to my mind would be crucial, as if ore cannot be developed at 
No. 5 Level it will be impossible even if good ore exists at upper 
levels to develop a sufficient overall tonnage to justify the 
erection of a treatment plant to separate zinc, copper and lead 
concentrates. Unfortunately it has not been appreciated by the 
company that a mixed sulphide ore is of no value unless it exists 
in sufficient amount to warrant a treatment plant. 
Smelters are not interested in the purchase of such ores…. 
The value of the Te Aroha property accordingly depends on the 
chances of proving up sufficient tonnage of ore of sufficient width 
to allow of economic mining. At the moment the chances of doing 
so do not appear bright…. I was disappointed on my first visit in 
January to find no evidence of continuous sulphide ore. Rather, 
the Te Aroha occurrence appears to run true to the type of the 
Hauraki field generally and the sulphides occur in bunches. 
 
Concerning financial assistance, none of the subsidy of £3 a foot for 
800 feet had been claimed, and of the first grant of £2 a foot for 500 feet 
driven payment had been made on 350 feet and the balance had been 
claimed. The interest-free loan had not been taken up, and despite the 
offered subsidy the reef in No. 5 had not been driven on. As driving 800 feet 
‘should allow the value of the area to be assessed’, until it was completed ‘no 
further assistance could be contemplated’; yet he was willing to see part of 
the subsidy diverted to enable the crosscut to cut another reef. He expected 
the company would prefer to drive on No. 4 where the prospects were ‘more 
attractive’, and Landreth was ‘willing to agree to this’ or to driving on reefs 
in Nos. 4 and 5. Increased assistance should not be considered until these 
developments were completed. As the circumstances on which the interest-
free loan was offered no longer existed he did not recommend increasing the 
amount.441 Had it read these views, the company would have protested: on 
the previous day Hogben had urged Sullivan to ‘consider our application as 
quickly as possible because success or failure depends in a considerable 
measure upon the amount of encouragement we receive from the 
                                            
441 R.F. Landreth to C.H. Benney, 16 October 1952, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, 
Part 2, ANZ-W. 
97 
Government’.442 Benney listed for Sullivan the grants and subsidies made 
already: £500 towards constructing the road, £1,000 to subsidize 500 feet of 
crosscutting, both claimed, and a loan of £2,000 and a subsidy of £2,400 to 
drive 800 feet, neither yet claimed. He enclosed and summarized Landreth’s 
report, and agreed to its recommendations, as did Sullivan.443 In informing 
Hogben Sullivan said he could consider further aid once the present work 
was completed.444 
In November, Dunsheath used official visits to support his request for 
protection of a prospecting license: 
 
The Company has at all times kept the Mines Department fully 
informed of the work being done and has had the benefit of advice 
from officers of that Department. One of whose senior officers in 
company with a Government Geologist recently inspected the 
work which had been done and was in progress and traversed and 
examined other parts of the Company’s areas to which the 
present work will extend. It was subsequent to this inspection 
that the further financial assistance was given.445 
 
In the following month, Dunsheath, when asking for the £2,000 to be 
paid before Christmas, told Benney that in January he would ask 
shareholders to approve increasing the capital to £75,000. ‘You will be 
interested to know we already have some verbal applications for shares in 




In February, Burton, now ‘Acting Manager’, asked whether Ray 
McEnteer could be given a provisional second class certificate to enable him 
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to supervise 12 men as underground manager. Raymond Dalton McEnteer, 
of Waihi,447 had been a miner for 30 years, for some years as a shift boss in 
the Martha, and had tickets for underground and surface quarry work.448 
But because he was not certified, the department could not permit him to be 
in charge of the mine. 
In mid-January, Dunsheath informed the department that new 
contractors had started work in the two levels, he hoped to have two shifts 
at work shortly, and he would appoint an experienced assayer. His brother, 
Percy Dunsheath, CBE, MA, Doctor of Engineering and Doctor of Science, a 
director of many British companies, had visited New Zealand over 
Christmas and spent several days ‘studying our proposition at Te Aroha and 
also became very favourably impressed with the Waiorongomai Reefs. He 
carried out the most intensive examination made by any other person 
during my four years association with the ground’, and as a result would 
invest £1,000. ‘He said we are only playing with what he considers to be a 
first class exploration’.449 On 30 March, Percy Dunsheath was indeed 
allotted 1,000 shares, one of only two such large holdings.450 Whether he 
was a competent judge of mining is not known, but he was certainly a 
highly competent engineer. In 1945, when he was chief engineer of W.T. 
Henley’s Telegraph Works Company and president of the Institute of 
Electrical Engineers, it was reported that he had played a major part in 
defeating Germany’s magnetic mines.451 He was the editor of a history of 
technology from 1851 to 1951 and the author of a history of electrical 
engineering.452  
Benney told Dunsheath he was ‘disappointed’ he had not reported the 
outcome of extending No. 5 to 1,000 feet and requested confirmation that as 
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no reef had been cut the company would now drive on the reef cut 600 feet 
from the portal.453 Unusually, it took almost two months before Dunsheath 
responded, in a letter to Sullivan explaining that No. 5 had been extended 
by 205 feet to 1,155 feet, ‘at which point we decided to stop crosscutting for 
the present’, despite the stone being ‘favourable and mineralised’. Having 
passed the surveyor’s ‘anticipated reef position’ in this level, they would 
drive in No. 4 before returning to No. 5. It was hoped to cut a reef soon; if 
unsuccessful, or their ‘first class’ assayer discovered it had low values, they 
would drive on the reef cut 380 feet from the portal. He claimed the ‘several 
hundred shareholders’ were ‘very enthusiastic’; ‘several’ were ‘mining men’ 
who believed there was ‘a fair chance of meeting with success’. (There were 
no indications in the lists of shareholders that any were ‘mining men’, apart 
from one retired miner, although some may have held interests in other 
mining companies.) Again claiming that his mine could ‘become vital to 
New Zealand’s economy!’ and that it was ‘a truly National Project’, he 
stated that many of the existing shareholders were acquiring more 
shares.454 (If that was the case, it was through purchases that were not 
recorded in the allotments reported to the Companies Office: none of those 
who took up shares in 1953 had held interests previously.)455 He again 
requested a subsidy for driving.456  
In a letter drafted by Landreth, Sullivan regretted the results had 
been ‘so disappointing’ in No. 5 and declined to grant a subsidy. When the 
directors had interviewed him in early November, Sullivan ‘thought that 
the position had been made quite clear to you and that agreement had been 
reached as to the programme of work which would carry subsidy’. Despite 
his department not being ‘sanguine as to the existence of another reef’, 
because of ‘a margin of doubt and to clear up the position’ it had agreed to 
subsidize crosscutting. ‘It was expressly stated at the interview that if the 
extension of No. 5 crosscut to 1000 feet did not disclose the existence of 
another reef, no useful purpose would be served in the extension of No. 4 
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crosscut in search of the same reef as this would only be duplication of the 
work carried out at No. 5’. Noting that Dunsheath had twice delayed 
providing information about the latter, he commented that the directors had 
clearly decided to extend No. 4, as, ‘of course, they were fully entitled to do, 
without advising the Department, but it must have been done in the full 
knowledge that no subsidy had been agreed upon for such work’. The 
department believed ‘an adequate test of the possibilities of your area 
cannot be made until the reef has been driven upon for some distance and 
the reef so exposed systematically sampled and assayed’. The subsidy would 
be paid upon completion of this work.457  
One month later, Dunsheath explained to Benney and Sullivan that 
No. 5 had been driven to 759 feet, where the direction was changed to the 
south-east; after driving in that direction for 230 feet, it was ‘decided to 
discontinue this angle driving and instead step back 15 feet to 974ft and at 
this point strike off to the Northern side of the Drive and continue parallel 
to the original’ direction. This portion of the drive was in 196 feet, making a 
total length ‘apart from the 15ft standby’ of 1,170 feet. ‘Three or four 
Mineralised Reefs’ had been cut in No. 5, but none had been driven upon 
because ‘the last 60 or more feet has passed through a different type of 
Country’ which was ‘most promising as an indication of the proximity to the 
Reef’ the surveyors had indicated. Instead, they had extended No. 4 to 580 
feet, cutting ‘one important Reef and several smaller ones’. They had driven 
about 40 feet north and 25 feet south on the major reef, had started 
sampling, and expected the results from ‘our own Laboratory’ within 
days.458 As Landreth interpreted this letter as meaning that ‘nothing of 
importance’ had been discovered in No. 5 the new mining inspector, 
Reginald Campbell Ruffin,459 was to examine the workings ‘at first 
opportunity’.460 
The logic for changing the direction of No. 5 crosscut was elusive, and 
in fact they were nowhere near the reef. McAra, who had recommended the 
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change of direction to the south-east, wrote in 1985 that, after he left the 
company, ‘an abortive attempt to locate the Ruakaka reef was made and 
over a hundred feet of driving in the wrong direction was done. The reef was 
located by another company [Norpac] some years later, by Diamond 
Drilling, exactly where I had predicted’.461 He described the company’s 
driving after he resigned as ‘blind stabbing’.462 In an interview later that 
year, McAra explained that he had surveyed the reefs and cut the 
Champion:  
 
Now the shortest distance to the Ruakaka was at right angles, 
wasn’t it, so I turned it at right angles to the bearing that I had 
here and drove about a hundred feet, then I left. Then this other 
fellow [Burton?] took over from Auckland, an adviser to the 
Managing Director he was, and he drove ... parallel with the 
reefs. You’d never have got there. And anyhow when Norpac came 
along they set up a diamond drill at the end of the face where I’d 
stopped and they put in four hundred feet which was what I’d 
calculated it would be when they cut the Ruakaka reef. And Dr 
[Arthur] Pentland [a Canadian geologist who advised Norpac]463 
said to me at the time, he said, “You were bang on.” Well, I 
couldn’t go wrong.... I’d surveyed the thing and it was all compass 
work and the needle couldn’t tell lies, could it? There it was at 
right angles to that bearing, it had to be.464 
 
Coppard, who was involved in proving that he had been right, 
described No. 5 as having ‘this dog leg’ because of the change of direction 
made after McAra left: 
 
Well when we came in [to the drive] the geologist Dr Pentland felt 
that the direction that McAra had told them to go in was correct. 
He felt this from his own surface observations and his own 
compass and map work, with the result that we put a diamond 
drill in there and we drilled a flat hole in ... what was left of the 
old face. 
 
After 300 feet of drilling, the Ruakaka reef was intercepted. ‘So there 
was quite a fair bit of joy and jubilation on this because Bert McAra was 
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now the Inspector of Mines for the district and he felt really vindicated that 
his - after all these years - his judgment was correct’.465 
At the end of May, 35 hundredweight of ore was sent to Japan for 
testing.466 Late that month, a Christchurch newspaper reported that, as 
well as lead, zinc, and copper, the property included germanium, a mineral 
‘attracting much interest in the United States’ because it might ‘replace the 
normal type of radio valve. For this reason an American company has 
shown considerable interest’. It noted that although the government knew 
of the existence of these metals, ‘nothing has been done about their 
extraction’ apart from subsidizing road making and drilling and offering an 
interest-free loan. The company would sell out to a larger one once the value 
of the ore had been proved.467 This article prompted Landreth to comment 
to Benney that Dunsheath was ‘apparently doing some publicity work to 
help sale of shares and has quoted Government assistance as a selling 
point’.468 In the following month, a Labour Party newspaper, citing this 
article, complained of a ‘handsome Nationalist gift to a private company’: 
‘substantial sums’ would benefit it but not the country. The public was 
‘entitled to a full explanation from the Nationalists about the Government’s 
extraordinary role in this scheme’.469  
In mid-June, Landreth was telephoned by Gick ‘to advise that the 
company was financially embarrassed’, its attempts to raise more capital 
have achieved ‘disappointing’ results.  
 
Accordingly, it had been decided to put out a prospectus and 
make an organized effort to raise capital. This would take time, 
and in the meantime the company lacked the money to tide them 
over. A contract had been let for driving 500 feet, and they were 
liable to be sued if they broke it. Therefore he requested a loan of 
£1,000. The assets of the company were worth only £15,000, the 
main asset being the house and grounds at the foot of the hill in 
which the contractor is now resident. 
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Landreth could not ‘be optimistic’ about the company’s prospects 
because the ‘sharp decline in the price of lead and zinc’ meant its position 
was ‘accentuated’. Development had produced disappointing results, and a 
considerable sum was needed to expand operations. An additional loan of 
£1,000 was ‘only tidying them over for a period when the same position 
must be faced again’.470 Benney agreed, and the request was declined.471  
In the first six months of the year, 463 1/2 feet were driven, of which 
321 1/2 were crosscutting and the balance was driving on the reef in No. 
4.472 At the end of June, Ruffin authorized payment of £576 for work 
done.473 Gick declared in July that there had been surface prospecting over 
all the ground during the past year, without giving indicating the amount of 
such work,474 which in fact had been minimal. 
After Ruffin visited the mine on 18 June, he informed Landreth that 
only two men were working underground, ‘starting to raise on reef’ in No. 4, 
and another two were working on the surface. Driving north on the reef had 
revealed a reef with stringers of lead ore, its prospects looking ‘fairly good’ 
provided values were satisfactory. As this was his first, preliminary, visit, 
he failed ‘to understand why prospecting has not been confined to this end’. 
An inspection should be made before another subsidy was granted.475 
Landreth responded that if ore was ‘confined to North end chances of 
proving tonnage of economic amount’ were ‘hopeless’.476  
After Guthrie, now acting chairman of directors, interviewed Landreth 
in late June, the latter minuted that it now appeared the reef struck in No. 
5 was barren and the only possibility of finding good ore in No. 4 was in its 
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northern portion, meaning there was ‘no prospect of developing sufficient 
tonnage’. To justify erecting a plant required from 100,000 to 150,000 tons 
of ore and the smallest amount that could be profitably treated was 50 tons 
a day. There was no prospect of selling the ore overseas ‘at a price which 
would meet mining costs’, and as there was ‘no market for complex ores 
containing lead, zinc and copper’ it ‘would be wise for the company to call it 
a day and cut its losses’. As the subsidy had provided the geological 
knowledge the department wanted, he recommended cancelling the amount 
unspent; the company’s assets would enable it to pay its debts and repay 
the £2,000 loan. No further development was warranted, and although the 
life of the company could be extended until the results of overseas tests 
were received government assistance must not be used to raise further 
capital.477  
 
WORK CEASES, BUT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS CONTINUE 
 
In the year to 31 March 1953, a subsidy of £1,020 for driving was 
paid.478 As at 1 July 1953, £2,340 18s 2d was owed to creditors, with 
possibly another £200 outstanding.479 On 10 July, Benney told Sullivan all 
work had ceased and the mine was ‘on a care and maintenance basis’. The 
company should, he considered, sell its house and motor vehicles to repay 
its debts, and no more assistance should be given; Sullivan agreed.480 In 
place of its seven employees one was retained as engineer and caretaker to 
maintain the plant and roads.481  
In December 1952, the company had decided to increase its capital to 
£75,000,482 and between the end of March and 8 May 1953, 2,400 shares 
were allotted. The new shareholders included, for the first time, two Maori, 
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both of Taumaranui and both prominent in their communities; Pei Te 
Hurinui Jones, a company secretary, and his adopted son Brian Hauauru 
Jones, a timber merchant and director of several companies.483 Only 12 
shareholders acquired interests, one being Percy Dunsheath, as noted; three 
lived in Auckland, and the remainder, presumably reflecting the 
sharebroker’s travels, lived in Taumaranui, Taihape, Gisborne, Wairoa, and 
Opotiki.484 Although this sharebroker was employed to sell shares on 
commission,485 no further shares were sold, which was ‘most disappointing 
to your Directors and has produced a critical stage in the progress of the 
Company’.486 The annual return revealed that calls paid to 23 July had 
raised a total of £46,233.487   
At the general meeting, held on 9 July, shareholders were not given all 
the facts. The directors reported that, during the year to 31 March, No. 5 
was extended to 1,175 feet, while No. 4 attained 567 feet, making a total of 
715 feet driven during the year at an average cost of £18 15s per foot, 
compared with Warrington’s estimate of £21 12s. This figure was despite 
‘greatly increased costs’ and ‘substantial charges for Brokerage and 
chlorination’ that Warrington had not anticipated. They argued that these 
figures proved work had ‘been done efficiently and as economically as 
possible’. Misleadingly, they stated that all the reefs cut in No. 5 justified 
driving upon ‘as soon as possible’ and that this drive appeared to be 
approaching another reef; yet work had been stopped in it to move the 
miners to No. 4, from which several hundred tons of ore had been 
paddocked.  
 
In order to assess exactly and expeditiously the value of the 
minerals opened up in the Company’s Developments continual 
sampling and assaying was found to be imperative. Therefore the 
Company’s own Laboratory has been suitably equipped and 
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started. This work is in Charge of Mr H.S. Howarth488 who is 
fully qualified due to his very extensive training and valuable 
experience gained in the United Kingdom and in several other 
countries. Mr Howarth in addition to being a skilled Inorganic 
Chemist, is a qualified Surveyor, Metallurgist and Mining 
Engineer, and the Company is indeed fortunate in securing his 
services. 
 
Depending on the funds available, it was planned to rise from No. 4 to 
No. 3 intermediate level and to use diamond drilling to prove the values.  
 
Recently a consignment of two tons of ore from No. 4 Level was 
forwarded to an overseas destination and, based upon the 
experience thus gained, it is hoped to find either a market or a 
potential purchaser of some of our concessions or both. 
The Company, however, is at the cross roads. Despite the full 
confidence of the Directors, it is not possible to carry on further 
without funds and the matter is one for the consideration of 
Shareholders.489  
 
Were all the directors so confident, and why did they permit No. 5, 
allegedly so promising, to be abandoned? Perhaps at the meeting a more 
realistic and honest picture was drawn, for more changes in the directorate 
were made. Stevens had resigned in November 1952, to be replaced by John 
Hector Luxford, Auckland’s stipendiary magistrate for the past 23 years, 
one of the longest terms in New Zealand. An obituary emphasized the 
respect in which he was held and his ‘painstaking attention to detail’, which 
would have been useful as a company director.490 In 1926 he was a 
foundation subscriber of the (private) Colonial Patent Cheese Hoop 
Company,491 but no other directorship has been traced. Another director, 
Guthrie, had been appointed in February 1953, and, as noted, had become 
acting chairman of directors. When Luxford declined to stand for re-election 
because he was (successfully) campaigning to be mayor of Auckland, 
Dunsheath offered himself for re-election,492 but resigned at the meeting, in 
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unrecorded circumstances. Littlejohn and Impey returned to the board in 
place of these two directors,493 suggesting shareholders’ dissatisfaction at 
Dunsheath’s role. In February 1953, Dunsheath transferred 250 of his 
shares to Luxford, which were returned in August, and in June he 
transferred 1,500 of his remaining 3,200 shares to Dunsheath Machinery 
Co. Ltd.494 This firm would retain 3,000 of these now worthless shares.495 
The company had always been reluctant to meet the cost of 
chlorinating the town’s water supply, feeling that it had been ‘unfairly 
coerced’ into agreeing to do this.496 By mid-year its debt to the borough 
council amounted to £294 0s 2d.497 In July the company said it was ‘re-
arranging the finances and anticipated being able to pay our account at an 
early date. It asked for the Council’s co-operation and tolerance to assist 
them to arrange their finances’. As a consequence, councillors agreed to take 
no action pending this re-arrangement.498 Also in July, Sullivan permitted 
releasing the company’s house and vehicles from the Crown’s security for its 
loan and sold to meet liabilities, but warned that ‘no further assistance in 
any form’ could be expected.499  
Any optimism expressed at the annual meeting would have been 
dashed by the news in September that Mitsui Mining and Smelting 
Company, having tested the ore, had ‘no interest’ because they used an 
unsuitable flotation process. Although Mitsui reported that the ore 
contained 10.15 per cent lead, 29.85 per cent zinc, and 1.69 per cent copper, 
making it ‘of a very good quality’, it was uneconomic for them to import 
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anything but a concentrate,500 which they would do when Norpac later 
mined the same area. That the company hoped to revive was indicated in 
October, when Gick protested at the proposal to revoke the proclamation of 
the Waihou River as a sludge channel, which by preventing the 
development of the mine would be ‘little short of a tragedy’.501 In November, 
the company sought and was granted protection for all its sites and licenses. 
Littlejohn informed the warden that since 1 June, one man had been kept 
on to look after the property ‘pending recommencement of mining on the 
same scale as previously’. The paid-up capital, which it was claimed, 
incorrectly, amounted to £51,820, had all been spent, along with all the 
subsidies. A parcel of ore had been sent to American interests, and once the 
directors heard from these mining might resume.502 
 
LAST, DESPERATE, MANOEUVERS 
 
In the early part of 1954, the Mines Department sought to retrieve the 
money it had lent. Late in January, Gick was reminded that repayment was 
required at the rate of £400 each year, the first repayment having been due 
on 1 January 1954.503 Gick replied that the directors were ‘at present 
endeavouring to re-arrange the finance’.504 In July, after Benney reminded 
him that he had not replied to his April and May letters asking when the 
first instalment would be paid: ‘I shall be pleased if you will accord me the 
courtesy of a reply’,505 Gick explained that it was not possible to pay. Impey 
was overseas attempting to sell the property and, should he be successful, 
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all £2,000 could be repaid.506 The department decided to await the outcome 
of his efforts because, as Landreth noted, ‘we would not get anything by 
insisting on payment and calling up debenture’.507 
In October, Impey claimed that experts of the Eagle Picher Company 
of America was ‘very impressed with the assays of the test samples’, and its 
president had ‘agreed to send two of the company’s experts, a geologist and 
a mining superintendent’, to discover ‘whether there are sufficient base 
metals to warrant investment of between $5,000,000 and $6,000,000 
(approximately £2,000,000)’. He then made yet another request for aid. ‘To 
some extent the American Company’s decision will also be governed by the 
amount of assistance the New Zealand government would give in 
establishing the industry’. He also urged the borough council, still 
concerned about pollution, ‘to show some leniency and not put too many 
obstacles in the way of a company which, if it goes ahead with its proposals, 
will give inestimable benefit to the town’ and its council. The experts were 
not expected to arrive until March, and the results of their findings and the 
American company’s decision would not be known until several months 
after their test drilling.508 As several councillors wanted this investigation 
they did not want the council to ‘put obstacles in the way’.509  
The general meeting of November 1954 was told that since suspending 
operations in the previous year because of lack of finance the directors had 
‘realized on certain of the assets’ without ‘suffering any heavy losses’ and 
had paid ‘the greater portion’ of the liabilities.510 Their plant was estimated 
to be worth over £11,000.511 The Japanese tests had ‘showed a high metal 
content’ but Mitsui were ‘unable to handle economically’ these complex ores. 
During Impey’s ‘extended trip abroad’ he tried to interest European and 
American companies, and the ‘tests of the Japanese consignment were of 
extreme value’ in helping him to interest Eagle Picher, which had ‘the 
necessary knowledge, finance and equipment to treat the ore economically’. 
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Shareholders were invited to provide £2,500 towards the cost of Eagle 
Picher sending ‘a Senior Mining Engineer and Senior Geologist’ to 
investigate and report; should his report be favourable, Eagle Picher would, 
at its own cost, carry out such diamond drilling and driving as would prove 
the extent of the deposits and then ‘submit to us proposals for our mutual 
benefit’. Another £2,500 would be required to clear tracks, de-water levels, 
and make the drives safe. Debentures were offered to raise this £5,000, 
shareholders being asked ‘to subscribe 10% of their present holdings with 
reasonable security’ to prove whether or not they owned ‘an economic 
mining proposition’. Should they be unwilling, ‘then there would seem to be 
no alternative to winding up the affairs of the Company without further 
delay’.512  
Changes in the directorate were required because Crawford had 
drowned in January 1954.513 Fletcher was re-appointed, Littlejohn having 
become chairman earlier in the year.514 The re-involvement of Fletcher and 
the elevation of Littlejohn indicated that the anti-Dunsheath faction was 
still in the ascendant. As an indication of declining fortunes, by December 
only £753 in calls had been received, and 200 shares had been forfeited.515  
At the end of November, the Mines Department was informed that 
shareholders had contributed only £1,500 of the £5,000 needed and was 
asked whether it could assist.516 Landreth commented that it was ‘most 
unusual for a Company examining a property with a view to purchase to 
demand that the expenses of examination should be paid by the holding 
company’. As Eagle Picher, one of the most important lead and zinc mining 
companies in the United States, had a capital of £15 million, if it considered 
there was a margin of success it would have paid the expenses of the 
geologist and engineer, £2,500 being ‘only chicken feed to such a company’. 
He predicted they would be unimpressed, and saw the financing of the visit 
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as ‘a desperate gamble’ by the company ‘to keep the venture alive and to 
recover some of their money from the wreck’. As it was ‘a very poor gamble’ 
no more aid should be given, for doing more work was ‘merely flogging a 
dead horse’.517 Accordingly, the company was told it must meet the expenses 
of the visit.518 
In late January 1955, the company was asked what it proposed to do 
about the  £800 it owed the department.519 Its response was that, although 
£2,500 had been raised towards the cost of the visit, it had no liquid funds. 
If the experts could not be brought out or their report was unfavourable, 
there was ‘no alternative but to liquidate the Company’. The department 
was asked to defer repayment until after the report.520 In May, Gick 
informed the warden that more capital, unspecified, had been raised by 
shareholders and the company was negotiating with overseas interests. 
Time was needed because reports ‘required revised planning for the work to 
be carried out within the capital resources available’, and ‘a decision on the 
extent and locality’ of future work required ‘extensive plans and estimates’. 
Another six months’ protection was granted.521 Four days later, Gick told 
Benney that the visit had fallen through because the Americans believed 
that the government’s ‘attitude towards the investment of profits was 
unsatisfactory’, and asked whether this was indeed so.522 When Halstead 
contacted Sullivan on the company’s behalf he was told the main difficulty 
was that the American company’s proposals were ‘nebulous’, but if ‘specific 
proposals’ were placed before Treasury, ‘arrangements could be made to 
have profits transferred to America’.523 Shortly afterwards, Gick was 
informed by Treasury that profits could be sent to America with prior 
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approval of the Reserve Bank.524 As this information did not change the 
situation, in August, responding to a request for a reply to the February 
letter about repaying the loan, Gick wrote that the directors intended to 
realize assets to pay their debts.525  
The next meeting of shareholders, held on 15 November, was informed 
that the directors had ‘met with many disappointments’ during the past 
year. Although shareholders had provided debenture applications to the 
extent of £3,294 10s to finance the proposed investigation, Eagle Picher had 
withdrawn their offer because ‘the proposition was of no further interest to 
them. This was of course very disappointing particularly as the Directors 
had incurred expense in raising the necessary funds and had also carried 
out considerable work clearing tracks and making the areas ready for 
inspection’. Many United States, Canadian, European and Japanese 
smelting companies had been contacted ‘in an endeavour to obtain a market 
for the sale of ore’, but although ‘several’ offers were received, none were 
‘sufficiently high’. Continued efforts, aided by information provided by 
Hardy, resulted in two English companies and one Australian one showing 
interest.526 By December, calls had totalled £47,173, and a further 200 
shares were forfeited.527 No more calls would be made, and only one man 
was employed to maintain the roads, buildings, plant and equipment.528 
Impey did not offer himself for re-election and was replaced by 
Dunsheath, who resigned once more the following May, for reasons 
unrecorded.529 In June the company sued the Dunsheath Machinery 
Company for £162 11s 11d and Dunsheath personally for £82 10s, but these 
cases were settled out of court, the suits being withdrawn at its request.530 
In March, Gick had informed the warden that £8 per week was being spent 
                                            
524 D. Barker (Secretary to the Treasury) to T.L. Gick, 15 June 1955, Mines Department, 
MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W. 
525 C.H. Benney to T.L. Gick, 2 August 1955; T.L. Gick to C.H. Benney, 9 August 1955, 
Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W. 
526 Auckland Smelting Company, Annual Report for meeting of 15 November 1955, 
Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
527 Auckland Smelting Company, Annual Return to 29 December 1955, Company Files, 
BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
528 AJHR, 1955, C-2, p. 42; 1956, C-2, p. 29. 
529 Auckland Smelting Company, Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A.  
530 Auckland Magistrate’s Court, Civil Cases 1956, folios 61, 64, 91, 144, 146, BADW 
10246/207a, ANZ-A. 
113 
maintaining the tracks, roadways, and vehicles and in ‘care and inspection’ 
of its prospecting areas. It was still negotiating ‘with overseas interests 
with a view to obtaining capital to mine’ all its properties.531 Whatever 
discussions took place with an undisclosed number of Australian and 
British companies continued to be unsuccessful, although one Australian 
investor expressed interest in April.532 After McAra, now the mining 
inspector, visited in May, he reported that ‘no work has been done for a 
considerable time’ and the company was ‘realizing on the equipment’.533 
Although Gick claimed that the Broken Hill Proprietary Company of 
Australia and two British firms were interested in the ore,534 McAra 
reported that most of the equipment had been sold and there did ‘not appear 
to be any definite future plans’. The caretaker worked elsewhere during the 
week and looked after the mine on weekends; only two buildings remained 
and equipment had been removed to the Te Aroha depot.535  
In February 1956, Benney asked when the company would repay the 
loan, and in the following month asked: ‘Will you kindly let me have a 
reply’.536 None was received, Benney noting in July that it had still not 
requested partial release over the house and vehicles.537 In September, 
Benney told Gick he had been informed that assets were being realized to 
meet the liabilities, which, if true, was ‘quite satisfactory’. Gick confirmed 
that liabilities would be met from these sales.538  
What was to be the last general meeting, held in December 1956, was 
informed that all efforts to interest overseas companies had failed. After 
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supplying three of these with all the reports and plans, ‘your Directors were 
disappointed to learn that none were sufficiently interested’ to send experts 
to inspect. Subsequently, an Australian geologist had recommended selling 
the ore in an untreated state to companies he nominated, which was done, 
but ‘despite the interest expressed by them it soon became evident that, 
without further concentration, the ore available for sale was not considered 
sufficiently rich at today’s prices for base metals’.  Although they were in 
contact with a Canadian company, as there was ‘little prospect’ that the 
money subscribed to meet the cost of visits by overseas experts would be 
needed it had been refunded. Realizing of assets had continued, but as the 
market for used machinery had been ‘very depressed for the last 12 months’, 
much remained to be sold. The directors recommended that shareholders 
consider whether there was ‘any object in the Company continuing. Much of 
course already has been lost but there appears to be little hope of any gains 




The warden was informed, in April 1957, that the company owned 86 
per cent of Hardy’s Mines Ltd and planned to develop its Waiorongomai 
holdings. Having spent over £50,000, it would need ‘considerable further 
capital’. Another unnamed overseas company, having been given ‘plans, 
reports and other necessary data’, would make its own investigations, 
necessitating another six months’ protection, which was granted.540 When 
Benney asked about sales of the assets, Gick explained that it was still 
‘extremely difficult’ to sell machinery.541 Benney responded that, as the 
department had security over the plant, now apparently all sold, he wanted 
a statement of accounts plus ‘at least part payment of the balance due’.542 
He had to repeat his request a month later.543 Nearly three weeks later 
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Gick informed him that, as all attempts to interest overseas companies had 
failed and there had been a heavy fall in the price of base metals, the 
company would have to be wound up.544 Benney pointed out that when 
assets were sold the Crown should be paid first and that no property should 
be sold without its approval. He wanted the immediate discharge of the 
debenture and details of all sales.545  
One month later, Halstead told Sullivan that he had ‘been asked to 
make representations’ to him ‘concerning the waiving of a Crown debenture 
of £2,000 over the assets. The company was ‘virtually in a state of 
liquidation, with no prospect of being able to come to any arrangement with 
any of the overseas mining companies’. Because shareholders had 
‘persevered in an attempt what could have been a venture of national 
value’, they were requesting ‘that the claim be waived in order that a small 
return might be received for the contributions which have been made 
towards this project’.546 Landreth responded that the company was 
behaving like others, trying ‘to get as much assistance as possible by 
subsidy or grant, then to ask for loan to be repayable security being given 
over assets of company and finally to ask for loan to be waived’. He wanted 
the loan repaid.547 The day before Landreth wrote this, Gick had indeed 
asked the government to waive its claim in order that some money could be 
repaid to the shareholders. It had not been possible to find anyone 
interested in acquiring the mining rights.548 He was told that the 
department would not object to the surrender of the rights, and was asked 
for details of the funds in hand, assets unsold, and the liabilities.549 Asked 
for his opinion, McAra recommended that, as the company had made a 
‘genuine attempt’ to explore the resources, there should be some remission 
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of the loan.550 Gick finally provided details, in late August: cash in the bank 
amounted to £840, and the truck and mining gear was possibly worth 
£1,500, which would enable the discharge of the debenture. There were no 
liabilities apart from small current ones ‘for services rendered’. He sought 
advice about where to sell an engine, but Benney could not assist.551 A 
month later, Benney recommended that Halstead’s request that the loan be 
waived entirely be rejected, for the company had received ‘free money’ 
amounting to £2,526.552 John McAlpine, the new Minister, in citing this 
figure to Halstead, noted that it was ‘not repayable’ and the loan had been 
provided on the basis that it would be repaid. He ‘considered that the 
Company has had ample assistance from Government funds and that it 
should repay the loan’.553 
In November, the directors suggested that the department take over 
its assets and realize on them to discharge the loan. The company had £810 
in the bank, some of this money being needed to meet debts, and still owned 
some machinery.554 This proposal was accepted; should the sale produce 
more than £2,000, the surplus would go to the company.555 The directors 
met twice in February 1958 to finalize arrangements for liquidation and 
agreed to pay themselves £150 each as a ‘token compensation for their 
services over a number of years’.556 In April, all the cash in the bank and all 
plant and equipment was transferred to the department in settlement of the 
debenture.557 Whether this meant that all the debt was repaid is not known, 
                                            
550 J.B. McAra to C.H. Benney, 23 August 1957, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 
2, ANZ-W. 
551 T.L. Gick to C.H. Benney, 28 August 1957; C.H. Benney to T.L. Gick, 14 October 1957, 
Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W. 
552 C.H. Benney to William Sullivan, 20 September 1957, Mines Department, MD 1, 
23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W. 
553 John McAlpine (Minister of Mines) to E.H. Halstead, 8 October 1957, Mines 
Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W. 
554 T.L. Gick to C.H. Benney, 7 November 1957, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 
2, ANZ-W. 
555 C.H. Benney to T.L. Gick, 5 December 1957, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 
2, ANZ-W. 
556 T.L. Gick to C.H. Benney, 7 February 1958, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Mines 
Department, Wellington. 
557 T.L. Gick to Assistant Registrar of Companies, Companies Office, Auckland, 11 April 
1958, Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
117 
for no value was recorded for the plant and equipment, but judging from 
Gick’s earlier comments about the difficulty of selling machinery it may not 
have been worth very much. Once the debenture owing to the Crown was 
discharged, there were no further liabilities, and the company applied to be 
struck off the register.558  
 
POST MORTUM AND CONCLUSION 
 
In his 1952 address to the Te Aroha Rotary Club, McAra explained 
that a mine had to be ‘thoroughly surveyed, tested and proven before the 
next stage of development was embarked upon’: 
 
This stage of the work was, perhaps, the most important and the 
programme had to be a thorough and comprehensive one. 
Sometimes the work took years to complete. Before a mine could 
be worked as a sound, payable proposition its possibility of a good 
life of say, 25 years had to be determined.... 
The question of treatment of the metals was not considered 
strongly until a field had been sufficiently proved and fairly 
accurate indications gained of the content and extent of the ores, 
which determined the size of the scheme.559 
 
In 1985, looking back over the history of this and similar companies, 
he commented that prospecting companies were ‘high risk investments’. It 
was necessary to  
 
put adits in and cut the reefs, drive on the reefs, and sample them 
and make your assessment of the total value - you’ve got to have 
enough to operate for ten years anyhow. You’ve got to be able to 
see enough for ten years before you put your plant in otherwise 
your capital costs of putting a plant in wouldn’t be covered. 
 
In the case of the Auckland Smelting Company, ‘they weren’t strong 
enough - they didn’t have enough resources to complete the crosscut and go 
through to the Ruakaka.... They ran out of funds and that was it’. He added 
that ‘generally speaking I think as far as mining’s concerned it’s too high a 
risk ... to invest local capital’.560  
                                            
558 T.L. Gick to Assistant Registrar of Companies, Companies Office, Auckland, 9 
December 1958, Company Files, BADZ 5181, box 949 no. 6489, ANZ-A. 
559 Te Aroha News, 4 April 1952, p. 5. 
560 Interview with J.B. McAra, 4 August 1985, pp. 13-14 of transcript. 
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This company’s history illustrated several aspects of how promoters 
attempted to keep their under-capitalised companies afloat despite almost 
insuperable difficulties: 
• by exaggerating the value of the ore, using as proof misleading 
assessments of samples made by earlier prospectors who had neglected to 
develop their discoveries; 
• by ignoring that new assays gave erratic results, and citing the 
highest result as though it was the average value of much of the lode; 
• by ignoring assays made by government officials and others that 
proved past and present assays to be unrepresentative; 
• by claiming, without providing evidence, that a large but unspecified 
number of unnamed experts applauded the company’s plans and their likely 
success; 
• by exaggerating the amount of prospecting being done; 
• by implying that underground tests had taken place whereas the 
collapse of the old workings had prevented these being done; 
• by greatly exaggerating the size of the reserve of payable ore; 
• by deliberately misleading existing and potential shareholders, along 
with officials, by making false claims about the prospects and by failing to 
produce reports giving much less positive assessments; 
• by claiming that extracting the ore would be crucial for the national 
economy; 
• by exaggerating the interest of overseas companies in purchasing 
either the ore or the ground; 
• by exaggerating the positive impact of the mine on the local 
economy; 
• by obtaining the support of residents, the council, and the local 
newspaper through exaggeration or misinformation; 
• by claiming to have the backing of the government and the Mines 
Department; 
• by seeking government assistance in the form of advice, machinery, 
and ever-increasing funding for a road, surface prospecting, crosscutting, 
and driving on the reefs; 
• by claiming that government assistance was thrust upon the 
company, unsought, and implying that a much larger amount was offered 
than was the case; 
• and by using a man associated with the company who was also a 
member of the governing party to seek financial assistance from the 
government. 
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None of these methods were unique to this company, but its career is a 
useful case study of how, despite all these efforts, an under-capitalised 
mining company could not succeed unless large amounts of very good ore 
were discovered. And Dunsheath was hardly unique in being tempted to 
produce misleading assays for the purpose of obtaining capital.  
As in the 1880s, the Tui district had not proved payable, although a 




Figure 1: ‘Lode-pattern in the Waiorongomai and Te Aroha area’, based 
on geological survey of 1911 and information provided by Alistair Isdale on 
the Tui mines, in Gordon Williams, Economic Geology of New Zealand 
(Melbourne, 1965), p. 121. 
 
Figure 2: Bo Stent, ‘Tui Creek Mines: Centres of Mining Interest’, in 
Kevin Wells, The Noble Aroha: Te Aroha Mountain: Celebrating Te Aroha 
125 years (1880-2005) (Te Aroha, 1905), p. 59; used with permission. 
 
Figure 3: Plan attached to application for Special Quartz Claim, 11 
August 1948, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, Mining Applications 1948, 6/1948 
[B.J. Dunsheath file], BCDG 11289/4a, ANZ-A [Archives New Zealand/Te 
Rua Mahara o te Kawanatanga, Auckland Regional Office]; used with 
permission. 
 
Figure 4: Plan showing location of applications for prospecting rights 
and the Te Aroha water catchment area, 1948, Te Aroha Warden’s Court, 
Mining Applications 1948, [B.J. Dunsheath file], BCDG 11289/4a, ANZ-A 
[Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Kawanatanga, Auckland 
Regional Office]; used with permission. 
 
Figures 5-15 are taken from Auckland Smelting Company 
Limited, ‘Base Metals Mine at Te Aroha: Lead, Copper, Zinc, also 
Gold and Silver’, (broadsheet, Te Aroha, 1948), J.B. McAra Papers; 
used with permission. 
 
Figure 5: ‘Excavating Site for Mine Buildings at 1600 feet’. 
                                            
561 See paper on pollution and Norpac, a chronology to 1980. 
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Figure 6: ‘Members of Staff ‘. 
 
Figure 7: ‘Preparing foundations for compressor and engine. “Jeep in 
foreground’. 
 
Figure 8: ‘Close-up of work’. 
 
Figure 9: ‘Engineer’s Shop, Smithy, Engine Room, Change Room and 
Crib’. 
 
Figure 10: ‘At portal of Drive, Tip Head Staging and Chutes’. 
 
Figure 11: ‘Type of Country through which road has been cut’. 
 
Figure 12: ‘View of Mine Portal with Bins, Staging, Staircase, Vee 
Chute, etc’. 
 
Figure 13: ‘Top end of Road viewed from Mine Staging’. 
 
Figure 14: ‘Chevrolet Four-wheel drive loading up at Bin’. 
 
Figure 15: ‘Mine Manager [J.B. McAra] at Mine Entrance’. 
 
Figure 16: [J.B. McAra], ‘Tui Mine Workings, looking north-east, 
August 1952’, Mines Department, MD 1, 23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W 
[Archives New Zealand The Department of Internal Affairs Te Tari 
Taiwhenua]; used with permission. 
 
Figure 17: [J.B. McAra], ‘Sketch Plan, Tui Mine, Five Levels Driven, 
Aug. 1952’, noting work still to be done, Mines Department, MD 1, 
23/2/1218, Part 2, ANZ-W [Archives New Zealand The Department of 
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